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Abstract

ATTITUDINAL RESPONSES TO MIXED EVIDENCE: THE ROLE OF ATTITUDE
EXTREMITY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN EFFECTING CHANGE VERSUS
RESISTANCE

By Jessica M. Barber, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Major Director: Natalie J. Shook,
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology
Four studies investigated the effects of attitude extremity and political ideology on the
degree and direction of changes in issue attitudes following the presentation of mixed evidence.
Based upon previous work, it was predicted that those holding relatively more extreme attitudes
would resist changing those views when presented with a mixture of supporting and opposing
statements and would potentially adopt more extreme evaluative positions – a phenomenon
known as attitude polarization (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Evaluative entrenchment or
intensification was also expected among more politically conservative participants, based upon
prior work describing cognitive rigidity and resistance to change as more characteristic of the
political right than left (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). An interaction of
attitude extremity and political ideology was also hypothesized, such that liberal individuals with
moderate attitudes were expected to demonstrate the least propensity to polarize.
Participants’ attitudes regarding abortion rights (Study 1), gun control (Study 2), tax
increases (Study 3), and environmental preservation (Study 4) were assessed before and after

reading statements that both opposed and supported the issue. Political ideology was also
assessed, along with several individual difference factors. Across all four studies, attitude
extremity significantly predicted evaluative change, although the pattern of that effect varied.
Political ideology did not emerge consistently as a predictor of attitude change; however,
significant interactive effects of extremity and ideology were found. In addition, several
individual difference factors (i.e., gender, need for cognition, issue importance) were found to
moderate the effects of the primary predictors on attitude change, and some divergent result
patterns were found when comparing data from a college and non-college sample in Study 4.
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that attitude extremity and political ideology
influence the degree and direction of evaluative change following the presentation of mixed
evidence. In addition, they identify other factors at work in effecting change versus resistance,
thereby highlighting the multi-faceted and complex nature of persuasion in a political context.

Attitudinal Responses to Mixed Evidence: The Role of Attitude Extremity and Political Ideology
in Effecting Change versus Resistance
In contemporary US politics, political discourse often seems more like partisan grandstanding and drum-beating than effective deliberation in the interest of arriving at consensus.
The summer 2011 dead-locked talks over if and how to raise the national debt ceiling in order to
avoid a government default provide a poignant but by no means atypical example of inflexibility
in Washington. Even with so much at stake, and despite bipartisan “negotiations” extending into
weekends and holidays, the deadline loomed ever larger with no viable resolution in sight. Many
of these inter-party talks were convened in an effort to present balanced and fair arguments about
the merits and limitations of both sides’ opinions in the interest of arriving at a reasonable,
unbiased solution. Democratic and Republican leaders alike asserted the importance of arriving
at such a solution, and yet for weeks, bipartisan discussions resulted in little more than each side
espousing the superiority of its preferred budget plan and accusing the other of irrational and
irresponsible bull-headedness. Why is compromise so difficult to achieve?
The “debt debacle” was infused with a variety of staunchly endorsed attitudes
surrounding the debt ceiling, balancing the budget, spending cuts, and tax increases.
Congressional players, party leaders, and even the president voiced strong evaluative positions
on these issues beginning early in the negotiation process; the bipartisan budget talks did little to
ease the in-fighting and certainly did not convince those involved to loosen their hold on their
initial attitudinal positions willingly. In fact, discussion of these varied views prompted many
individuals to cling to their original attitudes with even greater intensity and in some cases may
have led some to shift their evaluative stance to an even more extreme version of the view they
previously held. The propensity for individuals advocating an extreme attitude about a particular

1

target or issue (politicians and laymen alike) to adopt an even more extreme attitude following
exposure to a mix of supportive and oppositional evidence is a phenomenon known as attitude
polarization (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Applied to the recent debt crisis, attitude polarization
may help to explain how an issue of national importance (averting a default), negotiations aimed
at achieving compromise (bipartisan budget talks), and extreme attitudes (e.g., “we cannot
increase taxes,” “we must increase taxes”) came together to form a “perfect storm” that brought
the nation perilously close to economic disaster.
In order to make sense of the deliberation gridlock – and the rarity of truly bipartisan
consensus in general – it may be helpful to consider factors underlying the chaotic and
frustrating climate prevailing in Washington. How does political ideology affect bipartisan
negotiations? Do allegiances to one’s party or to one’s pre-conceived notions make compromise
and consensus impossible? Very generally, do liberals and conservatives differ in their
propensities to compromise versus polarize? Or do close-mindedness, intolerance of alternative
views, and resistance to attitude change describe the political left and right equally well?
Political Ideology
For more than six decades, researchers have investigated the underlying differences
between political liberals and their conservative counterparts. Over that time, a plethora of
theories have been advanced regarding such individual differences as personality characteristics,
epistemic and existential motivations, and sociopolitical orientations that are purported to capture
the essence of the distinction between those on the ideological right versus left. Researchers
uncovering these distinctions view them as meaningful diagnostic differences that, taken
together, paint a picture of individuals on the political right as less open, less tolerant, and less
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flexible than those on the left, who are pictured as valuing fairness and equality over authority
and convention and emphasize the progressive potential of change.
Personality differences. Theories surrounding the personality differences between
individuals on the political left and right began to emerge in the midst of the Second World War.
One of the earliest systematic treatments of these differences was described by Nazi psychologist
Erich Jaensch (1938), who proposed two personality types that differed in their propensity to
become “good” or “bad” Nazis. The J-Type was characterized by decisiveness, persistence,
aggression, and allegiance to tradition and established leaders; Jaensch (1938) looked favorably
on J-Types, as he considered them to be predisposed to make good Nazis. In contrast, the SType personality profile consisted of ambiguous and indefinite decision making, lack of
perseverance, eccentricity, and “perceptual slovenliness” (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008);
S-Types were considered weak and inferior fodder for Nazism.
Jaensch’s (1938) personality distinctions were later echoed by a group of American
researchers known as the “Berkeley team,” although the connotation surrounding the inherent
“goodness” or “badness” of the two types was, in essence, reversed. In an attempt to explain and
understand the rise of Fascism during the 1930s and 1940s that culminated in regimes such as
Nazism in Germany and Italian Fascism under Mussolini during World War II, Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) published The Authoritarian Personality, a seminal
work that focused on the development and defining features of authoritarianism, as well as the
link between authoritarianism and vulnerability to the influence of Fascism. Adorno et al. (1950)
contended that harsh parenting styles resulting from economic hardships contributed to the
development of a stable personality profile characterized by obedience to authority figures and a
tendency to punish social outcasts and scapegoats. According to Adorno and colleagues (1950),
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this combination of anxious devotion to authority and to conventionalism coupled with
vindictiveness toward out-groups was particular to political conservatives; liberal individuals, by
and large, did not possess or exhibit authoritarian personalities and tendencies, due at least in
part to differences in their early childhood experiences and upbringing.
Because of this underlying difference, Adorno et al. (1950) concluded that a personality
assessment aimed at identifying the presence of antidemocratic tendencies could reliably
differentiate high and low authoritarians and that this differentiation, in turn, would allow for the
prediction of which individuals were most susceptible to Fascist propaganda in the general U.S.
population. The researchers developed and validated a measure of “implicit antidemocratic
tendencies,” the F-scale, which was purported to identify individuals whose personality make-up
(as determined via their responses to the measure) predisposed them to the influence of Fascist
propaganda and put them at risk of becoming Fascists themselves.
Since then, several lines of research have examined differences between conservatives
and liberals in terms of personality traits. In an effort to improve upon the methodological
weaknesses of the Berkeley team’s (1950) F-scale, Wilson (1973) and colleagues (e.g., Wilson &
Patterson, 1968) developed a measure of general conservatism called the C-scale. Dissatisfied
with the use of all positive, statement-form attitude scales in the F-scale, Wilson (1973) devised
a scale that required individuals to report their immediate, affective reactions to a series of
pertinent buzz words and phrases (e.g., “death penalty,” “evolution”), which he contended were
truer predictors of actual behavior. High scores on the C-scale revealed a syndrome of
conservative characteristics, including right-wing political orientation, religious fundamentalism,
preference for convention, and intolerance of minorities. Those who scored lower on the C-
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scale, in contrast, generally aligned themselves with the political left, preferred change over the
status quo, and were more tolerant of minorities and out-groups.
Others have focused on differences in openness to experience as an underlying distinction
between the ideological right and left (Altemeyer, 1996; McCrae, 1996; Riemann, Grubich,
Hempel, Mergli, & Richter, 1993; Ray, 1983; Stone; 1981; van Hiel & Mervielde, 1996).
Eysenck (1954) first proposed that political liberals were generally higher in sensation-seeking
and extraversion than were conservatives and that these discrepancies in need for (i.e., tolerance
of) stimulation were, in part, biologically based. Results from these and other studies have
consistently demonstrated significant negative correlations between conservatism and openness.
That is, political conservatives consistently score lower on the personality domain of openness to
experience (characterized by open-mindedness, empathy, novelty-seeking, and intellectual
curiosity) than do liberal individuals. In an effort to further generalize this pattern of results, van
Hiel, Kossowska, and Mervielde (2000) assessed the ideological positions and personality
profiles of a cross-national sample of European students, non-students, and political party
members. Even in this diverse sample, van Hiel and colleagues (2000) found conservatism to be
related to lower scores on the openness subscale of the NEO personality inventory (NEO-PI-R;
Costa & McCrae, 1992). Liberals, in contrast, scored significantly higher on the openness
subscale. Van Hiel et al.’s (2000) findings strongly suggest that the relationship between trait
levels of openness to experience and conservatism are not particular to US college samples. That
the openness-ideology link has been found and replicated across cultures, age groups, and levels
of political participation bolsters the claim that differences in a key facet of personality –
openness to experience – may underlie individual differences in political ideology.
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During the 1980s and 1990s, Altemeyer worked to improve upon previous attempts to
define conservatism by developing a theory of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Building
upon what he saw as the admirable but incomplete foundations laid by the Berkeley research
team (1950) and others (e.g., Wilson, 1973), Altemeyer sought to develop a more
methodologically sound formulation of the concept of authoritarianism. At the core of
Altemeyer’s RWA lay three covarying attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission (i.e.,
obedience to established authority figures and institutions), authoritarian aggression (i.e.,
aggressive tendencies directed at out-groups and other targets as sanctioned by established
authorities), and conventionalism (i.e., strict adherence to societal norms and traditions endorsed
by authorities). Importantly, Altemeyer (1981) argued that the RWA profile required the
convergence of all three elements: An individual had to report or exhibit evidence of submission
to authorities, aggression toward out-groups, and adherence to tradition in order to be labeled
high in RWA. Through several iterations, Altemeyer created a measure of RWA that combined
what he saw as the most interconnected and pertinent items from pre-existing measures (e.g., Fscale, C-scale, dogmatism scale). Altemeyer’s scale has been shown to correlate with right-wing
political party allegiance, desire for conventionalism, religious fundamentalism, and prejudice
(e.g., Altemeyer, 1981).
Another personality factor of empirical study has been intolerance of ambiguity. In 1949,
Frenkel-Brunswick first investigated intolerance of ambiguity, which she conceptualized as a
proneness for dichotomous (i.e., “black and white”) thinking, rigid categorization of the social
world and its norms, and a preference for clear distinctions as opposed to qualified statements
and comparisons. Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) explained the source of this intolerance in Freudian
terms: the antecedents of intolerance of ambiguity were emotional conflict with one’s parents
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coupled with a simultaneous tendency to idealize them. Later researchers developed a new
theoretical perspective of intolerance of ambiguity, focusing instead on perceptions of the
ambiguous as threatening and the familiar as safe (e.g., Budner, 1962). Intolerance of ambiguity,
it was theorized, led conservative individuals to cling to convention, seek certainty, and resist
consideration of new and relevant information once a decision has been reached (Furnham &
Ribchester, 1995).
Finally, Tomkins (1963) advanced the theory of ideo-affective polarity, which focused on
the role of affect in the development and maintenance of ideological orientations, as well as the
pervasiveness of such orientations into nearly all aspects of life. According to Tomkins (1963),
there are two broad orientations toward the world: one associated with liberty and humanism
(LEFT) and one concerned with rule following and normative focus (RIGHT). Through
emotional experiences in early childhood, individuals come to prefer and adopt one of these
orientations. Tomkins (1963) argued that one’s general orientation, either to the left or to the
right, pervaded not only one’s political life but also such domains as mathematics, literature, and
science. For example, according to Tomkins’ theory, a left-oriented individual would approach
the disciplines of politics, art, music, mathematics, science, education, etc. from the same general
perspective: that each is an opportunity to tap into and express human creativity and improve
upon the human condition. For a right-oriented person, in contrast, the appeal and aim of art,
science, and politics lies in adhering to rules, developing discipline, and establishing and
preserving certainty. Because of this interconnectedness, Tomkins (1963) believed that knowing
an individual’s beliefs and focus in one domain afforded you knowledge of his or her views in
other domains.
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Epistemic and existential motives. Early work into the defining characteristics of
conservatism focused on not only personality traits but also individual motivation. In contrast to
more static personality theories of conservatism, Huntington (1957) maintained that the
conservative ideology was necessarily wedded to particular historical and political situations.
That is, certain environmental elements, most notably threats to the established social order, set
the stage for the adoption and embracing of conservative views. Huntington (1957) described
political conservatism as a cluster of general tendencies geared toward the preservation of
existing institutions and established inequalities and characterized conservatives as fearful of
challenges to the established order. Huntington (1957) posited that this opposition to change was
rooted in a concern that abandoning the status quo could leave a society vulnerable to chaos,
lawlessness, and general upheaval. Huntington’s investigations constitute some of the earliest
work identifying motivational factors as elements important to the description of conservatism
specifically.
More recently, several researchers have theorized that ideological differences are based
upon underlying differences in personal motivation. Lay epistemic theory (LET; Kruglanski,
1989) holds that an individual’s belief system is the consequence of motivated information
searches that have both cognitive and motivational components. Of central importance to LET is
the motivational construct of need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), which
refers to the desire to hold a firm belief – any firm belief – as opposed to experiencing
uncertainty and confusion. Although such a preference for a solidified, coherent belief system
could lead to the endorsement of any established ideology, research has shown a greater need for
closure among political conservatives than among political liberals (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon,
1999). In explaining this pattern, Jost et al. (1999) contended that the need for cognitive closure
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is better served by a belief system that advocates conventionalism and maintenance of the status
quo (i.e., conservatism) than by one built around the principles of change and continual
progression (i.e., liberalism).
Conservatives and liberals also differ in terms of their focus and goals. Work in the
regulatory focus tradition (e.g., Higgins, 1997, 1998) has shown that political conservatives are
more apt to adopt a “prevention focus” toward achieving goals, which is categorized by avoiding
unpleasantness (e.g., failure, danger) and adhering to duty and obligation in an effort to achieve
goals of safety and responsibility fulfillment (i.e., “ought goals”). In contrast, political liberals
tend to adopt a “promotion focus,” whereby they seek out and approach pleasantness (e.g.,
success, satisfaction) as a means of achieving goals related to personal growth and advancement
(i.e., “ideal goals”). These two foci mesh with characterizations of conservatives as preferring
the familiar to the novel and being uncomfortable with change and liberals as endorsing change
and the pursuit and tolerance of the non-traditional.
Sociopolitical orientations. In contrast to the individual difference and motivational
approaches outlined above, there also exist sociopolitical theories of the differences between
liberals and conservatives. Specifically, these theories emphasize the role of existing social
systems and the functional consequences of adopting a conservative versus liberal view. These
theories also seek to explain the connection between many aspects of social conservatism and
such problems as sexism, ethnocentrism, and intolerance.
Social dominance theory is one such sociopolitical approach to understanding differences
between liberals and conservatives. According to social dominance theory, the drive to sustain
human societies leads to the creation of belief systems aimed at justifying the relative standing of
various groups within the social hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Because these belief
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systems seek to justify and uphold the status quo, they are inherently conservative ideologies. In
addition to these societal belief systems, there are individual-level differences in the extent to
which one endorses or denounces them. Those who are high in social dominance orientation
(SDO) think about their social world in hierarchical terms and are motivated to preserve the
dominance of high-status groups (e.g., Whites, men, upper-class), whereas low-SDO individuals
view the world in more egalitarian terms and show a preference for attenuating or dismantling
the established social hierarchy (Sidanius, 2010). Factor analysis of the SDO scale has revealed
two underlying factors: a desire for dominance based on group membership and opposition to
group equality (Jost & Thompson, 2000). These dimensions are clearly reminiscent of elements
highlighted by earlier researchers, such as adherence to conventionalism and authoritarian
aggression.
Social dominance theory endeavors to explain conservative, “hierarchy-enhancing”
orientations among society’s higher-level groups. At first glance, it would seem that members of
groups lower in the existing social hierarchy (e.g., women, racial and religious minorities) would
tend to be oriented toward attenuating that hierarchy, motivated by a desire to end or overthrow
the established order to improve their relative standing in society. Paradoxically, however, high
SDO scores and propensities to preserve the status quo are found among historically and socially
oppressed groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994). A complementary theory, system justification theory
(SJT), offers an explanation for right-wing/conservative allegiance among lower status groups
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Thompson, 2000). According to SJT, individuals rationalize
existing social systems in terms of fairness and legitimacy, thereby perpetuating hierarchical
ideologies and social systems. Individuals from historically disadvantaged groups are presumed
to feel a great deal of dissonance between the need to support the current system and the
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suffering they endure because of their place in it. Paradoxically, this can lead some members of
lower-status groups to even more strongly endorse and support the system as a means of
reducing the dissonance (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a). Motivations to view the
world as a just and fair place (Lerner, 1980) may also help to explain hierarchy-endorsing
orientations and conservative tendencies among low-status groups.
There is a strong and substantial body of empirical work documenting the personality,
motivational, and sociopolitical differences between liberals and conservatives. Across a variety
of research domains, empirical work has shown that features such as intolerance for ambiguity,
heighted need for closure, and preference for the status quo and existing inequalities are
characteristic of the political right. In turn, the profile of the political left consists of openness,
tolerance, and preference for change and equality. The picture of political orientation that
emerges is one of necessary juxtaposition between openness on the left and the rigidity on the
right.
Rigidity of the Right
Several studies provide direct evidence that mental rigidity and resistance to change are
uniquely characteristic of the political right. Altemeyer’s program of research surrounding rightwing authoritarianism has consistently demonstrated that high scores on the RWA scale are
positively correlated with dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, prejudice toward out-group
members, and political conservatism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).
In a series of cross-national studies in the 1970s, Altemeyer collected data from US and
Canadian college students from large, urban, geographically diverse universities. Participants
completed a battery of measures, including Adorno et al.’s Fascism (F) scale, Rokeach’s
dogmatism (D) scale, Wilson’s conservatism (C) scale, and Altemeyer’s RWA scale. Across
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samples, high RWA scores covaried with a) preference for conservative political parties, b)
religious fundamentalism and acceptance of parents’ (i.e., established) religion, and c) dogmatic
adherence to ideological beliefs. In contrast, individuals scoring low on the RWA scale reported
less support for fundamentalist forms of religion and greater open-mindedness in regards to
alternative views; low RWA scores were also positively correlated with preference for leftleaning political parties. These findings provide evidence that RWA is associated with a host of
factors related to mental rigidity, including dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and prejudice.
In addition, Altemeyer’s work indicates that higher RWA scores are more characteristic of the
political right than the political left.
An interesting study conducted by Conover and Feldman (1981) explored the ways in
which average citizens come to categorize themselves and others as “liberal” versus
“conservative.” Using data collected during the 1976 National Election Study, Conover and
Feldman (1981) examined the relationship between individuals’ self-reported political
identification on a scale from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative) and their ratings
of several factors potentially underlying their definitions of what it means to be liberal versus
conservative. Results indicated that one of the most important and frequently reported
explanations for what differentiates conservatives and liberals was “change”: those surveyed
tended to view openness to change and progress as a defining feature of liberalism, whereas
resistance to change was seen as a calling card of conservatism. Conover and Feldman’s (1981)
work shows that characterizations of the political right as more resistant to change than the left
are not limited to experts, political elites, or others well-versed in the psychological distinctions
between liberals and conservatives: The difference in reactions to change are so fundamental as
to be apparent to the average citizen.
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In an effort to integrate theories of the epistemic, existential, personality, and ideological
motivations underlying conservatism, Jost and colleagues (2003a) conducted a large-scale metaanalysis, incorporating 88 samples from 12 different countries. The researchers found
conservatism to be significantly negatively correlated with integrative complexity (r = -.20; d = .41), openness to experience (r = -.32; d = -.68), and uncertainty tolerance (r = -.27; d = -.57).
Conservatism was found to be significantly positively correlated with dogmatism/intolerance of
ambiguity (r = .34; d = .73); needs for order, structure, and closure (r = .26; d = .54); fear of
threat or loss (r = .18; d = .38); mortality salience (r = .50; d = 1.20); and system instability (r =
.47; d = 1.08). Based on this pattern of significant correlations, Jost et al. (2003a) concluded that
the various correlates and manifestations of conservatism (e.g., epistemic needs, social system
concerns, openness, and ideological dogmatism) are diverse but connected.
Specifically, Jost and colleagues (2003a, 2003b) proposed that conservatism can best be
conceptualized as a form of motivated social cognition, thereby integrating factors related to
epistemic and existential motivations, personality propensities, and sociopolitical orientations.
Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) argued that the two defining aspects of political conservatism are
opposition/resistance to change and acceptance of/preference for inequality. Further, the
researchers held that psychological motives to manage uncertainty and fear explained these
dimensions: A desire to manage uncertainty is at the root of change resistance, and the need to
manage fear manifests as a preference for inequality (whereby out-group members are kept at a
safe distance). The researchers contended that these underlying psychological foci explain the
otherwise widely varied constellation of motivations, personality differences, and belief systems
that characterize conservatism and serve to integrate various theoretical perspectives on
conservatism that have appeared over more than half a century’s worth of research. Specifically,
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Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) identified uncertainty and fear management as key motivational factors
underlying right-wing rigidity.
Over the past several decades, a number of empirical investigations have provided
evidence that conservatives are more cognitively rigid, more dogmatic, and more resistant to
change than are political liberals. Altemeyer’s research program has reliably demonstrated,
across samples and over time, that individuals differ in terms of their authoritarian aggression,
authoritarian submission, and conventionalism – and that higher levels of authoritarianism are
more characteristic of the political right than the political left. Conover and Feldman’s (1981)
large-scale study spoke to the primacy of differential responses to change as a core distinction
between liberals and conservatives – one so fundamental that average citizens based their
categorizations of the political right versus left upon it. More recently, Jost and colleagues (e.g.,
Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b) have argued and provided evidence that two psychological motivations
– managing uncertainty and staving off fear and threat – give rise to a pervasive pattern of
resistance to change and acceptance of inequality that is unique to political conservatism. Taken
together, these and other studies speak of an inherent distinction between liberals and
conservatives in terms of mental rigidity and change resistance, in which those on the right are
systematically more rigid and resistant than those on the left.
Ideological Extremism
Research trumpeting the “rigidity of the right” is not without its critics, however.
Contemporaries of Adorno and colleagues, including Shils (1954), Christie (1954), and Rokeach
(1960), attacked The Authoritarian Personality for its “lopsided” focus on the political right.
Barker (1963) and Smithers and Lobley (1978) sought to identify the presence of authoritarian
tendencies in both right-leaning and left-leaning elements of the political sphere. More recently,
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Greenberg and Jonas (2003) have challenged claims that motivations to reduce threat and
uncertainty are unique to the ideological conservative, arguing instead that both the far left and
the far right exhibit dogmatic adherence to convention and tolerance of inequality. These and
other opponents of the “rigidity of the right” contend that mental rigidity, preference for order
and control, and negative attitudes toward out-groups are not elements particular to political
conservatives but rather can be found in abundance at both extremes of the ideological spectrum.
Shils (1954) rejected the traditional view of the bipolar ideological continuum, anchored
at either end by the “extreme left” and “extreme right,” as too narrow. Pointing to tumultuous
political developments during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in Russia, Shils
(1954) called into question the conventional wisdom that authoritarianism (as defined by Adorno
et al., 1950) was a distinctly conservative phenomenon. Shils (1954) argued that the political
right and left were not necessarily diametrically opposed and that, in fact, the extreme endpoints
of the continuum (e.g., reactionaries/fascists on the far right; revolutionaries/communists on the
far left) were quite similar in terms of hostility toward civil liberties, political democracies,
parliamentary institutions, and individualism. Shils criticized the Berkeley team’s (1950)
treatment of authoritarianism as narrow-minded, biased, and methodologically unsound,
contending that the authors of The Authoritarian Personality had been blinded by their
misconceptions about a right-left dichotomy and had, as a result, overlooked meaningful
similarities at the ideological extremes.
Shils (1954) also took issue with Adorno et al.’s (1950) exclusive focus on personality
characteristics as the sole predictors of vulnerability to Fascist influence. According to Shils
(1954), the effects of one’s political context and broader social environment should not be
underestimated as a contributor to, or defense against, the adoption of authoritarian ideals. A
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climate of economic hardship, a charismatic leader, the ideological bent of the ruling regime, and
societal norms and institutional constraints can all affect the likelihood that an individual will
come to endorse and act upon underlying “antidemocratic tendencies.” Shils (1954) argued
vehemently that, by overlooking situational factors that could act as catalysts or constraints,
Adorno et al. (1950) came to view personality factors as overly diagnostic of vulnerability to
Fascism.
Additional, related concerns about the Berkeley team’s (1950) methods and conclusions
were raised by Christie (1954). In particular, Christie contended that much of the
methodological criticisms being lobbed at The Authoritarian Personality – and at the F-scale in
particular – stemmed from a lack of clarity as to the work’s theoretical underpinnings. Christie
saw The Authoritarian Personality as seriously lacking in theoretical integration and argued that
it was more accurately thought of as a descriptive summary of the development and validation of
several measures of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and Fascist predilections. Specifically, Christie
(1954) questioned the relationship between the F-scale and authoritarianism, noting that nowhere
in Adorno et al.’s (1950) work is the F-scale referred to as an authoritarianism scale. Christie
contended that, although the F-scale did appear to assess receptivity to Fascism (as demonstrated
in terms of convergent validity with other personality, attitudinal, and behavioral measures of
Fascism), the scale was insufficient to capture authoritarian tendencies on the political left,
especially among those ascribing to Communism. Focusing his attention on the smattering of
self-identified communists in Adorno et al.’s (1950) samples, Christie (1954) inferred that these
individuals scored low on the F-scale; further, he interpreted this as evidence that the F-scale is
not equipped to detect left-wing authoritarianism, which he saw as a very real concern.
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Spurred by what he viewed as an asymmetrical account of authoritarianism by Adorno et
al. (1950), Rokeach (1960) contended that mental rigidity, dogmatism, and close-mindedness
were not exclusive to political conservatives; rather, that these features appropriately
characterized individuals at either extreme of the ideological spectrum. Rokeach argued that
dogmatism and close-mindedness provided a robust cognitive framework upon which to
construct and interpret one’s social world, thereby warding off the anxiety of uncertainty and
satisfying one’s need to understand the world (or at least to feel as if one understands it). The
certainty afforded by black and white thinking, mental rigidity, and resistance to change would
presumably be equally appealing for those at either end of the political spectrum as a means of
preserving and protecting the values and identity that one holds dear. To this end, Rokeach
(1960) developed a measure of “general conservatism” or dogmatism, which he labeled the Dscale. This measure sought to identify individuals – at any point on the ideological continuum –
who exhibited mental rigidity, intolerance of alternative views, and stubborn adherence to their
ideological beliefs.
Barker (1963) compared scores on the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950) to scores on the Dscale (Rokeach, 1960) to examine the relation between the scales and the prevalence of
authoritarianism on the political right, left, and center. Using a sample of New York area
graduate students, Barker (1963) found that, although high F-scores were particular to rightleaning individuals, political leftists, rightists, and centrists did not differ in their dogmatism (D)
scores. Barker (1963) concluded that dogmatists on both the right and the left were more likely
than low D-scorers to voice strong opinions and to favor the censoring of the opposing side’s
view.
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A study conducted by Smithers and Lobley (1978) provides additional evidence that
dogmatism is not a uniquely right-wing phenomenon. The researchers administered a series of
opinion questions, as well as Rokeach’s dogmatism (D) scale and Eysenck’s radicalism (R)
scale, to a large sample of British college students. Results indicated that the dogmatism scores
of extreme leftist radicals (i.e., those who scored high on the R-scale) were virtually
indistinguishable from the D-scores of extreme conservatives. Smithers and Lobley (1978)
concluded that dogmatism looks and behaves very similarly in those at the ideological extremes,
be they radical or reactionary.
More recently, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) took issue with Jost et al.’s (2003a) claim
that motivations to avoid fear and reduce uncertainty underlie conservatism but not liberalism.
Citing historical examples of conservative movements that seemed to advocate change (e.g.,
Hitler’s Nazism, Mussolini’s Fascism) and leftist regimes that have resisted change and tolerated
inequality (e.g., Soviet Union, Communist China), Greenberg and Jonas (2003) contended that
motives to reduce fear and uncertainty can be – and are – served just as well by left-wing
orientations as by right-wing ones. The researchers focused particular attention on
authoritarianism and dogmatism in communist countries, arguing that staunch supporters of
established, leftist regimes are often just as ardent in their defense of the status quo and
intolerance of out-groups and deviants as the rigid conservatives highlighted by Jost et al.
(2003a). Based on these cases, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) proposed a two-factor model of
ideology, wherein ideological content (i.e., right-wing v. left-wing) and ideological rigidity
function as independent, orthogonal dimensions. The researchers argued that high levels of
rigidity and dogmatism were equally likely among those adhering to leftist and rightist
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ideologies, especially when one considers political movements and regimes beyond those found
in the United States.
Right-Wing Rigidity versus Ideological Extremity
The debate surrounding the proper conceptualization of the differences between liberals
and conservatives continues to rage. Indeed, the literature is so clouded that the work of several
groups of researchers is difficult to categorize as exclusively supportive of one side or the other.
A few have actually espoused different positions on the issue over the course of their programs
of study. For instance, although Eysenck (1954) contended that liberalism and conservatism
were based on different levels of extraversion and sensation-seeking (with conservatives being
less open), he also proposed a two-factor model of political orientation comprised of the
radicalism (R) of political-economic attitudes (traditional, right-to-left continuum) and “toughmindedness” versus “tender-mindedness” (T). Eysenck argued that the independent nature of the
R and T factors allowed for the existence of “tough-minded” liberals and “tender-minded”
conservatives.
Similarly, Huntington’s (1957) conceptualization of conservatism as situationally
determined seems to lend credence to both sides of the debate. Huntington (1957) contended
that underlying individual differences between political liberals and conservatives do exist, in
terms of preference for existing institutions and inequalities. However, he also theorized that,
because conservatism was situational, political liberals could, paradoxically, end up thinking and
behaving as conservatives when the established regime was itself left-leaning and/or challenges
to established equality and fairness threatened these tenets of the liberal ideal.
In explaining the implications of their work on terror management theory (TMT) and
ideology, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Chatel (1992) contended that mortality
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salience need not give rise to political conservatism exclusively. Although earlier work (e.g.,
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) found evidence of a “conservative shift” in terms of
prejudice toward out-groups following a mortality salience manipulation, Greenberg and
colleagues (1992) argued that reminders of death can lead to the defense of whichever
ideological view, liberal or conservative, the individual held dear. Empirical studies have shown
that, when forced to imagine their mortality, liberal and conservative individuals react
differently. Among conservatives, exposure to death reminders has been shown to lead to
increased support for the use of military force (Pyszczynski et al., 2006), heightened prejudice
toward out-group members (e.g., Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008), and greater endorsement of
conservative stances on moral issues such as abortion rights (Weise, Pyszczynski, Rothschild, &
Greenberg, 2007, cited in Anson, Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2009). In contrast,
mortality salience inductions show mixed results among liberals. In some studies (e.g., Weise,
Arcizewski, Verhilliac, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg 2007, cited in Anson et al., 2007), death
reminders gave rise to “liberal shifts” (i.e., increased importance placed on liberal moral issues
such as gay marriage and affirmative action), but in others (e.g., Weise, Pyszczynski, et al.,
2007), no significant shifts – in a liberal OR conservative direction – were found among political
liberals. Studies pertaining to terror management theory suggest that individuals react to and
buffer against mortality salience in different ways based upon their ideological belief systems.
Amid their studies of the relationship between conservatism and openness to experience,
van Hiel et al. (2000) uncovered a few subsamples in which the overall negative correlation with
political conservatism did not emerge. Specifically, the researchers’ sample of Polish adults
showed a much weaker negative correlation between openness and conservatism. Van Hiel and
colleagues (2000) suggested that this attenuation could be due to Poland’s history of and
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transition from Communist (leftist) rule. In addition, members of both leftist and rightist
Flemish political parties did not show the overall negative correlation between conservatism and
openness, as was found in the other Flemish samples. This finding (or lack thereof) could be
interpreted as evidence that ideological extremism, and not necessarily conservatism, is
characterized by less openness.
The debate between the “rigidity of the right” and “ideological extremism” hypotheses
has raged for nearly as long as the study of differences underlying political conservatives and
liberals and shows little sign of abating (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Greenberg & Jonas,
2003). Research over more than six decades and across myriad domains has produced no
consensus in terms of whether resistance to change, dogmatism, and close-mindedness are more
appropriately conceptualized as characteristic of the ideologically right-leaning or the
ideologically extreme. One means of shining light on this debate is to focus directly on one of
the elements at its core: reactions to persuasive communications. Much research surrounding
ideological differences has focused on general propensities to entertain versus reject alternative
points of view (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Rokeach, 1960; van Hiel et al., 2000; Jost et al.,
2003a, 2003b). However, comparatively little work has focused specifically on how liberals
versus conservatives react to targeted attempts to change their attitudes. Although the “rigidity
of the right” and “ideological extremism” approaches lead to divergent predictions regarding
whose attitudes would be susceptible versus resistant to change, to date no studies have directly
examined how one’s ideology and prior attitudes influence his or her reactions to persuasion
attempts. Work surrounding attitude change and persuasion may provide much-needed insight
into the patterns and predictors of attitude change versus resistance among political liberals and
conservatives.
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Attitude Polarization: What Explains “When Persuasion Backfires”?
Within psychology, there has been a lengthy history of empirical investigation into the
causes and consequences of resistance to persuasion. As early as the 1930s, researchers
investigating social and political attitudes uncovered paradoxical patterns of attitude change,
particularly following exposure to “both sides” of an issue. Thouless’s examinations of fervent
religious beliefs led him to develop the “Principle of Certainty,” which held that individuals’
initial acceptance or rejection of a religious belief came to be defended with even more
conviction following exposure to “influences acting both in the direction of acceptance and of
rejection” (Thouless, 1935, p. 24). Instead of having a “sobering” or moderating effect on
religious attitudes such that the majority of individuals came to hold their original attitude with
less conviction, mixed evidence gave rise to a marked split in opinion, with individuals
becoming more assured of their initial attitude following its presentation. In a similar vein,
Thurstone’s (1945) comparison of attitudes at various stages of political campaigns revealed that
the attitudinal distribution took on a distinctly bimodal character as campaigns neared their end.
This suggested that, as the campaign progressed, the presentations of multiple issue positions and
varying views on the candidates’ merits actually led the populace (in the aggregate) to adopt
more polarized positions on the candidates and issues. These early investigations suggested that,
once formed, social and political attitudes could be extremely resistant to change, even when the
attitude holder was confronted with a seemingly balanced presentation of supporting and
opposing evidence.
Later work into group-level attitude change built upon and clarified the findings of
Thouless and Thurstone. Studies along these lines uncovered not only propensities to resist the
alteration of initial attitudes in response to persuasive messages but also instances in which
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attitudes actually shifted “outward,” becoming even more extreme in terms of positivity or
negativity. The term “attitude polarization” came to describe this increase in the extremity of
attitudes from their initial starting position and has received frequent and varied empirical
treatment among researchers in domains ranging from impression formation to political
campaigning.
Discussion-induced polarization. An early investigation into discussion-induced
attitude polarization among small groups was conducted by Myers (1975). In two studies,
participants formed small groups, read information about pay raise recommendations for
hypothetical faculty members (Study 1) or attitudes toward women (Study 2), and provided
preliminary pay raise recommendations or attitudes toward women. Next, groups were
instructed to carefully discuss the information provided and the general issue at hand. After
approximately ten minutes of discussion, each group’s recommendation for faculty pay raises
(Study 1) or attitude toward women (Study 2) was again assessed. Myers (1975) found that the
most polarization (i.e., outward shift in attitudes) occurred following discussions in like-minded,
homogeneous groups, suggesting that discussion in such groups served to bolster the group’s
unanimous opinion via either social comparison among individual discussants or informational
influence. Myers’ (1975) work indicates that exposure to and immersion in one point of view on
an issue – one that you happen to already support – could lead to an “outward” shift in grouplevel attitudes. Of note, however, is that Myers (1975) did not assess the degree or direction of
attitude change at the individual level but focused instead on the aggregate outcome of group
discussion.
More recently, Baron et al. (1996) investigated the role of social corroboration in
promoting opinion extremity. The researchers hypothesized that receiving corroboration of a
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categorical position on a particular issue would lead people to have more confidence in their
choice, which in turn would lead them to endorse it more strongly than they originally did (i.e.,
attitude polarization). The researchers demonstrated that participants became more extreme (i.e.,
shifted outward in the same direction as their starting attitude) in their ratings of a target’s
attractiveness, as well as pledged more money to charity, after having experienced social
corroboration of their categorical stances and judgments. Baron et al. (1996) also found
evidence that the relationship between social corroboration and opinion extremity was partially
mediated by confidence: Individuals who had received corroboration of their categorical views
were more certain of their position/rating and therefore came to endorse that position or rating
even more strongly than they had initially. Importantly, these studies demonstrated that
polarization in a group setting can and does occur even in the absence of a) the sharing of novel
persuasive information (informational influence) or b) the comparison of specific, quantitative
positions or attitudes (social comparison).
Thought-induced polarization. In addition to Myers’ investigations of group
polarization, other noted psychologists were attempting to tackle issues related to judgments,
attributions, and attitude change at the individual level. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Tesser and
colleagues examined attitude polarization in light of its relationship to deliberation and the
generation of relevant thoughts. For example, Tesser and Cowan (1975) assessed the effect of
thought versus distraction on impressions of hypothetical individuals based on trait adjective
descriptions. Participants first saw descriptions of hypothetical people (that contained either four
or eight adjectives) and provided an initial likeability rating of these target individuals on a scale
ranging from -7 (dislike strongly) to +7 (like strongly). Next, two individuals for whom they had
reported moderately positive attitudes (i.e., +3 to +4) and two who had been rated moderately
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negatively (i.e., -3 to -4) were selected for further consideration. For each target, participants
were instructed to form an impression based on the adjective descriptions provided. Half of the
participants then spent ninety seconds concentrating on and thinking about the target individual
(thought condition); the other half worked on unrelated multiple choice items for the same period
of time. After the ninety seconds had elapsed, all participants rated the target’s likeability again,
on the same scale as was presented originally.
Results revealed a main effect for thought, such that participants who had engaged in
deliberative thought about the target person between initial and posttest attitude assessments
demonstrated greater attitude polarization than did the distracted participants. In addition, Tesser
and Cowan (1975) found that those who had been presented with fewer adjectives initially
reported greater polarization and felt that they had “gone beyond the information given” more so
than did individuals who were provided with more adjectives. The researchers took this as
support for a meditational explanation of the link between thought and polarization called the
“thought-generation hypothesis.” According to Tesser and Cowan (1975), increased thought
about an attitude object leads to the generation of new cognitions that are consistent with (i.e., in
the same direction as) the originally held attitude. These additional thoughts serve to strengthen
the basis of the initial attitude, thereby giving rise to evaluative shifts outward following the
deliberation process. For Tesser (1976) and colleagues (e.g., Tesser and Cowan, 1975) then, an
increase in (evaluatively consistent) thoughts about a target explained the observed polarization
in attitudes about it.
Information-induced polarization. Other researchers posited different underlying
mechanisms to explain attitude polarization. To investigate if and why “first impressions” carry
such weight in our processing of subsequent information, Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975)
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conducted a series of interesting studies employing false feedback and debriefing. Participants
first completed a novel task that involved reading several suicide notes and choosing which were
real and which were created by the experimenters as a ruse. Next, participants randomly
received feedback stating that they were either more or less successful than “the average student”
at differentiating real from fake notes. Shortly after having received this false feedback,
participants were debriefed: The experimenter told them, in no uncertain terms, that the
performance feedback previously provided was completely bogus, randomly assigned, and not at
all indicative of their performance on the novel task. Following this disclosure, participants were
asked to rate their performance on the suicide note detection task, how successful they believed
they would be on similar tasks in the future, and how they felt their performance “stacked up” to
the average participant in the study. The experimenters also had participant observers watch
others perform the novel task and receive feedback, as well as hear the debriefing that explained
the irrelevance of the performance feedback. Results showed that both actors’ and observers’
perceptions of the actor’s success or failure based upon the phony feedback persisted, even after
being explicitly told via debriefing that the feedback was entirely invalid. That is, those who
originally received “success” feedback rated their (the actor’s) performance as better than
average, whereas individuals who had been provided with “failure” feedback reported that they
(the actor) did worse than average. Ross and colleagues (1975) coined the term “perseverance
effect” to describe this propensity to cling to initial impressions of oneself and others, even when
given definitive information that the basis for that perception is incorrect. The researchers found
that a standard “outcome” debriefing was not sufficient to correct participants’ perceptions; the
only thing that “undid” the effect of the phony feedback on actors’ and observers’ judgments was
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a process debriefing, which entailed explaining not only that the performance feedback was fake
but also that erroneous perceptions can persist even after debriefing.
In attempting to explain the perseverance effect, Ross and colleagues (1975) introduced
the concept of biased processing as a potential underlying mechanism. The researchers
hypothesized that, once individuals had received the faulty feedback, their subsequent views of
their (or the actor’s) performance were indelibly colored by that feedback, such that even being
told that the performance information was phony did not effectively remove the lens through
which participants saw themselves (or others). Ross et al. (1975) posited that this biased
processing of information about the self and others was pervasive and quite ubiquitous,
permeating perceptions of ourselves and the social world around us. Also, in the case of these
studies, even a debriefing process that explicitly and directly discounted the validity of the prior
information participants had received was insufficient to offset the perseverance effect. The
researchers noted, somewhat somberly, that real-world information is very rarely as unequivocal
or clear-cut as the debriefing procedure had been. If people’s perceptions and attributions can
persist in the face of definitive evidence of their erroneousness, what would we expect to occur
outside of the lab setting, in which information challenging our prior beliefs about ourselves and
others is generally much more ambiguous?
Building upon work related to the layman’s “shortcomings as an intuitive scientist”
(Ross, 1977) and belief perseverance (Ross et al., 1975), Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979)
conducted a now classic series of studies investigating attitude polarization via biased
assimilation. Lord et al. (1979) noted that, although exposing someone to both sides of an issue
is an intuitively appealing way to elicit more balanced views on the topic, the presentation of
mixed evidence can actually lead to a deeper entrenching and polarizing of original attitudes.
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Specifically, the researchers posited that the presentation of a mix of both supporting and
opposing views on a particular issue would lead those who held extreme views initially to adopt
an even more extreme evaluative stance due to the biased assimilation of the “balanced”
persuasive information. Lord et al. (1979) held that several biased assimilation processes might
be at work: Individuals might remember the strengths of supporting evidence but the weaknesses
of the opposing evidence; they might gauge supporting evidence as more relevant or reliable but
dismiss the “other side’s” arguments as irrelevant or unreliable; they might accept supporting
evidence at face value but scrutinize the opposing evidence deeply with an eye toward finding
flaws; and/or they could interpret limitations in the opposing arguments as necessarily indicative
of the correctness of the evidence supporting their stance. Whatever the particular process(es) at
work for an individual, Lord et al. (1979) believed that the outcome would be the same: This
biased assimilation of ostensibly balanced information would lead to attitude polarization among
those with extreme attitudes.
To test the relationship between attitude extremity and subsequent polarization, the
researchers first assessed participants’ attitudes toward capital punishment to identify those who
reported established pro-deterrence or established anti-deterrence attitudes. Participants were
considered proponents if they favored capital punishment, believed that it had a deterrent effect,
and felt that their opinion was supported by current research; those who opposed capital
punishment, doubted its effectiveness as a deterrent, and thought that relevant research supported
their view were labeled “opponents.” Both proponents and opponents were subsequently
presented with the general results of, as well as more detailed information about and refutations
of, two studies: one whose findings supported the effectiveness of capital punishment and one
that denounced its effectiveness as a deterrent. After having read the information provided about
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both studies, participants were asked to rate the quality of each study, as well as to evaluate their
current attitude toward capital punishment relative to the one they had expressed at the outset of
the study. Lord et al. (1979) found evidence of both biased assimilation and attitude
polarization. First, participants who were pro-capital punishment initially viewed the prodeterrence study as more sound, valid, and convincing than the anti-deterrence study; the exact
opposite evaluative pattern was found among anti-capital punishment participants. As both sets
of participants had actually read the same mix of information and had come to such divergent
conclusions regarding the studies’ relative merit, Lord et al. (1979) took this as evidence of
biased assimilation (i.e., individuals processing the information based upon their pre-existing
attitudes about the issue of capital punishment). Second, analyses of the link between initial
attitude and self-reported attitude change provided evidence of self-reported attitude polarization.
That is, pro-capital punishment participants felt that they were now even more positive about
capital punishment, whereas anti-capital punishment participants reported that their attitudes had
become even more negative than they were initially.
The foundations laid by Lord et al. (1979) and by Tesser (e.g., Tesser & Cowan, 1975;
Tesser, 1976) firmly established the phenomenon of attitude polarization as a legitimate
occurrence with sweeping practical implications, as well as a fertile area of empirical study. In
1993, Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd conducted a series of studies aimed at qualifying and
clarifying the process and scope of attitude polarization as defined by these two camps. This
work extended our knowledge of attitude polarization in two important ways. First, in both Lord
et al.’s (1979) and Tesser’s (1976) procedures, polarization was operationalized as participants’
self-reported attitude change from the beginning of the study to the end. Noting that selfassessed change and objectively determined movement were two different things, Miller and
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colleagues (1993) compared self-reported attitude change to directly assessed change or
polarization via a “trinary index” (i.e., comparison of posttest to pretest scores with +1 =
polarization, -1 = depolarization, and 0 = no change). Second, in an effort to gauge the practical
significance and outcomes of holding extreme or polarized attitudes, Miller and colleagues
(1993) assessed a behavioral consequence of attitude polarization: the strength and
persuasiveness of essays. Participants wrote an essay explaining their attitudinal stance on a
target issue, and these essays were subsequently rated in terms of convincingness and strength by
both the participant him- or herself (Study 3) and an independent reader (Study 4) in order to
determine if essays written by individuals who reported attitude polarization were more
persuasive than those of individuals who reported attitude depolarization.
Miller et al. (1993) first assessed individual’s attitudes toward capital punishment
(Studies 1 and 2) or affirmative action (Study 3) on a scale ranging from -50 (extreme
disagreement) to +50 (extreme agreement) to determine the direction (positive/negative) and
extremity (moderate/extreme) of their initial attitudes. From this continuous scale, the
researchers created four categories related to valence and extremity: attitudes between -36 and 50 were considered “extreme anti,” those between -1 and -35 as “moderate anti,” between +1 and
+35 as “moderate pro,” and between +36 and +50 as “extreme pro.” Next, participants read
arguments supporting both the pro- side and the anti- side of the issue at hand (as in Lord et al.,
1979), rated their perceived change in attitudes since the outset, and directly evaluated the issue
as they had at the beginning of the study. In Studies 2 and 3, participants then wrote an essay
either supporting or opposing the target issue and rated the convincingness of that essay; in
Study 4, other participants read and evaluated the previously written essays to provide an
observer’s perspective on the essay’s persuasiveness. Several interesting findings emerged.

30

First, Miller et al. (1993) found evidence of biased assimilation: Proponents of the target issue
found the pro- arguments to be more valid and convincing than the anti- arguments, and vice
versa for those who opposed the target issue. This preference for “my side’s” arguments was
more pronounced among participants with extreme views than among moderates. Second,
evidence of self-reported attitude change and polarization was found, with extreme individuals
generally reporting that their attitudes had become even more positive (or negative) than at the
outset but moderate participants reporting a depolarization, or change in the opposite evaluative
direction, of their initial views. Correlational analyses revealed a significant positive relation
between biased assimilation and self-reported polarization as well. However, in examining
actual difference scores (i.e., post-attitude minus pre-attitude), no evidence of attitude
polarization among “extremists” was found; only moderate participants demonstrated an actual
“outward” shift in their attitudes relative to their starting position. Finally, an investigation of
the link between extremity/polarization and the persuasiveness of participants’ essays revealed
that polarization was not significantly predictive of perceived essay quality or strength,
suggesting that the behavioral consequences of attitude polarization were minimal.
From these studies, Miller et al. (1993) reasoned that both information-induced attitude
polarization (e.g., Lord et al., 1979) and thought-induced attitude polarization (e.g., Tesser,
1976) are based, at least in part, on biased processing and assimilation of mixed persuasive
information. Given the discrepancy in their results based upon self-reported and directly
assessed attitude polarization, Miller and colleagues (1993) cautioned against an overly broad
generalization of Lord et al.’s (1979) findings and conclusions. Interestingly, the researchers did
not find nearly as much evidence of attitude polarization in Study 3, in which the target issue was
affirmative action. As a potential explanation, Miller and colleagues (1993) offered Liberman

31

and Chaiken’s (1991) value-conflict hypothesis, which posits that an attitude object that makes
salient two important but conflicting values will also bring to mind thoughts that are evaluatively
inconsistent; these ambivalent evaluations could essentially counteract one another, resulting in
relatively little polarization.
In response to work surrounding information-induced and thought-induced attitude
polarization, Harton and Latané (1997) investigated the role of issue involvement as a common
underlying feature that could explain both forms of the phenomenon. The “catastrophe theory of
attitudes” (Latané & Nowak, 1994) posits that not all attitudes are properly conceptualized as
continuous constructs. Whereas moderate attitudes are continuous in the sense that information
can sway people’s evaluations to become slightly more or less favorable, extreme attitudes are,
in essence, categorical in that one is either extremely positive or negative with no proverbial
middle ground representing an acceptable attitudinal position. Harton and Latané (1997) posited
that this “catastrophic” difference in the workings of moderate versus extreme attitudes was due
to increased issue involvement or importance in the latter case. If it is the importance one places
on a particular issue that determines whether his or her attitudes will depolarize or polarize, then
any process that heightens issue involvement should, theoretically, result in polarization. That is,
both information (Lord et al., 1979) and deliberation (Tesser, 1976) could presumably give rise
to attitude polarization, insofar as one feels that the target issue is important or personally
relevant.
To examine this meditational model, Harton and Latané (1997) compared thoughtinduced and information-induced attitude polarization, as measured via pretest-posttest
difference scores. At the outset of the studies, participants provided their initial attitudes about
several social issues (e.g., school vouchers, minority-preference programs) on scales ranging
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from -7 (extremely negative) to +7 (extremely positive). Next, participants either rated the issues
again (control), read mixed evidence about the issues (information), thought carefully about the
good and bad aspects of the issues (thought), or read mixed evidence and deliberated on the
issues (read + thought). Harton and Latané (1997) found that reading mixed evidence increased
both issue involvement and attitude polarization; moreover, involvement mediated the
relationship between information exposure and polarization. The researchers found more
polarization (in terms of difference scores) among individuals who initially viewed the issues as
less important than among those who viewed the issues as highly important at the outset. Harton
and Latané (1997) interpreted this pattern as evidence that increases in issue involvement, and
not simply baseline levels of involvement, affect the degree of subsequent attitude polarization.
Finally, the results indicated that thought alone did not increase importance or increase the
extremity of one’s attitudes, although the combined thought and information condition showed
levels of importance and extremity that approximated the information only condition. From this,
Harton and Latané (1997) concluded that information-induced polarization (e.g., Lord et al.,
1979) might be more common than thought-induced polarization (e.g., Tesser, 1976), at least in
part because exposure to a mix of information appeared to increase issue involvement to a
greater extent than did simply thinking about the issue at hand.
Biased assimilation in applied contexts. In the past decade, several groups of
researchers have examined the phenomena of biased assimilation and subsequent attitude
polarization with an eye toward more closely approximating real-world considerations such as
the presentation of and selective exposure to relevant information and attitudes toward
stigmatized groups or topics. As information relevant to a particular real-world judgment is
usually not all available at once, Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen (2001) examined the
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ways in which information is encountered, selected, and processed sequentially. Specifically, the
researchers were interested in determining if and how conformational biases (i.e., selecting viewsupporting information to a greater extent that view-opposing information) occur in a sequential
search for information. In response to a study prompt, participants initially decided whether or
not alternative healing methods should be covered by health insurance. Next, they had the
opportunity to select and read a mix of articles supporting and opposing the inclusion of
alternative methods in health coverage in one of two ways: They either selected and read articles
one at a time (sequential condition) or selected and read articles that were presented on an
exhaustive list (simultaneous condition). Afterward, participants were asked to make a final
decision concerning the proposed extension of health insurance. Jonas et al. (2001) found that
participants in the sequential condition demonstrated a larger confirmation bias than did those in
the simultaneous condition. That is, individuals who selected informational articles one by one
were much more likely to choose more articles that supported instead of opposed their initial
view than were participants who chose their desired information from the exhaustive list. The
researchers posited that the sequential presentation of information could have primed a “decision
focus” in participants, such that each new piece of information was compared to both their initial
decision and the prior accumulated information, which contributed to a greater focus on viewsupporting evidence. In contrast, those in the simultaneous presentation condition may have
adopted an “information focus,” in which processing was geared toward the connection and
integration of information. Jonas and colleagues (2001) felt that this more equal consideration of
evidence in the interest of generating a coherent and integrated view could explain why the
confirmation bias was less pronounced under conditions of simultaneous information
presentation. From this, the researchers warned that biased processing in a real-world setting
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might be even more prevalent than expected, given the sequential nature of information
presentation and selection.
In a related series of studies, Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt (2005) investigated
the effects of restricted information search and selective exposure as a means of testing the
nature and prevalence of biased information search under conditions of “limited” information.
Participants read a mix of positive and negative facts about a hypothetical employee and made a
preliminary decision about whether his contract should be extended or not. Following their
decision, participants were presented with the “gist” of several additional pieces of information
about the employee, half of which supported his continuation and half of which did not.
Participants were then asked to decide which of the additional snippets of information to read.
Results showed that, when information was restricted (i.e., participants could select only a
certain number of snippets to read), participants conducted a biased information search, in that
they selected more arguments that supported their preliminary decision than those that opposed
it. Subsequent studies supported Fischer et al.’s (2005) cognitive mediation explanation for the
findings. In essence, knowing that their information search was restricted prompted participants
to seek out what they thought to be the highest quality information; relying on the
assumption/heuristic that information supporting “my view” is of better quality, participants then
over-selected supporting information and under-selected opposing information. Interestingly,
this confirmation bias did not emerge for individuals placed under cognitive load, indicating that,
paradoxically, an interruption of people’s ability to seek out “quality information” may actually
lead them to be more balanced and fair in their selective exposure to persuasive arguments.
More recently, Boysen and Vogel have demonstrated the presence and implications of
biased assimilation and attitude polarization in the meaningful real-world context of attributions
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for stigmatized behaviors. Generally speaking, stigmatized behaviors that are attributable to
biological causes (e.g., genetics, chemical and hormonal levels) are perceived less negatively
than those attributable to “mere” psychological causes (e.g., stress, family support systems), in
large part due to perceptions of intent or control. However, Boysen and Vogel (2007) posited
that simply providing a biological explanation for something like homosexuality would not
necessarily lead to greater positivity among all people, as experimental studies aimed at reducing
negative attitudes toward homosexuality by offering biological explanations have produced
mixed results. Boysen and Vogel (2007) predicted that the extremity of one’s pre-existing
attitudes could determine whether this biological explanation resulted in more favorable attitudes
or greater resistance and polarization. Specifically, the researchers predicted that those who held
extremely negative attitudes toward homosexuality initially would be less likely to view the
biological explanations as persuasive evidence due to biased processing and/or outright rejection
of the counterattitudinal message. The end result could well be a deeper entrenchment of
negative attitudes toward homosexuality.
To examine the relationships among attitude extremity, biased processing, and attitude
polarization in response to biological explanations of homosexuality, Boysen and Vogel (2007)
had participants report their initial attitudes toward homosexuality, read short essays providing
biological explanations for it, and then report the degree (and direction) to which they felt their
attitudes had changed since the outset of the study (i.e., self-reported attitude change). As
predicted, results revealed a significant direction by extremity interaction, such that those with
extreme negative attitudes reported that their attitudes had actually become more negative,
whereas those with moderately negative, moderately positive, and extremely positive initial
attitudes all reported at least slightly positive change. In keeping with past work in the attitude
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polarization tradition, it seems that the persuasive evidence presented (i.e., biological
explanations of homosexuality) was filtered through the lens of participants’ pre-existing
attitudes, such that people viewed the information provided as supporting their view, regardless
of whether they were extremely negative or relatively more positive.
In another, closely related set of studies, Boysen and Vogel (2008) investigated biased
assimilation and attitude polarization in regards to mental health stigmas. After providing their
initial attitudes of either a low-control mental health condition (schizophrenia) or a high-control
condition (addiction), participants read and evaluated “educational information” about the
stigmatized condition that was comprised of either biological or psychosocial explanations.
They then self-reported the extent and direction of any change in their attitudes after having read
the information. As in their earlier study, Boysen and Vogel (2008) found that the educational
information was processed and used differently by those who had relatively negative or positive
initial attitudes. That is, those with negative initial attitudes saw the educational information as
supportive of their negative view (biased assimilation) and felt that their attitudes had become
more negative (attitude polarization); participants with positive attitudes at the outset viewed the
information as supportive of their positive opinions and polarized in a positive direction.
Empirical investigations into the phenomenon of attitude polarization have examined
many factors underlying resistance to persuasion and outward shifts in evaluative stance. Early
work (e.g., Thouless, 1938; Myers, 1975) focused primarily upon attitude change at the group
level and how deliberation among heterogeneous versus homogeneous groups of individuals led
to more or less group polarization. Later studies explored attitude polarization at the individual
level; in particular, the effects of initial attitude extremity, biased assimilation of mixed evidence
(Lord et al., 1979), cognitive deliberation (Tesser, 1978), and issue involvement (Harton &
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Latané, 1997) were subjected to empirical scrutiny in a variety of contexts. Work by Miller et al.
(1993) helped to clarify and fine-tune the methodological and analytic procedures for assessing
and interpreting attitude polarization, as well as assessed a potential behavioral consequence of
attitude polarization, the convincingness of subsequently written essays. This body of work
establishes attitude polarization as a real phenomenon, with known antecedents and predictable
and meaningful consequences.
Integrating Political Ideology and Attitude Polarization
Both political ideology and attitude polarization have a lengthy and rich history of
empirical study within social psychology. Despite this, a great deal of uncertainty and lack of
consensus remains, particularly within the ideological tradition. As one element associated with
ideological distinctions between the right and left is amenability versus resistance to change and
persuasion, it seems that the findings coming out of the attitude polarization tradition might serve
as a worthwhile topic of investigation within the ideology framework. If, as researchers
advocating the “rigidity of the right” contend, conservatives are more resistant to change and less
tolerant of opposing views than are liberals, one would expect greater propensities toward
attitude polarization among those on the political right as compared to those on the left. In
contrast, if ideological extremity of either flavor is equally well-characterized by resistance to
persuasion and change, one would expect equally high levels of polarization among extreme
leftists and rightists. It would seem that the attitude polarization literature offers a means of
further explaining differences between the ideological left and right, or between ideological
extremists and moderates. A few recent lines of empirical investigation have endeavored to
combine the realms of ideology and attitude polarization in an attempt to better our
understanding of both.
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Recently, work has sought to demonstrate the antecedents and consequences of extreme
attitudes in a political context. Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard, and Scheufele (2009) examined the
relationship between informal discussion networks and extreme attitudes toward a controversial
socio-political issue, stem cell research, during the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign.
Interestingly, Binder and colleagues (2009) focused not only on how political talk could instigate
the development of extreme attitudes but also whether holding extreme attitudes affected
individuals’ roles and influence in their discussion networks, as they hypothesized that extremity
may be both an impetus for and product of group discussions. Using data from the “Life Style
Study,” a national mail survey conducted in three waves (Feb 2002, Nov 2004, June-July 2005),
Binder et al. (2009) specified and compared causal models of both the “discussion  extremity”
and the “extremity  discussion” relations using structural equation modeling. Model
comparisons yielded support for both relationships. As predicted, individuals who reported more
extreme attitudes toward stem cell research in the first wave later reported being (actively)
involved in informal political discussions. Although Binder et al. (2009) did find evidence
supporting the link between political discussions and the development of more extreme attitudes,
this relationship was moderated by the type of discussion network in which one took part.
Specifically, those respondents who reported involvement in homogeneous, or like-minded,
discussions in early waves of the study subsequently reported more extreme attitudes toward
stem cell research. This finding is in keeping with past work on group polarization (e.g.,
Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers, 1975) demonstrating that discussions with like-minded
others drive the overall opinion of the group to become more extreme. Interestingly, Binder and
colleagues (2009) found no significant link between heterogeneous discussion and attitude
extremity. Binder et al.’s (2009) work represents a novel and meaningful application of attitude
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polarization to real-world patterns of political discussion and attitude change. However, the use
of secondary data limited the scope of the researchers’ questions to those included in the Life
Style Study data set. As such, Binder et al. (2009) could not examine many potentially important
individual difference factors related to processing style and biased assimilation, variables shown
to influence the degree to which extreme attitudes give rise to attitude polarization.
Work by Greitmeyer, Fischer, Frey, and Schultz-Hardt (2009) experimentally
investigated the effect of both argument content and source identification on biased assimilation
of political information and subsequent attitude polarization. The researchers hypothesized that
biased assimilation could be due to not only the content of the arguments presented (i.e.,
supporting v. opposing one’s opinion) but also the label of the source of that information (i.e.,
“my party” v. “the other side”). Drawing from work on social categorization and social identity
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Greitmeyer et al. (2009) held that source position, even when conveyed
implicitly, can communicate to a message recipient whether or not this is a valued, trusted source
of information. In particular, ideological or party labels could serve as a cue or heuristic as to the
reliability of the source and likely quality of the argument. The authors proposed that this source
cue could be strong enough that individuals could end up agreeing more strongly with the “other
side” of an issue than their own if the argument was credited to a source who shared their
ideological leaning.
To test this, Greitmeyer and colleagues (2009) conducted two studies on non-student
samples in Germany. Participants provided their attitudes toward and likelihood of voting for
each of two prominent political parties (Christian Democratic Party – CDU, Social Democratic
Party – SPD); read arguments from both parties on current issues such as the job market, health
care, and education; rated the arguments themselves in terms of quality and persuasiveness; and
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then reported their party attitudes again. Greitmeyer et al. (2009) manipulated the source label
on the issue arguments, such that the arguments were attributed to the correct party (match),
identified with the incorrect party (mismatch), or were not labeled (control). Results showed
evidence of both biased assimilation and attitude polarization, but only for participants who had
read arguments accompanied by correct source labels. That is, individuals who originally
supported the SPD strongly became more favorable in their evaluations of that party, and those
with initially positive attitudes toward CDU became more positive, but only in the condition in
which the sources of the persuasive arguments were properly labeled. Moreover, Study 2
revealed that, when arguments were misidentified (i.e., SPD arguments attributed to CDU and
vice versa), participants actually sided with their party label, regardless of argument content. For
instance, SPD (CDU) supporters rated the statements under the SPD (CDU) label as more
convincing, even though the statements had actually been made by the opposing party (CDU and
SPD, respectively). This suggests that, as Greitmeyer et al. (2009) predicted, people were using
the source labels provided as a cue to the quality and persuasiveness of the argument itself: So
much so, in fact, that they reported preferring arguments whose content ran counter to their
group’s issue positions and values.
One major limitation of Greitmeyer et al.’s (2009) work for the current project is that the
researchers did not assess the effect of either starting ideological position (although this could be
inferred from participants’ party attitudes) or the strength/extremity of their party allegiance. As
these researchers conceptualized attitude extremity and polarization in terms of competence
ratings, not issue attitudes, they did not examine the role of argument content in swaying or
galvanizing initial opinions on these issues.
Purpose and Aim of Present Studies
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The primary focus of the present studies was to integrate two rich bodies of research
within social psychology in an attempt to better understand the mechanisms underlying
ideological differences in reactions to persuasive communication. Although much work has
examined various psychological processes upon which ideological differences may be based, the
question of whether propensities toward maintaining the status quo and endorsing inequality are
primarily characteristic of a) political conservatives or b) ideological extremists remains hotly
debated. Alongside this literature has emerged an extensive body of work surrounding the
phenomenon of attitude polarization, suggesting that biased processing and assimilation (among
other things) lead individuals with extreme attitudes to come away from “balanced” information
even more deeply convinced of their point of view than they were initially. Biased assimilation
and attitude polarization are psychological processes that have direct implications for our
understanding of individual differences in attitude change versus resistance. One proposed
distinguishing factor between liberals and conservatives has been just that: Do people respond to
relevant information by considering it with an eye toward understanding (more open-minded), or
do they instead remain “rooted” to their originally held beliefs and reject all evidence to the
contrary without much consideration (close-minded)?
Before proceeding with a description of the current studies, it is important to explicitly
operationalize two concepts of primary focus: attitude extremity and political conservatism.
Throughout the history of the investigations of both attitude polarization and political ideology,
different researchers have defined “extremity” and “conservatism” in a variety of related but by
no means identical ways. This lack of clarity in operational definitions has almost surely
contributed to some of the methodological and theoretical inconsistencies in both lines of
research. For the purposes of the present studies, the term “attitude extremity” refers to the
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proximity of an attitude to either the positive or negative endpoint of a standard semantic
differential scale. Attitudes closer to the “outer edge” of the scale, in either evaluative direction,
are considered more extreme; those closer to the center of the scale (i.e., evaluative neutrality)
are considered more moderate. When discussing “conservatism” in the current studies, the term
should be considered synonymous with political conservatism, or identification with the right
side of the ideological continuum (as opposed to the left). This conceptualization differs from
social, fiscal, religious, and general conservatism; neither is it synonymous with “Republican,”
as the right side of the political spectrum is much broader than that encompassed by this single
political party.
The present studies assessed the separate and interactive effects of political ideology and
attitudinal extremity on subsequent attitude polarization (i.e., adopting a more extreme attitude of
the same valence as the original evaluation) versus depolarization (i.e., becoming less
evaluatively extreme). Including both elements as predictors of reactions to various types of
persuasive communications allowed for a more accurate assessment of the relations among
ideology, underlying attitudes, and the degree/direction of change. In addition, this project
sought to better approximate the factors at work in “real-world” persuasive contexts such as
politics. For instance, potential voters do not encounter and consider campaign messages in a
proverbial vacuum. Instead, each person brings to the table both ideological allegiances and preexisting attitudes about the candidates, the issues, the parties, etc. that create a unique and
powerful lens through which any and all persuasive information is processed (Lord et al., 1979).
To examine the role of political ideology and attitude extremity on attitude polarization, a
series of four studies was conducted assessing participants’ reactions to various arguments for
and against pertinent social, economic, and political issues. Specifically, participants provided
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their initial attitudes toward the issue in question, reported their ideological preferences, and
received an equal number of pro- and anti- arguments. Then, they provided their attitude a
second time after reading the mixed evidence arguments. In later studies, participants completed
additional measures to examine potential mediators and control for covariates. Specifically,
biased assimilation and factors proposed to differ between political conservatives and liberals
(i.e., cognitive flexibility and need for cognitive closure) were examined as mediators. Need for
cognition, importance placed on politics, and demographics were assessed as potential
covariates. By incorporating a series of different target issues and assessing a variety of different
individual characteristics across the studies, the extent to which result patterns generalized could
be examined.
Hypotheses
It was hypothesized that individuals holding extreme initial attitudes would be more
likely to polarize (i.e., become more extreme) following the persuasive messages than would
those holding more moderate views of the issues initially. Work on attitude polarization
suggests that extreme pre-existing attitudes color the processing of subsequently presented
information, such that individuals are likely to view supporting arguments as more convincing
than opposing statements (e.g., Lord et al., 1979). This biased processing, in turn, leads such
individuals to come away from the persuasive context with even more entrenched and extreme
attitudes than they originally held; in contrast, more moderate individuals are more likely to
demonstrate attitude change in the direction suggested by the persuasive information they
encounter.
Second, based upon work on ideological differences by a variety of researchers (e.g., Jost
et al., 2003a, 2003b; Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981), it was anticipated that political
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conservatives would demonstrate more resistance to changing their attitudes in response to the
persuasive essays. As past work has indicated that relative close-mindedness, intolerance for
ambiguity, and rejection of novel or alternative viewpoints are characteristic of conservatism, it
was hypothesized that conservatives would show more polarization of their attitudes, especially
in response to information that opposes their views (e.g., arguments supporting tax increases),
than would political liberals, whose relative open-mindedness and tolerance of ambiguity (Jost et
al., 2003a, 2003b) was expected to give rise to more depolarization.
Third, attitude extremity and political ideology were expected to interactively affect
attitude polarization. That is, the extent to which attitude extremity gave rise to subsequent
polarization following exposure to a mix of supporting and opposing statements was predicted to
differ for liberals versus conservatives. Political conservatives were expected to show evidence
of attitude polarization, regardless of the extremity of their initial attitudes. Based on
characterizations of the conservative “profile” as relatively intolerant, close-minded, and
resistant to change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), attitude polarization was expected to be
observed among conservatives with moderate initial attitudes as well as among conservatives
holding extreme initial attitudes.
Among liberals, however, the degree of attitude polarization was predicted to depend
upon the extremity of their initial attitudes toward the target issue. As liberalism is generally
associated with relative openness, tolerance, and preference for change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a,
2003b), it was predicted that attitude extremity would be more predictive of attitude polarization.
Liberals holding extreme attitudes at the outset were expected to show evidence of polarization,
whereas liberals with more moderate attitudes toward the target issues were expected to be
relatively open to depolarizing their opinions in response to the presentation of mixed evidence.
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Study 1
The first of the four studies conducted examined the effects of attitude extremity and
political ideology on attitude change in response to mixed evidence about abortion rights. In this
first study, participants indicated their attitudes toward the issue of abortion rights before and
after reading an article containing a combination of statements supporting and opposing this
social issue. Political ideology, as well as the importance of politics, were also assessed.
Attitude change was assessed by examining the difference between participants' pre- and postmessage attitudes. The purpose of this study was to examine how differences in individuals’
initial attitudes and ideological positions affected their reactions to the persuasive messages. As
such, there were a number of hypotheses that I tested.
Hypothesis 1. Extremity of initial attitudes predicts attitude polarization. Based
upon work related to attitude polarization, it was hypothesized that individuals reporting more
extreme attitudes toward abortion rights would demonstrate greater polarization of their attitudes
than would those holding moderate initial attitudes, as evidenced by the difference between
posttest and pretest attitudes. The findings of Lord et al. (1979) suggest that individuals
espousing extreme support for or against a particular social issue are likely to come away from
mixed evidence messages even more assured of their initial view, leading them to report even
more extreme attitudes than they held initially. Furthermore, it was expected that, in comparison
to those with extreme pretest attitudes, individuals displaying more moderate initial attitudes
toward abortion rights would report depolarization of those evaluative views following exposure
to the mixed evidence message. Miller and colleagues (1993) found that attitudinal moderates
reported that their views on capital punishment had changed in the opposite direction from their
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initially held attitudes following exposure to a mixture of statements supporting and opposing
capital punishment.
Hypothesis 2. Political ideology predicts attitude polarization. Conservatives were
expected to exhibit attitude polarization in response to the mixed evidence essays. Based on the
extensive line of research demonstrating that political conservatives are more close-minded (e.g.,
Altemeyer, 1981), less open to new experiences (e.g., van Hiel et al., 2000), less tolerant of
ambiguity (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), and more uncomfortable with uncertainty (e.g., Jost et
al., 2003a, 2003b) than are political liberals, it was predicted that conservatives would
demonstrate a propensity to resist changing their initially espoused attitudes toward abortion
rights and would adopt an even more extreme attitudinal position than the one they originally
held. Political liberals on the other hand were expected to demonstrate depolarization following
the mix of pro- and anti-abortion rights statements. Relative to their conservative counterparts,
liberal individuals are relatively more open-minded, tolerant, and accepting of change (e.g., Jost
et al., 2003a, 2003b). Based on this, it was expected that liberals would be more apt to
depolarize their initial views on abortion rights than would conservatives following the
presentation of mixed evidence.
Hypothesis 3. Attitude extremity and political ideology interactively affect attitude
polarization. The extent to which attitude extremity gave rise to subsequent polarization
following exposure to a mix of supporting and opposing statements was predicted to depend
upon political ideology. For political liberals, attitude extremity was expected to determine
attitude polarization. As political liberalism is generally characterized by openness, tolerance,
and preference for change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), the extremity of a specific attitude was
expected to determine a liberal individual's reaction to a mixed-evidence message, not his or her
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ideology. Thus, it was hypothesized that liberals espousing extreme initial attitudes would
demonstrate polarization after having read the mix of pro-life and pro-choice statements. In
contrast, liberals holding more moderate abortion rights attitudes at the outset were expected to
show evidence of depolarization in response to the mixed evidence. That is, among liberals, the
relation between attitudinal extremity and subsequent evaluative change was expected to be
consistent with work in the attitude polarization tradition (e.g., Lord et al., 1979).
Among political conservatives, no differences in attitude polarization were predicted
based upon initial attitude extremity. As the conservative “profile” is characterized by greater
intolerance, less openness, and greater resistance to change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b) than
liberals, attitude polarization was expected to be observed among conservatives with moderate
initial attitudes toward abortion rights as well as among conservatives holding extreme initial
attitudes.
Method
Participants
Sixty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at Virginia
Commonwealth University participated in the study for one hour of research credit. There were
no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or religious affiliation. The only requirements
for participation were a minimum age of eighteen and fluency in English, as participants needed
to be able to carefully read and evaluate written arguments. Six participants were excluded from
analyses due to missing data or inappropriate completion (e.g., selecting the same response
option for all items in a questionnaire containing reverse-coded items) of the study measures.
The final sample was therefore comprised of sixty-two participants (forty-five women; 50%
Caucasian, 16% Asian, 15% Black, 3% Hispanic, 2% Native American, and 14% “other”).

48

Measures and Materials
Pretest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ initial attitudes toward a variety of social
issues were assessed using 7-point semantic differential scales ranging from -3 (negative) to +3
(positive; see Appendix A). Embedded in this series of questions was an item assessing views
on the issue of abortion rights, which served as the pretest attitude assessment.
Social Networking Sites Essay. A series of statements describing the benefits and risks
of using social networking sites was developed (Appendix B). Statements supporting social
networking sites focused upon the ease of sharing ideas, meeting new people, and staying in
contact with friends and acquaintances. Arguments opposing social networking sites emphasized
the risks of divulging sensitive information that could adversely affect one’s employment
opportunities or leave one vulnerable to cyber crime. Messages were standardized in terms of
length and content. The social networking sites essay was intended to a) familiarize participants
with the study’s primary task and b) make the study’s premise – evaluating “a few” social issues
– seem more credible.
Abortion Rights Essay. A series of statements supporting and opposing abortion rights
was developed (see Appendix C). Statements supporting abortion rights centered on women’s
right to choose, family planning, and making abortions safer and rarer. Oppositional statements
focused on an unborn child’s right to life, traditional family values, and legal protections for the
unborn. Arguments were adapted from the websites of organizations supporting abortion rights
(e.g., Planned Parenthood) as well as those opposed to abortion rights (e.g., National Right to
Life). Messages were standardized in terms of length and content, and the order of presentation
of supporting and opposing statements was counterbalanced.
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Posttest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ posttest attitudes toward abortion rights were
assessed using five semantic differential scales, ranging from -4 to +4, with the following
endpoints: (a) dislike/like, (b) bad/good, (c) negative/positive, (d) unfavorable/favorable, and (e)
against/in favor. All five attitude items were highly correlated (rs from .76 to .94) and internally
reliable (α = .97). As such, these five items were averaged to create a composite variable
assessing posttest attitudes toward abortion rights, with higher scores indicating more positive
attitudes.
Political Ideology Scale. Political ideology was assessed using a composite scale
adapted from those used by Shook and Fazio (2009) and Terrizzi, Shook, and Ventis (2010).
Both Shook and Fazio’s (2009) 13-item and Terrizzi et al.’s (2010) 31-item scales have
demonstrated satisfactory reliability (Shook & Fazio, 2009, α = .71; Terrizzi et al., 2010, α =
.80); these two scales were combined to enhance the overall reliability of the measure. The
resulting 44-item scale, presented in Appendix D, contained a variety of questions assessing
various aspects of political ideology. That is, whereas some items focused on a wide variety of
social concerns (e.g., “Homosexuals should not be allowed to legally marry;” “Some crimes are
so despicable that they should be punishable by death”), others addressed economic or financial
issues (e.g., “Congress should not increase taxes, rather, they should decrease spending;” “The
minimum wage should not be raised”). Participants indicated the extent to which they endorsed
each item on a scale from -2 (Disagree strongly) to +2 (Agree strongly). In addition, selfreported political ideology was gauged by asking participants to rate themselves on a nine-point
scale ranging from “as conservative as it gets” to “as liberal as it gets.” After reverse-coding the
self-reported ideology question and standardizing all items, the forty-five political ideology items
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were averaged to create a composite variable representing political ideology (α = .87), with
higher scores being indicative of a more conservative ideology.
Importance of Politics Questionnaire. As work by Petty and Cacioppo (1979) and
Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) has demonstrated, the degree of personal relevance that a
particular topic has for an individual affects his or her motivation to cognitively elaborate on
arguments surrounding it. In the current studies, it was important to assess how much
participants cared about political issues, figures, and events in order to determine how relevant
arguments supporting and opposing political issues would be. The importance participants
placed on politics could moderate the effect of attitude extremity and/or political ideology on
participants’ attitudes toward the target issue. To assess this potential motivational factor,
participants completed an “importance of politics” questionnaire (see Appendix E). This
measure was comprised of three types of items designed to gauge the importance placed upon
politics both directly and indirectly. Specifically, the measure contained a) four items directly
assessing importance (e.g., “How important are political figures, issues, and events to you?”), b)
three items assessing frequency of political exposure (e.g., “How often do you read about
political figures, issues, and events?”), and c) eleven items assessing degree of participation, for
which participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had taken part in several political
activities, including voting, taking part in a march or rally, and contacting their congressional
representatives. The number of political activities engaged in was then totaled for each
participant to generate a summed political participation score. After standardization, all eighteen
items were found to correlate positively with one another and demonstrated good internal
consistency (α = .85). As such, they were averaged to form a composite variable assessing the
importance of politics with higher numbers indicating greater importance.
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Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a demographics
questionnaire (see Appendix F) assessing sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and
hometown size.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were seated at individual cubicles. Participants were
informed that they would be taking part in a study about people’s opinions on a variety of
relevant social issues. They were informed of the confidentiality and anonymity of the study and
were asked to sign an informed consent form. Participants were then told that they would be
reading and carefully considering arguments about a few social issues, as well as completing a
variety of questionnaires related to the issues and some other measures. First, they provided
their attitudes about several issues, including the true attitudinal target, abortion rights. Next,
participants read an essay comprised of statements supporting and opposing the use of social
networking sites. They then responded to a few questions about social networking sites. Again,
the social networking sites essay and questions were included simply to familiarize participants
with the study’s primary task (i.e., scrutinizing issue arguments and voicing their attitudes about
those issues) and to bolster the cover story. Next, they were presented with a combination of
mixed evidence supporting and opposing the target issue, abortion rights, and were instructed to
read the statements as before. After participants had thoroughly read the arguments, their
attitudes toward abortion rights were assessed using the posttest attitude measure. Participants
then completed the following measures: Importance of Politics (IPQ), demographics, and
Political Ideology (composite scale and self-identification item; PID). Participants were then
debriefed. Any questions that participants had were addressed, and they were dismissed.
Results
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Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest in Study 1 are presented in
Table 1. Before proceeding with tests of the study’s main hypotheses, it was necessary to ensure
that the data met all assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance. Pretest
attitudes toward abortion rights were found to be negatively skewed (Skewness = -1.78, SE =
0.30). In order to correct for this, a log transformation was performed on the pretest abortion
rights variable. Following transformation, the new variable demonstrated much improved fit
statistics (Skewness = -0.25, SE = 0.30), so subsequent analyses were conducted using this
transformed variable. All other variables of interest were found to meet the assumptions of
normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance, making it appropriate to run analyses with
these data in their original form. In particular, the composite measure of political ideology was
not skewed (Skewness = 0.04, SE = 0.30) and did not indicate any restriction of range or
variability, indicating that the sample was not biased in terms of its ideological composition.
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for Study 1
Variable

M (SD)

Min

Max

Skewness

SESk

Pretest Abortion Rights Attitude

5.24 (1.98)

1.00

7.00

-1.78

0.30

Posttest Abortion Rights Attitude

6.08 (2.70)

1.00

9.00

-0.52

0.30

Political Ideology Composite¹

2.46 (0.45)

1.43

4.43

0.03

0.30

Self-Identified Ideology¹

4.16 (1.69)

1.00

8.00

0.54

0.30

Importance of Politics2

0.00 (0.70)

-1.89

1.32

0.00

0.30

¹ higher values = more conservative
2
standardized composite
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Tests of Main Hypotheses
The main purpose of the current study was to test the effects of attitude extremity and
political ideology on changes in attitudes toward abortion rights. The primary dependent
measure in the analyses was a direct assessment of change in participants’ attitudes from pre- to
posttest (i.e., before versus after encountering the abortion rights essay). In order to compute this
difference score, it was first necessary to standardize both pretest and posttest attitudes so that
they were on the same metric. Standardized pretest attitudes toward abortion rights were then
subtracted from their standardized posttest counterparts, thereby generating a difference score.
Positive values indicated that posttest attitudes were more positive than pretest attitudes (i.e., a
positive evaluative shift) and negative values indicated that posttest attitudes were more negative
than pretest attitudes (i.e., a negative evaluative shift). A difference score of zero indicated no
change in attitudes from pretest to posttest.
In order to examine both main and interactive effects of attitude extremity and political
ideology (PID) on attitude difference scores, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted.
Also, given the nature of the target issue, gender was included as a third predictor variable.1 The
extremity of initial attitudes was operationalized in terms of evaluative distance from the
midpoint of the original seven-point (-3 to +3) pretest attitudes scale. In order to assess the
degree of extremity of starting attitudes toward abortion rights independent of valence, original
pretest attitudes were squared. Thus, larger numbers were representative of more extreme initial
attitudes. In accordance with Aiken and West (1991), both the attitude extremity and political
ideology variables were centered to reduce collinearity, and the gender variable was dummy

1

Direct and interactive effects of IPQ on the attitudes difference scores were also
examined. However, a hierarchical regression revealed no significant direct or interactive effects
of IPQ, ps > .45.
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coded (0 = “man,” 1 = “woman”). The dummy coded gender variable, along with the centered
attitude extremity and political ideology variables, were entered in Step 1. The three two-way
interactions among attitude extremity, political ideology, and gender (i.e., extremity X PID,
extremity X gender, PID X gender) were entered in Step 2. The three-way interaction of attitude
extremity, political ideology, and gender was entered in Step 3.
The first model of the regression analysis predicted significant unique variance in
abortion rights attitude difference scores, F(3,58) = 4.24, p < .01, R2 = .18. This significance was
driven by a main effect of attitude extremity (B = -0.24, t(61) = -3.02, p < .001), such that
individuals with more moderate initial attitudes became more positive toward abortion rights
whereas individuals with extreme initial attitudes tended not to change their attitudes. Model 2
did not contribute significantly to the prediction of difference scores in abortion rights attitudes,
F(3,55) = 0.41, p = .75, R2 = .02. However, the third model predicted significant additional
variance in the difference scores, F(1,54) = 5.10, p < .03, R2 = .07, due to the significant threeway interaction of attitude extremity, political ideology, and gender, B = 0.48, t(61) = 2.26, p <
.03 (see Figure 1). To decompose this pattern, regression models predicting the effects of gender
at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of attitude extremity and political ideology were run
(Aiken & West, 1991). Gender did not predict changes in abortion rights attitudes for more
liberal individuals, regardless of whether their initial attitudes were relatively moderate (B =
0.98, t(61) = 1.78, p = .08) or extreme (B = -0.09, t(61) = -0.32, p = .75). In addition, no
differences in the attitude change scores of men versus women were found among conservative
individuals with more moderate views initially, B = -0.11, t(61) = -0.35, p = .73. Gender
emerged as a significant predictor of attitude difference scores only for conservative individuals
who also held relatively extreme attitudes toward abortion rights, B = 0.75, t(61) = 2.24, p < .03,
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such that among conservatives with extreme attitudes, men became more evaluatively negative
whereas women tended not to change.
MEN
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Figure 1. Abortion rights attitude difference scores as a function of gender, attitude extremity,
and political ideology at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 1).
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To further explore gender differences, the regression model predicting the effects of
attitude extremity, political ideology, and their interaction was run for men and women
separately. The results of these analyses indicated that the effects of extremity, ideology, and
their interaction differed by gender. Specifically, extremity was the only significant predictor of
abortion rights difference scores for women, B = -.22, t(42) = -2.58, p < .02, such that moderate
initial attitudes were associated with positive change and extreme attitudes were associated with
relatively little change. Among men, the only effect approaching significance was that of the
attitude extremity X political ideology interaction, B = -.43, t(13) = -1.97, p = .07.
Conclusions
Study 1 was the first attempt to examine the effects of attitudinal extremity and political
ideology on change in attitudes toward an issue (i.e., abortion rights) following exposure to a mix
of statements supporting and opposing that issue. The results provide an initial indication of the
relations among attitude extremity, political ideology, and persuasion in response to mixed
evidence. First, extremity of initial attitudes was found to significantly predict the degree and
direction of attitude change. Specifically, individuals who reported more extreme evaluative
positions at the outset of the study demonstrated resistance to altering that attitude after having
read the arguments supporting and opposing abortion rights, whereas participants with more
moderate initial attitudes became more positive in their attitudes toward abortion rights. This
pattern of results supported the first hypothesis and was in keeping with much of the research
surrounding the phenomenon of attitude polarization. These studies have found that individuals
with more extreme attitudes toward a topic tend to report either an entrenchment or
intensification of those initial evaluative stances following exposure to a mix of supporting and
opposing statements (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993; Boysen & Vogel, 2007, 2008).
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In contrast, individuals expressing more moderate attitudes toward abortion rights demonstrated
a positive shift in their evaluative positions following exposure to mixed evidence. This greater
openness to change associated with moderate attitudes is also consistent with past work (e.g.,
Miller et al., 1993).
Study 1 also examined the effect of political ideology on attitude difference scores. It
was hypothesized that political conservatives would demonstrate polarization of their initial
attitudes, whereas political liberals were expected to depolarize. However, political ideology did
not emerge as a significant predictor of change in abortion rights attitudes in this study. As
previously noted, the sample was not skewed or restricted in regards to ideology, meaning that
the lack of political ideology main effect was not due to a lack of ideological variability in the
sample. The target issue itself may explain this lack of a predictive effect of political ideology
on attitude change. The distribution of pretest abortion rights attitudes was highly negatively
skewed, indicating that participants were generally highly positive about the issue of abortion
rights. It seems that individuals in this college sample held relatively positive attitudes toward
the target issue, regardless of their political ideology. Given the predominance of pro-choice
sentiment at pretest, even relatively more conservative individuals evaluated the issue positively.
Finally, an interactive effect for attitude extremity and political ideology was also
predicted. In Study 1, this interaction emerged, but not in the predicted direction and only for
men. Specifically, attitude extremity did not predict change scores for liberal men, but for
conservative men, extreme attitudes were associated with a negative shift in abortion rights
attitudes, whereas moderate attitudes predicted a positive shift. The change in women’s attitudes
toward abortion rights was predicted only by the extremity of their initial attitudes: Consistent
with the broader extremity main effect, women with extreme attitudes demonstrated resistance to
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change, whereas women espousing more moderate evaluative views became more positive about
abortion rights. Given the nature of the issue, it may be that women viewed abortion rights as a
topic of greater personal relevance. As such, women’s attitudinal reactions following the mixed
message arguments about abortion rights were driven largely by how extreme versus moderate
their initial attitudes were and were not dependent upon ideological identification. For men, the
issue of abortion rights likely did not carry the same degree of personal relevance as it did for
women. As such, male participants’ attitudinal reactions depended not only upon the extremity
of initial attitude but also ideological propensities.
In sum, Study 1 provided initial evidence that attitudinal extremity predicts the degree
and direction of attitude change following exposure to mixed evidence. In addition, the nature of
the topic itself may help to explain the divergent result patterns between men and women:
evidence that the particular issue topic may also influence attitudinal reactions and propensities
to polarize. Overall, political ideology was not associated with attitude polarization, which may
be due to the nature of the specific topic - abortion rights - and the use of a college sample.
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Study 2
Study 2 replicated and expanded upon the first study in three primary ways. First, a new
social issue, gun control, was employed in an effort to determine whether the patterns of attitude
change related to abortion rights in Study 1 generalized to a different attitude target. Second,
participants completed thought listings in order to more clearly examine the processing of the
mixed evidence statements. Past work on attitude polarization has indicated that the relation
between attitude extremity and polarization is driven by the biased assimilation of statements
that support versus oppose that view (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993). The inclusion
of thought listings in Study 2 allowed me to assess if, in fact, there were differences in the
processing and recall of the gun control essay based upon attitude extremity as found in previous
studies and if any differences in biased assimilation mediated the extremity-polarization relation.
Specifically, the accuracy of the information recalled in the thought listings indicated
participants’ processing and recall of the arguments presented, thereby providing a gauge of the
degree to which the information was interpreted in a biased manner. Third, a need for cognition
scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) was added in order to assess an important individual
difference: propensity to engage in thought (i.e., cognitive elaboration). Participants' general
tendency to cognitively elaborate could potentially affect the relations among attitude extremity,
political ideology, and attitude polarization, as well as the extent to which they processed the
issue essay on gun control. As such, it was important to measure and control for individual
differences in need for cognition.
Hypothesis 1. Extremity of initial attitudes predicts attitude polarization. In
keeping with Study 1’s predictions, a main effect for attitudinal extremity was hypothesized,
such that individuals expressing more extreme attitudes toward gun control at the outset were
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expected to adopt even more extreme evaluative positions (i.e., polarize) following the
presentation of mixed evidence, whereas those with relatively more moderate initial attitudes
were expected to demonstrate more “willingness” to change in response to the mixed evidence,
therefore resulting in depolarization of their pretest attitudes (Miller et al., 1993).
Hypothesis 2. Political ideology predicts attitude polarization. As in Study 1, a main
effect for political ideology was also hypothesized. Specifically, it was predicted that political
conservatives would show more evidence of polarization than would political liberals. Ideology
may not have emerged as a significant predictor in Study 1 due to the nature of the target issue,
abortion rights. As a different issue, gun control, was employed in Study 2, the original
hypothesis regarding a main effect for political ideology on attitude change was again advanced.
Hypothesis 3. Attitude extremity and political ideology interactively affect attitude
polarization. It was again expected that the effect of extremity of initial attitudes on subsequent
polarization would depend upon ideological allegiances to the right versus the left. Specifically,
political conservatives were predicted to demonstrate attitude polarization in response to the mix
of statements about gun control, regardless of whether their initial attitudes about gun control
were relatively extreme or relatively moderate. Among liberals, however, it was anticipated that
those holding extreme attitudes would be more apt to polarize, whereas individuals reporting
moderate initial attitudes would show evidence of depolarization
Hypothesis 4. Biased assimilation mediates the link between attitude extremity and
attitude polarization. Studies of the attitude polarization phenomenon have repeatedly
indicated that the relation between attitude extremity and polarization is driven, at least in part,
by the biased assimilation of mixed persuasive evidence (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al.,
1993). Specifically, research has shown that individuals holding extreme attitudes about a target
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issue do not process subsequent information in a balanced manner. Rather, the vividness of that
extreme initial attitude colors the processing of even a seemingly balanced mix of supporting and
opposing statements, such that the extreme attitude holder comes away from the mixed evidence
even more confident of the correctness of his or her original view and the faultiness of the
opposing view. It is this biased assimilation of new information that strengthens the pre-existing
attitude and, in so doing, gives rise to attitude polarization.
In keeping with the pattern found in previous empirical investigations, it was therefore
hypothesized that biased processing would at least partially mediate the extremity-polarization
relation. That is, individuals holding extreme attitudes were expected to engage in more biased
assimilation and processing of the mixed evidence about gun control than those holding
moderate initial attitudes, and this discrepancy in processing, in turn, was expected to manifest as
greater attitude polarization among extreme attitude-holders versus moderates.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one individuals enrolled in psychology courses at Virginia Commonwealth
University participated in the study for one hour of research credit. As with Study 1, there were
no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or religious affiliation. The only requirements
for participation were a minimum age of eighteen and fluency in English, as participants needed
to be able to carefully read and evaluate a written argument. In addition, individuals who had
participated in Study 1 were not eligible to take part in Study 2. Two participants were excluded
from analyses due to inappropriate completion (e.g., selecting the same response option for all
items in a questionnaire containing reverse-coded items) of the study measures. The final
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sample was therefore comprised of seventy-nine participants (forty women; 54% Caucasian,
16% Asian, 16% Black, 4% Hispanic, and 10% "other").
Measures and Materials
Pretest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ initial attitudes toward a variety of social
issues were assessed using the same set of 7-point semantic differential scales ranging from -3
(negative) to +3 (positive) employed in Study 1(see Appendix A). Embedded in this series of
questions was an item assessing views on the issue of gun control, which served as the pretest
attitude assessment.
Social Networking Sites Essay. The same series of statements describing the benefits
and risks of using social networking sites developed and employed in Study 1 was again
incorporated in Study 2 (Appendix B).
Gun Control Essay. A series of statements supporting and opposing gun control were
developed (see Appendix G). Statements supporting gun control centered on the dangers of guns
falling into the wrong hands, the link between gun legislation and lowered crime rates, and the
importance of background checks and safety features. Oppositional statements focused on
defending the right to bear arms and the importance of gun ownership for self-defense purposes.
Arguments were adapted from the websites of organizations devoted to gun control (e.g., Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence) as well as those opposed to gun control (e.g., National Rifle
Association). Messages were standardized in terms of length and content, and the order of
presentation of the supporting and opposing statements was counterbalanced.
Posttest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ posttest attitudes toward gun control were
assessed using the same series of items used in Study 1. Participants rated the issue of gun
control on five semantic differential scales, ranging from -4 to +4, with the following endpoints:
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(a) dislike/like, (b) bad/good, (c) negative/positive, (d) unfavorable/favorable, and (e) against/in
favor. As in Study 1, a composite variable (with higher scores indicating greater positivity
toward gun control) was created by averaging the five posttest attitude items (α = .95).
Thought Listings. Following the posttest attitude items, participants were provided with
eight blank spaces and asked to list, in each, one thought or fact that they recalled from the essay
they had read on gun control. The content of the thought listings provided information regarding
the accuracy versus inaccuracy (i.e., bias) of individuals’ recall of the presented information.
This information provided evidence of the extent to which participants processed and recalled
the mixed evidence statements in an accurate manner versus demonstrated inaccurate processing
of the mixed information.
The thought listings were subsequently examined by two independent coders and rated in
terms of the accuracy of the information provided. For each thought listing, each coder
compared participants’ written responses to the information provided in the original gun control
essay to determine how closely they matched. Thought listings were rated on a scale of 1 (not at
all accurate) to 5 (extremely accurate). Paired comparisons of the accuracy ratings revealed that
there was sufficient agreement between the coders (rs > .70), so average accuracy ratings for
each thought listing were generated from the coders’ paired ratings. These individual accuracy
ratings demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .78) and were therefore averaged to create a
composite accuracy variable, for which higher scores represented greater accuracy. This
composite accuracy variable served as the primary indicator of biased assimilation.
Political Ideology Scale. Political ideology was again assessed using the composite
scale developed and employed in Study 1 (see Appendix D). After reverse-coding the selfreported ideology question and standardizing all items, the forty-five political ideology items

64

were averaged to create a composite variable representing political ideology (α = .89), for which
higher scores were indicative of a more conservative ideological orientation.
Importance of Politics Questionnaire. To assess the potential motivational factor of
importance placed on politics, participants completed the “importance of politics” questionnaire
developed for Study 1 (see Appendix E). After standardization, all eighteen items were found to
correlate positively with one another and demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .86). As
such, they were averaged to form a composite variable assessing the importance of politics, with
higher scores indicating greater importance.
Need for Cognition Scale. In addition to assessing participants’ attitudes, political
ideology, and importance placed on politics, individuals’ need for cognition (NFC) was
measured. As outlined by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and demonstrated empirically by
Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, and Rodriguez (1986), people who routinely engage in and enjoy effortful
cognitive processing (NFChigh) are more motivated to process deeply and thus operate at a higher
level of elaboration than low need for cognition individuals (NFClow). In order to gauge this
individual difference variable, all participants completed Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) 18-item
need for cognition scale (see Appendix H). This scale included items such as “I find satisfaction
in deliberating hard and for long hours” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must
solve.” Individuals indicated how characteristic of themselves each item was on a scale ranging
from 1 (Very uncharacteristic) to 5 (Very characteristic). After reverse-scoring the necessary
items, the average of these eighteen items was computed to create a composite NFC score (α =
.87), with higher scores indicative of higher need for cognition.
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Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a demographics
questionnaire (see Appendix F) assessing sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and
hometown size.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 closely resembled that of Study 1. Upon arrival at the lab,
following informed consent, participants provided their attitudes about several issues, including
the target issue, gun control. Next, they read the essays describing the pros and cons of social
networking sites and evaluated the issue. Then, they read the mixed evidence essay about the
target issue (gun control) and completed the posttest attitudes measure. In addition, participants
then provided their thoughts about the topic via eight thought listings. Participants then
completed the following measures: Need for Cognition (NFC), Importance of Politics (IPQ),
demographics, and Political Ideology (composite scale and self-identification item; PID).
Finally, participants were debriefed, any questions were addressed, and they were dismissed.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest in Study 2 are presented in
Table 2. Before proceeding with tests of the study’s main hypotheses, it was necessary to ensure
that the data met all assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance. Pretest
attitudes toward gun control were found to be positively skewed (Skewness = 1.07, SE = 0.27).
In order to correct for this, a log transformation was performed on the pretest gun control
variable. Following transformation, the new variable demonstrated much improved fit statistics
(Skewness = -0.05, SE = 0.27), so subsequent analyses were conducted using this transformed
variable. All other variables of interest were found to meet the assumptions of normality,
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linearity, and homogeneity of variance, making it appropriate to run analyses with these data in
their original form. As in Study 1, the composite measure of political ideology was not
significantly skewed (Skewness = -0.03, SE = 0.27), indicating that the sample was not biased in
terms of its ideological composition.
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for Study 2
Variable

M (SD)

Min

Max

Skewness

SESk

Pretest Gun Control Attitude

2.83 (1.67)

1.00

7.00

1.07

0.27

Posttest Gun Control Attitude

6.69 (1.82)

1.00

9.00

-0.59

0.27

Political Ideology Composite¹

2.63 (0.48)

1.39

4.84

-0.03

0.27

Self-Identified Ideology¹

4.75 (1.94)

1.00

9.00

0.07

0.27

Importance of Politics2

0.00 (0.71)

-2.16

1.58

-0.35

0.27

Need for Cognition

3.35 (0.61)

1.61

4.67

0.01

0.27

Accuracy

2.99 (0.69)

1.00

4.50

-0.57

0.27

¹ higher values = more conservative
2
standardized composite

Tests of Main Hypotheses
The main purpose of the current study was to test the effects of attitude extremity and
political ideology on changes in attitudes toward gun control. As in Study 1, the primary
dependent measure in the analyses was direct assessment of change in participants’ attitudes
from pre- to posttest (i.e., before versus after encountering the gun control essay). The
difference score was computed in the same way as in the first study. Positive values indicated
that posttest attitudes were more positive than pretest attitudes (i.e., a positive evaluative shift)
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and negative values indicated that posttest attitudes were more negative than pretest attitudes
(i.e., a negative evaluative shift). A difference score of zero indicated that no change in attitudes
had occurred from pretest to posttest.
In order to examine both main and interactive effects of attitude extremity and political
ideology (PID) on attitude difference scores, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted.
Need for cognition (NFC) was also included as a predictor, given past work demonstrating
differential processing of arguments among high versus low elaborators.2 Attitude extremity was
operationalized in the same way as in Study 1 (i.e., pretest attitude squared). In accordance with
Aiken and West (1991), the attitude extremity, political ideology, and need for cognition
variables were centered to reduce collinearity. These three centered variables (extremity, PID,
NFC) were entered in Step 1. The three two-way interactions among attitude extremity, political
ideology, and need for cognition (i.e., extremity X PID, extremity X NFC, PID X NFC) were
entered in Step 2. The three-way interaction of attitude extremity, political ideology, and need
for cognition was entered in Step 3.
The first model of the regression analysis predicted significant unique variance in gun
control attitude difference scores, F(3,75) = 8.23, p < .001, R2 = .25. A main effect of attitude
extremity was found (B = 0.60, t(78) = 4.19, p < .001), such that individuals with more moderate
attitudes became more negative toward gun control and individuals with more extreme attitudes
became more positive toward gun control. In addition, need for cognition emerged as a
significant predictor of gun control attitude difference scores (B = 0.39, t(78) = 2.80, p < .01),
such that higher NFC scores were associated with positive attitude change.
2

Direct and interactive effects of gender and IPQ on gun control attitude difference
scores were also examined. However, hierarchical regressions revealed no significant direct or
interactive effects of either gender or IPQ, ps > .17.
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The second model also contributed significantly to the prediction of difference scores in
gun control attitudes, F(3,72) = 3.14, p = .03, R2 = .09. This was driven by a significant
interaction between attitude extremity and political ideology, B = 0.41, t(78) = 2.33, p < .03 (see
Figure 2).

Change in Gun Control Attitudes

2
1.5
1
0.5

Attitude
Extremity

0
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-0.5

Extreme

-1
-1.5
-2

Liberal
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Political Ideology
Figure 2. Gun control attitude difference scores as a function of attitude extremity and political
ideology at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 2).

To more closely examine this pattern, simple slopes analyses were conducted as outlined
by Aiken and West (1991). These analyses revealed that the coefficients associated with
extremity differed depending upon the level of PID. Liberal individuals (-1 SD) tended not to
change their attitudes about gun control, regardless of the extremity of their initial attitudes, B =
0.01, t(78) = 0.06, p = .95. For more conservative participants (+1 SD), a relation existed
between attitude extremity and difference scores, B = 0.98, t(78) = 5.01, p < .001. Specifically,
conservative individuals with more extreme initial attitudes demonstrated a positive shift in their
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attitudes toward gun control, whereas conservatives with more moderate initial attitudes became
more negative. Thus, although liberals tended not to change their attitudes regardless of how
moderate versus extreme their initial evaluations were, conservatives espousing extreme initial
attitudes became more positive about gun control and those expressing moderate attitudes
became more negative.
The third model emerged as marginally significant in predicting variance in gun control
attitude difference scores, F(1,71) = 3.74, p < .06, R2 = .03, due to the trending three-way
interaction of attitude extremity, political ideology, and need for cognition, B = -0.26, t(78) = 1.93, p < .06 (see Figure 3). To decompose the interaction, regression models predicting the
effects of need for cognition at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of attitude extremity and
political ideology were run (Aiken & West, 1991). Need for cognition did not predict perceived
attitude change for more conservative participants, regardless of whether they held relatively
moderate (B = 0.45, t(78) = 1.34, p = .19) or extreme (B = 0.14, t(78) = 0.53, p = .60) initial
attitudes toward gun control. In addition, need for cognition did not predict gun control attitude
difference scores among liberals with moderate initial attitudes, B = -0.01, t(78) = -0.02, p = .98.
Need for cognition emerged as a significant predictor of gun control attitude difference scores
only for liberal participants who expressed relatively extreme attitudes toward the target issue, B
= 0.72, t(78) = 3.08, p < .01. Among this particular subgroup, individuals higher in need for
cognition became more evaluatively positive, whereas those lower in need for cognition tended
not to change their attitudes toward gun control.
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Figure 3. Gun control attitude difference scores as a function of need for cognition, attitude
extremity, and political ideology at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 2).
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Accuracy as a Mediator of the Extremity-Polarization Relation
It was hypothesized that differences in biased assimilation would at least partially
mediate the extremity-polarization relation in Study 2. In order to examine whether the
significant relation between attitude extremity and gun control attitude difference scores was at
least partially accounted for by differences in the accuracy of processing of extreme versus
moderate attitude holders, this mediation model was tested in accordance with procedures
detailed by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, the direct relation between attitude extremity and
gun control attitude difference scores was assessed via a regression model predicting difference
scores from extremity. This relation was found to be significant, B = 0.56, t(78) = 3.94, p < .001,
with extreme attitudes associated with positive change and moderate attitudes associated with
negative change. Next, the relation between attitude extremity and accuracy was examined by
entering extremity as the sole predictor in a regression model predicting accuracy. This path was
marginally significant (B = -0.21, t(78) = -1.83, p = .07) and indicated that more extreme
attitudes were associated with less accuracy in processing and recall (consistent with past work
related to biased assimilation, e.g., Lord et al., 1979). Finally, the direct and indirect paths
between attitude extremity and difference scores were assessed simultaneously by entering both
extremity and accuracy into a regression model predicting gun control attitude difference scores.
Accuracy did significantly predict difference scores, B = 0.33, t(78) = 2.32, p < .03. However,
the inclusion of this indirect path did not affect the magnitude of the direct relation between
attitude extremity and change in gun control attitudes, which remained significant (B = 0.60,
t(78) = 4.21, p < .001). A Sobel’s test confirmed that there was no significant decrease in the
relation between attitude extremity and gun control difference scores after controlling for
accuracy, Sobel’s z = -0.15, p = .14.
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Given that accuracy did significantly predict gun control attitude difference scores, it was
included in a hierarchical regression model to determine if it moderated the effects of the
primary predictors (i.e., attitude extremity, political ideology) on difference scores. The centered
versions of extremity, ideology, and accuracy were entered in Step 1; the three two-way
interactions (i.e., extremity X PID, extremity X accuracy, PID X accuracy) were entered in Step
2; and the three-way interaction (i.e., extremity X PID X accuracy) was entered in Step 3. The
first model of the regression analysis was significant, F(3,75) = 6.69, p < .001, R2 = .21. In
addition to the main effect for attitude extremity previously examined, accuracy also emerged as
a significant predictor of gun control difference scores (B = 0.33, t(78) = 2.31, p < .03),
indicating that greater accuracy was associated with positive attitude change.
Model 2 also predicted significant unique variance in attitude difference scores, F(3,72) =
5.14, p < .001, R2 = .14. This significance was driven by two effects: the previously examined
attitude extremity X political ideology interaction, and a significant interaction between attitude
extremity and accuracy, B = 0.39, t(78) = 2.84, p < .01 (see Figure 4). Simple slopes analyses
revealed that accuracy did not predict attitude change for participants with relatively moderate (1 SD) initial attitudes toward gun control, B = -0.16, t(78) = -0.72, p = .47. For participants with
relatively extreme (+1 SD) gun control attitudes, however, accuracy significantly predicted
difference scores, B = 0.63, t(78) = 3.65, p < .001. Specifically, individuals with more extreme
attitudes who were also more accurate in their recall demonstrated a positive shift in their
evaluations of gun control, whereas extreme attitude holders who were less accurate were less
likely to change their attitudes. Consistent with this, the effect of attitude extremity was
significant for more accurate (+1 SD) participants (B = 1.05, t(78) = 5.00, p < .001) but not for
less accurate (-1 SD) individuals (B = 0.26, t(78) = 1.46, p = .15). The significant interaction
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between attitude extremity and political ideology was therefore driven by the positive evaluative
shift among more accurate individuals who also held relatively extreme initial attitudes toward
gun control.
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Figure 4. Gun control attitude difference scores as a function of attitude extremity and accuracy
at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 2).

Conclusions
Study 2 built upon the findings obtained in the first study and provided further
information regarding the relations among attitude extremity, political ideology, and attitude
change following exposure to mixed evidence about a target issue. First, although extremity of
initial attitudes was again found to significantly predict the degree and direction of attitude
change, the result pattern differed from that found in the first study. In Study 2, individuals who
reported more extreme evaluative positions toward gun control became more positive after
having read the arguments supporting and opposing gun control, whereas participants with more
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moderate attitudes initially became more negative in their attitudes toward gun control. Instead
of demonstrating resistance to change, those holding relatively more extreme attitudes about gun
control demonstrated a positive shift in their evaluations of the target. This change in attitude
may reflect that participants were not as familiar with or invested in the issue of gun control as
Study 1 participants were in regards to abortion rights. Attitudes toward gun control may not
have been very salient or the issue may not have been seen as personally relevant in this
particular college sample.
Study 2 also examined the effect of political ideology on attitude difference scores. It
was hypothesized that political conservatives would demonstrate polarization of their initial
attitudes, whereas political liberals were expected to depolarize. However, consistent with Study
1, political ideology did not emerge as a significant predictor of change in gun control attitudes.
Political ideology did interact with attitude extremity, but not in the predicted direction. Attitude
extremity did not predict change scores for liberals, who demonstrated resistance to change
regardless of the extremity of their initial views on gun control. For conservative individuals,
however, attitude extremity significantly predicted gun control difference scores, such that
extreme attitudes were associated with little change, whereas moderate attitudes predicted a
negative shift. This finding was further qualified by a marginal three-way interaction with need
for cognition. Although no effect of need for cognition on attitude difference scores was found
for conservatives or participants with moderate attitudes, need for cognition significantly
predicted changes in gun control attitudes among liberals with extreme attitudes. Specifically,
liberal individuals who also expressed more extreme pretest attitudes demonstrated positive
change if they were also relatively higher in need for cognition but resisted changing their views
if they were relatively low in need for cognition.
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The fourth hypothesis advanced in Study 2 was that biased assimilation would mediate
the relation between attitude extremity and subsequent change in gun control attitudes. Past
work in the attitude polarization literature has found evidence that individuals with more extreme
attitudes engage in more biased (i.e., less accurate) processing of mixed information, thereby
coming away even more assured of the correctness of their evaluative stance and potentially
adopting a more extreme version of that position (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993). In
Study 2, the direct path from attitude extremity to gun control attitude difference scores was
found to be significant, with more extreme attitudes associated with positive change. The
relation between extremity and the hypothesized mediator, accuracy (a proxy for biased
assimilation), was marginally significant and in the predicted direction. That is, more extreme
attitudes toward gun control were predictive of less accurate (i.e., more biased) thought listings.
Finally, both attitude extremity and accuracy significantly predicted difference scores when
examined together, providing evidence that both the direct and indirect paths between extremity
and attitude change were significant. However, accuracy did not mediate the extremity-attitude
change relationship, given that there was not a significant reduction in the significance of the
direct relation between attitude extremity and gun control difference scores when controlling for
accuracy.
Although accuracy of participants’ thought listings was not found to be a mediator
between extremity of initial attitudes toward gun control and subsequent attitude change, its
significant relation to both extremity and difference scores prompted its examination as a
potential moderator. In addition to directly predicting gun control attitude difference scores
(more accurate thought listings were associated with positive change; less accurate responses
related to change resistance), the interactive effect of extremity and accuracy emerged as
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significant. Specifically, although those with moderate initial attitudes tended not to change their
attitudes regardless of their accuracy, individuals with extreme attitudes showed different change
patterns depending upon how accurate they were. Whereas extreme attitudes coupled with high
accuracy gave rise to positive difference scores, the pairing of extreme attitudes and less accurate
thought listings was associated with resistance to change. This pattern is consistent with past
work in the attitude polarization literature, which has found that extreme initial views
accompanied by biased information processing relates to change resistance and polarization (e.g.,
Lord et al., 1979). Although accuracy did not mediate the extremity-attitude change relation, it
did emerge as a significant moderator with effects patterns consistent with past work.
Study 2 provided further evidence that attitudinal extremity predicts the degree and
direction of attitude change following exposure to mixed evidence. In addition, interactive
effects with ideology, need for cognition, and accuracy suggest that many factors influence
individuals’ propensities to polarize.
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Study 3
The third study extended the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in three primary ways. First, the
target issue was changed to tax increases in an effort to determine whether reactions to a fiscal
topic differed from those elicited by the more socially flavored issues of abortion rights (Study 1)
and gun control (Study 2). Second, two measures of individual propensities toward mental
rigidity, cognitive flexibility (Martin & Rubin, 1995) and need for cognitive closure (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994), were added to Study 3. Study 2 focused on the role of biased assimilation as
a potential mediator of the attitude extremity-attitude polarization relationship, as suggested by
work in the attitude polarization tradition (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993). Study 3
built upon this by investigating the role of mental rigidity, a general factor of interest in the
ideological difference literature, in contributing to change resistance and attitude polarization.
Past research suggests that political conservatives are more cognitively rigid, more dogmatic, and
less integratively complex than their liberal counterparts (e.g., Gruenfeld, 1995; Smithers &
Lobley, 1978; Altemeyer, 1981; Tetlock, 1983, 1984). In addition, the psychological need for
cognitive closure, a central element of Lay Epistemic Theory, tends to be greater among political
conservatives versus liberals (Jost et al., 1999). The inclusion of these measures in Study 3
allowed for the assessment of important motivational factors in terms of which liberals and
conservatives have been shown to differ, as well as the relation between such differential
motivation and subsequent attitude polarization. Third, self-reported attitude change was
included as an additional measure of attitude polarization. Work in the attitude polarization
tradition has assessed attitude change both directly, via difference scores (e.g., Tesser & Cowan,
1975; Harton & Latané, 1997), and indirectly, via self-reported attitude change (e.g., Lord et al.,
1979; Miller et al., 1993). Incorporating self-assessed attitude change in addition to the use of

78

difference scores allowed for the comparison of the result patterns obtained for these measures of
polarization.
Hypothesis 1. Extremity of initial attitudes predicts attitude polarization. In
keeping with the results of Studies 1 and 2, a main effect for attitudinal extremity was again
hypothesized, such that individuals expressing more extreme attitudes toward tax increases at the
outset were expected to adopt even more extreme evaluative positions (i.e., polarize) following
the presentation of mixed evidence, whereas those with relatively more moderate initial attitudes
were expected to demonstrate more “willingness” to change in response to the mixed evidence,
therefore resulting in depolarization of their pretest attitudes (Miller et al., 1993).
Hypothesis 2. Political ideology predicts attitude polarization. As in the first two
studies, a main effect for political ideology was again hypothesized. Specifically, it was
predicted that political conservatives would show more evidence of polarization than would
political liberals. Ideology may not have emerged as a significant predictor in Studies 1 or 2 due
to the social nature of the target issues, abortion rights and gun control. As a different type of
issue, tax increases, was employed in Study 3, the original hypothesis regarding a main effect for
political ideology on attitude change was again advanced.
Hypothesis 3. Attitude extremity and political ideology interactively affect attitude
polarization. It was again expected that the effect of extremity of initial attitudes on subsequent
polarization would depend upon ideological allegiances to the right versus the left. Specifically,
political conservatives were predicted to demonstrate attitude polarization in response to the mix
of statements about tax increases, regardless of whether their initial attitudes about tax increases
were relatively extreme or relatively moderate. Among liberals, however, it was anticipated that
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those holding extreme attitudes would be more apt to polarize, whereas individuals reporting
moderate initial attitudes would show evidence of depolarization
Hypothesis 4. Biased assimilation mediates the link between attitude extremity and
attitude polarization. In keeping with Study 2 predictions, as well as research in the attitude
polarization tradition, it was again hypothesized that accuracy of processing and recall would
mediate the significant relation between extremity of initial attitudes and subsequent attitude
change. That is, individuals holding extreme attitudes were expected to engage in more biased
assimilation and processing of the mixed evidence about tax increases than those holding
moderate initial attitudes, and this discrepancy in processing, in turn, was expected to manifest as
greater attitude polarization among extreme attitude-holders versus moderates.
Hypothesis 5. Mental rigidity mediates the relation between political ideology and
attitude polarization. Research on ideological differences has consistently indicated that
liberals and conservatives differ in terms of mental rigidity. Past research has shown that liberals
and conservatives differ in their need for cognitive closure (NCC) as well as their cognitive
flexibility, such that political conservatives demonstrate higher NCC scores and lower flexibility
scores than do political liberals (Rokeach, 1960; Tetlock, 1984; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994;
Jost et al., 1999; Jost et al., 2003a).
The potential mediating effects of mental rigidity, as indicated by NCC and cognitive
flexibility, on the ideology-polarization link was examined in Study 3. It was hypothesized that
differences in mental rigidity, in terms of need for cognitive closure and cognitive flexibility,
would at least partially mediate the political ideology-polarization relation. That is, political
conservatives were expected to report higher levels of NCC and lower levels of cognitive
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flexibility than political liberals, and this discrepancy in mental rigidity, in turn, was predicted to
manifest as greater attitude polarization among conservatives than among liberals.
Method
Participants
One hundred thirty-one individuals enrolled in psychology courses at Virginia
Commonwealth University (ninety-one women; 50% Caucasian, 28% Black, 11% Asian, 8%
Hispanic, and 3% “other”) participated in the study for one hour of research credit. As in the
previous two studies, there were no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or religious
affiliation. The only requirements for participation were a minimum age of eighteen and fluency
in English, as participants needed to be able to carefully read and evaluate a written argument.
In addition, individuals who had participated in Study 1 or Study 2 were not eligible to take part
in Study 3.
Measures and Materials
Pretest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ initial attitudes toward a variety of social
issues were assessed using the same set of issue items employed in the first two studies (see
Appendix A). However, the response options were expanded from 7-point to 9-point semantic
differential scales (i.e., ranging from -4 (negative) to +4 (positive)) in order to facilitate the
computation of attitude difference scores. Embedded in this series of questions was an item
assessing views on the issue of tax increases, which served as the pretest attitude assessment.
Social Networking Sites Essay. The same series of statements describing the benefits
and risks of using social networking sites developed and employed in the first two studies was
again incorporated in Study 3 (Appendix B).
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Tax Increase Essay. A series of statements supporting and opposing tax increases was
developed (see Appendix I). Statements supporting tax increases, gathered and adapted
primarily from the Democratic Party website, centered on the benefits of increased revenue for
education, defense, and other social programs. Oppositional statements, which were largely
adapted from the Republican Party website, focused on the burden that additional taxes would
place on individuals and potential detrimental effects of slowed consumer spending and small
business growth on the weakened national economy. Messages were standardized in terms of
length and content, and the order of presentation of the supporting and opposing statements was
counterbalanced.
Posttest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ posttest attitudes toward tax increases were
assessed using the same series of five items used in Studies 1 and 2. As in the previous studies, a
composite variable (with higher scores indicating greater positivity toward tax increases) was
created by averaging the five posttest attitude items (α = .97).
Self-Reported Attitude Change. In Study 3, participants also reported their selfassessed attitude change via the following item (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993): “How
would you compare your current attitude about raising taxes with the attitude you had at the very
start of this experiment?” Response options ranged from -4 (much more against tax increases) to
+4 (much more in favor of tax increases). Past work has relied upon self-reported change as the
primary means of assessing attitude polarization (e.g., Lord et al., 1979). As such, the selfreported change item was incorporated in Study 3 and served as an additional dependent
variable. Positive scores indicated self-perceived positive change in tax increase attitudes from
pre- to posttest, negative scores indicated self-perceived negative change, and a score of zero
indicated no self-perceived change in attitudes.
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Thought Listings. Following the posttest attitude items, participants were again
provided with eight blank spaces and asked to list, in each, one thought or fact that they recalled
from the essay they had read on tax increases. The accuracy of these thought listings was
subsequently rated by two independent coders on a scale of 1 (not at all accurate) to 5 (extremely
accurate), as in Study 2. Paired comparisons of the accuracy ratings revealed that there was
sufficient agreement between the coders (rs > .70), so average accuracy ratings for each thought
listing were generated from the coders’ paired ratings. These individual accuracy ratings
demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .81) and were therefore averaged to create a
composite accuracy variable, for which higher scores represented greater accuracy. This
composite accuracy variable again served as the primary indicator of biased assimilation, as in
Study 2.
Political Ideology Scale. Political ideology was again assessed using the composite
scale developed and employed in the previous two studies (see Appendix D). After reversecoding the self-reported ideology question and standardizing all items, the forty-five political
ideology items were averaged to create a composite political ideology variable (α = .85), for
which higher scores were indicative of a more conservative ideological orientation.
Importance of Politics Questionnaire. Importance placed on politics was assessed
using the same questionnaire used in Studies 1 and 2 (see Appendix E). After standardization,
all eighteen items were averaged to form a composite importance of politics variable (α = .87),
with higher scores indicating greater importance.
Need for Cognition Scale. As in Study 2, all participants completed Cacioppo and
Petty’s (1982) 18-item need for cognition scale (see Appendix H). After reverse-scoring the
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necessary items, the average of these eighteen items was computed to create a composite NFC
score (α = .86), with higher scores indicative of higher need for cognition.
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale. The Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NCCS)
assesses individuals’ preference for arriving at an answer - any answer - rather than remain
undecided (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The original 42-item NCCS scale (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994) demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .84) and includes five facets or
subscales: order (e.g., “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life”), predictability (e.g.,
“I dislike unpredictable situations”), decisiveness (e.g., “When I have made a decision, I feel
relieved”), discomfort with ambiguity (e.g., “I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean
many different things”), and close-mindedness (e.g., “I do not usually consult many different
opinions before forming my own view”). All items are rated on six-point Likert scales ranging
from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree), with higher scores representing greater
need for closure.
In order to gauge individual differences in need for cognitive closure, all participants in
Study 3 completed the abbreviated NCCS (see Appendix J). This 15-item abbreviated version of
the NCCS (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) is comprised of three items from each of the five subscales
and has also demonstrated strong reliability (α = .87). In Study 3, these fifteen items were found
to be highly correlated and internally consistent (α = .86), so their average was computed to
create a composite NCCS variable, higher scores on which indicated greater need for cognitive
closure.
Cognitive Flexibility Scale. The 12-item Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin &
Rubin, 1995) was included in the third study in order to assess individual differences in
willingness to consider multiple options and alternatives, as well as self-efficacy in being flexible
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(Appendix K). Work investigating ideological differences has shown that conservatives are less
cognitively flexible and cognitively integrated than are political liberals (e.g., Tetlock, 1984; Jost
et al., 2003a). Response options range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), with
higher values indicating greater cognitive flexibility. In Study 3, the twelve CFS items were
averaged to create a composite variable, which was found to have satisfactory internal
consistency (α = .77). Higher scores on the composite CFS variable indicated greater cognitive
flexibility.
Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed the demographics
questionnaire (see Appendix F) assessing sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and
hometown size.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 3 was nearly identical to that of Studies 1 and 2. After having
signed the informed consent forms, participants provided their attitudes about tax increases,
among several other issues, followed by the CFS. Participants then read the essay about social
networking sites and evaluated the issue. Next, they read about and evaluated tax increases,
completed the self-reported attitude change item, and completed thought listings about the target
issue. Participants then completed the following measures: Need for Cognition (NFC),
Importance of Politics Questionnaire (IPQ), Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NCCS),
demographics, and Political Ideology (composite scale and self-identification item; PID).
Finally, participants were debriefed, any questions were addressed, and they were dismissed.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
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Descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest in Study 3 are presented in
Table 3. Before proceeding with tests of the study’s main hypotheses, the data were checked for
normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance. The accuracy variable was found to be
negatively skewed (Skewness = -1.11, SE = 0.21). In order to correct for this, a log
transformation was performed on the composite accuracy variable. Following transformation,
the new variable demonstrated much improved fit statistics (Skewness = -0.55, SE = 0.21), so
subsequent analyses were conducted using this transformed accuracy variable.
Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics for Study 3
Variable

M (SD)

Min

Max

Pretest Tax Increase Attitude

4.21 (2.07)

1.00

9.00

0.15

0.21

Posttest Tax Increase Attitude

4.62 (2.08)

1.00

9.00

-0.08

0.21

Self-Reported Attitude Change

-0.80 (1.38)

-4.00

4.00

-0.49

0.21

Political Ideology Composite1

2.48 (0.44)

1.42

4.60

-0.07

0.21

Self-Identified Ideology1

4.47 (1.79)

1.00

8.00

0.17

0.21

Importance of Politics2

0.00 (0.75)

-2.11

1.53

-0.53

0.21

Need for Cognition

3.48 (0.60)

2.00

4.83

-0.16

0.21

Accuracy

3.44 (0.49)

1.75

4.10

-1.11

0.21

Cognitive Flexibility

4.80 (0.55)

3.33

5.92

-0.24

0.21

Need for Cognitive Closure

3.80 (0.73)

1.67

5.80

-0.17

0.21

1
2

higher values = more conservative
standardized composite
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Skewness

SESk

All other variables of interest were found to meet the assumptions of normality, linearity, and
homogeneity of variance, making it appropriate to run analyses with these data in their original
form. As in the previous two studies, the composite measure of political ideology was not
significantly skewed (Skewness = -0.07, SE = 0.21) or restricted in range or variability,
indicating that the sample was not biased in terms of its ideological composition.
Tests of Main Hypotheses
The main purpose of the current study was to test the effects of attitude extremity and
political ideology on changes in attitudes toward tax increases. In Study 3, two
conceptualizations of attitude change were employed as dependent variables. First, as in Studies
1 and 2, a direct assessment of change in participants’ attitudes from pre- to posttest (i.e., before
versus after encountering the tax increase essay) was employed. The difference score was
computed in the same way as in the previous studies, with positive values indicating a positive
evaluative shift and negative values indicating a negative evaluative shift. In addition, the item
assessing self-reported change in attitudes toward tax increases was employed as a second
dependent variable. The correlation between these two measures was relatively weak (r = .29, p
< .05), so they were analyzed separately.3
Effects on difference scores. In order to examine both main and interactive effects of
attitude extremity and political ideology (PID) on attitude difference scores, a hierarchical
3

In addition to exploring the effects of attitude extremity and political ideology on both
directly assessed and self-reported attitude change, the effects of several individual difference
factors (i.e., gender, IPQ, NFC, accuracy, and mental rigidity) were also examined. Hierarchical
regressions revealed no significant direct or interactive effects of IPQ, NFC, accuracy, or mental
rigidity (ps > .09) for either dependent measure. A main effect for gender on self-reported
attitude change was found (B = -0.65, t(130) = -2.51, p < .02), such that women reported
becoming more negative than men. However, gender did not correlate with either attitude
extremity or political ideology, and no interactive effects of gender were found to be significant,
ps > .11. As this gender effect did not emerge for both conceptualizations of tax increase attitude
change, it was not considered in the main analyses.
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regression analysis was conducted. Attitude extremity was operationalized as in Studies 1 and 2
(i.e., pretest attitude squared). In accordance with Aiken and West (1991), the attitude extremity
and political ideology variables were centered to reduce collinearity. The centered extremity and
ideology variables were entered in Step 1, and their two-way interaction (i.e., extremity X PID)
was entered in Step 2.
The first model of the regression analysis predicted significant unique variance in tax
increase attitude difference scores, F(2,128) = 3.88, p < .03, R2 = .06. This significance was
driven by a main effect of attitude extremity, B = 0.43, t(130) = 2.64, p < .01. Specifically, it
was found that individuals espousing more moderate attitudes toward tax increases tended not to
change their attitudes, whereas those expressing extreme attitudes demonstrated positive attitude
change. Neither political ideology nor the interaction of extremity and ideology emerged as
significant predictors, and Model 2 did not predict significant unique variance in tax increase
attitude difference scores, F(1,127) = 2.00, p = .16, R2 = .02.
Effects on self-reported attitude change. A hierarchical regression was also conducted
to investigate the effects of attitude extremity, political ideology, and their interaction on
participants’ self-reported change in attitudes toward tax increases. The centered extremity and
ideology variables were entered in the first step, and their interaction comprised the second step.
The first model of the regression analysis was marginally significant in predicting self-reported
change in tax increase attitudes, F(2,128) = 2.68, p = .07, R2 = .04. There was a significant main
effect of attitude extremity, B = -0.24, t(130) = -2.04, p < .05. As in the model predicting actual
difference scores, moderate attitudes were associated with no perceived change in tax increase
attitudes. However, extreme attitudes were associated with self-reported negative attitude
change.
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The second model also contributed significantly to the prediction of self-reported change
in tax increase attitudes, F(1,127) = 4.41, p < .04, R2 = .03, due to the significant interaction
between attitude extremity and political ideology, B = -0.25, t(130) = -2.10, p < .04 (see Figure
5). Simple slopes analyses were conducted in accordance with Aiken and West (1991). For
more conservative (+1 SD) individuals, a relation existed between extremity and difference
scores such that extreme initial attitudes were associated with self-reported negative shifts in
attitudes toward tax increases, whereas moderate attitudes were associated with relatively little
perceived change, B = -0.47, t(130) = -2.94, p < .01. For more liberal (-1 SD) participants,
extremity of initial attitude did not significantly predict self-reported tax increase attitude
change, B = 0.03, t(130) = 0.15, p = .88. Furthermore, among participants with extreme attitudes
(+1 SD), political ideology significantly predicted self-reported attitude change (B = -0.34, t(130)
= -2.22, p < .03), such that more conservative individuals reported becoming more negative than
more liberal individuals.

Self-Reported Change in
Tax Increase Attitudes

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Moderate
-0.2

Extreme

-0.4
-0.6
-0.8

Liberal

Conservative

Political Ideology
Figure 5. Self-reported change in tax increase attitudes as a function of attitude extremity and
political ideology at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 3).
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Political ideology did not significantly predict self-reported attitude change for
participants with moderate initial attitudes (-1 SD), B = 0.15, t(130) = 0.83, p = .41. Together,
these analyses indicate that more conservative individuals with more extreme attitudes perceived
their attitudes toward tax increases to have become more negative following exposure to the
mixture of supporting and opposing arguments, whereas liberals and those with more moderate
initial attitudes tended to report less evaluative change.
Accuracy as a Mediator of the Extremity-Polarization Relation
It was hypothesized that differences in biased assimilation, as assessed by accuracy of
recall in the thought listings, would at least partially mediate the extremity-polarization relation
in Study 3. Although attitude extremity significantly predicted both actual attitude change (i.e.,
posttest – pretest difference score), B = 0.43, t(130) = 2.64, p < .01, and perceived attitude
change, B = -0.24, t(130) = -2.03, p < .05, attitude extremity did not predict accuracy, B = -0.09,
t(130) = -0.97, p = .34. Moreover, accuracy did not predict attitude change as assessed by the
difference score or self-reported change, ps > .40. Thus, there was no evidence of biased
assimilation as a mediator of the extremity-polarization association.
Mental Rigidity as a Mediator of the Ideology-Polarization Relation
As both cognitive flexibility and need for cognitive closure speak to the general
characteristic of mental rigidity, the two measures (i.e., NCCS and CFS) were combined to
create a composite variable indicating general mental rigidity. First, items from the CFS were
reverse-coded, so that higher values indicated less cognitive flexibility. Then, all items in the
NCCS and (newly reversed) CFS were standardized in order to put them on the same metric. All
twenty-seven standardized items (15 NCCS; 12 CFS) were found to correlate highly and
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demonstrated strong internal consistency (α = .81), so a composite variable assessing general
mental rigidity was created, with higher values being indicative of greater mental rigidity.
It was hypothesized that differences in mental rigidity would at least partially mediate the
relation between political ideology and tax increase attitude change in Study 3. Although
political ideology did not emerge as a significant predictor of either difference scores (B = -0.15,
t(130) = -0.89, p = .38) or self-reported change (B = -0.13, t(130) = -1.09, p = .28), most
contemporary analysts (e.g., Kenny, 2011) argue that a significant direct relation need not be
present in order for mediation to occur. As such, it was appropriate to proceed with tests of
mediation despite the lack of a significant predictive effect of political ideology on the dependent
measures of interest. Analyses revealed that political ideology did predict mental rigidity, B =
0.22, t(130) = 2.54, p < .02. In keeping with previous work on the relation between cognitive
rigidity and political ideology (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Jost et al., 1999; Jost et al.,
2003a), higher scores on the composite mental rigidity variable were associated with greater
conservatism. However, mental rigidity did not predict attitude change as assessed by either the
difference score or self-reported change, ps > .19.4 Thus, there was no evidence that mental
rigidity mediated the relation between political ideology and either actual or perceived attitude
change.
Conclusions
Study 3 built upon the findings obtained in the first two studies and provided further
information regarding the relations among attitude extremity, political ideology, and attitude
change following exposure to mixed evidence about a target issue. By including a measure of
4

Mediation analyses were also conducted employing NCCS and CFS as potential
mediators of the ideology-attitude change relationship. As these analyses revealed the same
pattern of results as those conducted on the overall composite mental rigidity variable, only
mediation analyses involving mental rigidity are described.
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self-reported attitude change, it was possible to examine and compare the effects of the primary
predictors (i.e., extremity and ideology) on both actual and perceived changes in attitudes toward
the target issue, tax increases. Consistent with the first two studies, a main effect for attitude
extremity was again found, although the result pattern differed for directly assessed versus selfreported attitude change. Individuals expressing more moderate attitudes toward tax increases
tended to remain consistent in their attitudes based on both the actual and self-reported attitude
change. Individuals holding more extreme initial attitudes demonstrated and perceived attitude
change. Interestingly, however, the direction of attitude change among extreme attitude holders
differed for actual versus self-reported change: Whereas those expressing extreme attitudes
actually became more positive in their evaluations of tax increases from pre- to posttest, these
same individuals reported becoming more evaluatively negative. This divergent pattern across
conceptualizations of attitude change is consistent with past work by Miller and colleagues
(1993), which demonstrated that participants’ directly assessed attitude change can differ
markedly from their perceptions of their evaluative movement in terms of both valence and
magnitude.
Study 3 also examined the effect of political ideology on both attitude difference scores
and perceived attitude change. It was hypothesized that political conservatives would
demonstrate polarization of their initial attitudes, whereas political liberals were expected to
depolarize. However, as in the previous two studies, political ideology did not emerge as a
significant predictor of either directly assessed or self-reported change in tax increase attitudes.
Given the prominence of the target issue – tax increases – in the media and contemporary public
discourse, it may be that individuals relied primarily upon their pre-existing (and likely salient)
attitudes about tax increases in determining their evaluative reactions to the mixed evidence and
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were relatively less inclined to use their ideological orientation as a guide in reporting their
attitudes toward tax increases. As in the previous studies, the sample was not skewed or
restricted in regards to ideology, making it highly unlikely that the lack of political ideology
main effect could be accounted for by a lack of ideological variability in the sample.
In addition to the hypothesized main effects, an interactive effect for attitude extremity
and political ideology was also predicted. In Study 3, this interaction did not significantly
predict directly assessed changes in attitudes toward tax increases. However, the interactive
effect of extremity and ideology emerged as a significant predictor of self-reported attitude
change. Specifically, liberal participants tended to report not changing their attitudes, regardless
of how moderate versus extreme their initial evaluations of tax increases were. In contrast,
attitude extremity significantly predicted perceived change scores among conservative
individuals, such that conservatives with moderate tax increase attitudes reported that their
attitudes had not changed, whereas those espousing extreme attitudes reported becoming more
negative in their views of tax increases. This pattern suggests that the only subgroup of
participants in Study 3 who reported changing their attitudes toward the target issue were
conservative individuals who espoused extreme attitudes about the issue at the outset of the
study. Given the prominence of the issue of tax increases in mainstream political discourse, as
well as the general stance among political conservatives that tax increases would further
jeopardize an already faltering national economy, it is likely that the extreme attitudes expressed
by some conservative participants were evaluatively negative. Indeed, a significant negative
correlation between pretest attitudes and political ideology confirmed that conservatives’ initial
attitudes toward tax increases were significantly more negative than were liberals’, r = -.26, p <
.01. The perception of becoming even more evaluatively negative toward tax increases
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following exposure to mixed evidence about the issue would seem to indicate that attitude
polarization occurred among conservatives with extreme initial attitudes.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses advanced in Study 3 proposed two factors as mediators of
the relations between the primary predictors (i.e., attitude extremity, political ideology) and the
dependent measures of interest. First, it was predicted that biased assimilation would mediate
the relation between attitude extremity and subsequent change in tax increase attitudes. Past
work in the attitude polarization literature has found evidence that those with more extreme
attitudes engage in more biased processing of information and that this biased assimilation
accounts for differences in the attitude change among extreme versus moderate attitude holders
(e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993). However, tests of mediation revealed no evidence
that accuracy explained the observed relation between attitude extremity and either actual or
perceived attitude change. It was also hypothesized that that mental rigidity would at least
partially mediate the relation between political ideology and both directly assessed and selfreported change in attitudes toward tax increases. Past work in the political ideology literature
has indicated that political conservatives demonstrate less cognitive flexibility (Jost et al., 2003a)
and greater need for cognitive closure (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Jost et al., 2003a) than
do political liberals and that this difference in mental rigidity accounts for greater resistance to
change among conservatives. However, no direct relation was found between political ideology
and either directly assessed or self-reported attitude change scores in Study 3, and mental rigidity
(although correlated with political ideology) did not significantly predict computed or perceived
attitude change. Therefore, mental rigidity did not emerge as a significant mediator in the
relation between political ideology and attitude change.
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Study 3 further revealed and clarified the relation between attitude extremity and attitude
change, in terms of both directly calculated difference scores and self-reported evaluative
movement. In addition, divergent patterns of both attitude extremity and the interaction of
extremity and ideology were found across the two dependent measures, indicating a disconnect
between real and reported attitude change.
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Study 4
Study 4 expanded upon the previous three studies in two primary ways. First, a new
target issue, environmental preservation, was the focus. As the previous studies had focused
upon social and economic issues, the fourth study incorporated a new topic in order to examine
the relations among the primary variables of interest in the context of the preservation of land,
wildlife, and natural resources. Second, a non-college sample was included in addition to the
student sample in Study 4 in order to more accurately approximate the ideological and attitudinal
parameters found in the broader US population. It was not expected that the non-college and
college samples would differ in terms of the hypothesized effects on attitude change. Thus, the
extent to which the previous findings (Studies 1-3) generalized beyond a college sample was
assessed.
Hypothesis 1. Extremity of initial attitudes predicts attitude polarization.
Consistent with the results of the previous three studies, a main effect for attitudinal extremity
was again hypothesized, such that individuals expressing more extreme attitudes toward
environmental preservation at the outset were expected to adopt even more extreme evaluative
positions (i.e., polarize) following the presentation of mixed evidence, whereas those with
relatively more moderate initial attitudes were expected to demonstrate more “willingness” to
change in response to the mixed evidence, therefore resulting in depolarization of their pretest
attitudes (Miller et al., 1993).
Hypothesis 2. Political ideology predicts attitude polarization. As in the first three
studies, a main effect for political ideology was again hypothesized. Specifically, it was
predicted that political conservatives would show more evidence of polarization than would
political liberals. Ideology may not have emerged as a significant predictor in the previous
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studies due to the social nature of the issues of abortion rights and gun control, as well as the
salience of the issue of tax increases. As a different type of issue, environmental preservation,
was employed in Study 4, the original hypothesis regarding a main effect for political ideology
on attitude change was again advanced and tested.
Hypothesis 3. Attitude extremity and political ideology interactively affect attitude
polarization. It was again expected that the effect of extremity of initial attitudes on subsequent
polarization would depend upon political ideology. Specifically, conservatives were predicted to
demonstrate attitude polarization in response to the mix of statements supporting and opposing
environmental preservation, regardless of whether their initial attitudes about environmental
preservation were relatively extreme or relatively moderate. Among liberals, however, it was
anticipated that those holding extreme attitudes would be more apt to polarize, whereas
individuals reporting moderate initial attitudes would show evidence of depolarization.
Hypothesis 4. Biased assimilation mediates the link between attitude extremity and
attitude polarization. In keeping with the predictions of Studies 2 and 3, as well as research in
the attitude polarization tradition, it was again hypothesized that accuracy would mediate the
significant relation between extremity of initial attitudes and subsequent attitude change.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that biased processing would at least partially mediate the
extremity-polarization relation. That is, individuals holding extreme attitudes were expected to
engage in more biased processing of the mixed evidence about environmental preservation than
those holding moderate initial attitudes, and this discrepancy in processing, in turn, was expected
to manifest as greater attitude polarization among extreme attitude-holders versus moderates.
Hypothesis 5. Mental rigidity mediates the relation between political ideology and
attitude polarization. As in Study 3, it was hypothesized that differences in mental rigidity, in
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terms of need for cognitive closure and cognitive flexibility, would at least partially mediate the
relation between political ideology and attitude change. That is, political conservatives were
expected to report higher levels of NCC and lower levels of cognitive flexibility than political
liberals, and this discrepancy in mental rigidity, in turn, was predicted to manifest as greater
attitude polarization among conservatives than among liberals.
Method
Online Data Collection
All data for Study 4 were collected via the online survey program SurveyMonkey. Thus,
all participants registered for the study online and completed the study at their own convenience
and at a location of their choosing. Participants were recruited through two sources: VCU
Department of Psychology's SONA system (college sample) and Amazon's Mechanical Turk
(non-college sample).
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a low-cost method for collecting data from a diverse, noncollege sample. It has been employed in large-scale data collection since the service (originally
used by Amazon to allow employees to check for duplicate items in the inventory) was adapted
for general public use in 2005 (Kelley, 2010). Since then, over 200,000 study respondents have
participated in studies advertised on the service. The benefits of MTurk as compared with other
methods of survey data collection include a significant economic savings in time, effort, and
cost. In addition, MTurk’s viability as a data collection tool in human subjects research has been
empirically tested and validated. In particular, studies about judgments, attitudes, and
perceptions have been found to transfer quite easily from university settings to online completion
via MTurk (e.g., Kelley, 2010; Sprouse, 2010).
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In the current study, the use of MTurk allowed for the timely collection of data from a
more diverse, non-college sample in addition to the convenience sample of undergraduate
psychology students collected via VCU’s SONA system. The set-up, advertising, and participant
sign-up procedures for MTurk studies closely resembled the procedures used to enroll university
participants in online studies via VCU’s SONA system. A researcher (i.e., “MTurk Requester”)
account was established, allowing for the creation and advertising of the current study as a
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on the MTurk marketplace, an online forum where studies
available for completion are listed. Individuals registered as potential participants in the MTurk
system (“MTurk Workers”) have access to this forum and can browse the studies (HITs) that
have been created and posted by researchers and select the study(-ies) that they wish to take part
in for minimal payment.
Participants
SONA Sample. One hundred forty-two individuals enrolled in psychology courses at
Virginia Commonwealth University participated in the study for one hour of research credit. As
in the previous three studies, there were no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or
religious affiliation. The only requirements for participation were a minimum age of eighteen
and fluency in English, as participants needed to be able to carefully read and evaluate a written
argument. In addition, individuals who had participated in Studies 1, 2, or 3 were not eligible to
take part in Study 4. Ten participants were excluded from analyses due to missing data or
inappropriate completion (e.g., selecting the same response option for all items in a questionnaire
containing reverse-coded items) of the study measures. The final SONA sample was therefore
comprised of one hundred thirty-two participants (ninety-one women; 50% Caucasian, 19%
Black, 17% Asian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Native American, and 7% "other").
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MTurk Sample. Two hundred ninety individuals registered as MTurk workers
participated in the study in exchange for 1.5 in Amazon dollars. As with the SONA sample,
there were no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or religious affiliation. The only
requirements for participation were a minimum age of eighteen, not being currently enrolled in
college, US residency, and fluency in English, as participants needed to be able to carefully read
and evaluate a written argument. Eighty-three participants were excluded from analyses due to
missing data or inappropriate completion (e.g., selecting the same response option for all items in
a questionnaire containing reverse-coded items) of the study measures. The final MTurk sample
was therefore comprised of two hundred seven participants (one hundred fifteen women; 87%
Caucasian, 5% Black, 3% Asian, 2% Hispanic, 1% Native American, and 2% "other")
representing thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia.
Measures and Materials
Pretest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ initial attitudes toward a variety of social
issues were assessed using the same set of issue items employed in the first three studies (see
Appendix A), employing 9-point semantic differential scales that ranged from -4 (negative) to +4
(positive) as in Study 3. Embedded in this series of questions was an item assessing views on the
issue of environmental preservation, which served as the pretest attitude assessment.
Social Networking Sites Essay. The same series of statements describing the benefits
and risks of using social networking sites developed and employed in the first three studies was
again incorporated in Study 4 (Appendix B).
Environmental Preservation Essay. A series of statements supporting and opposing
environmental preservation was developed (see Appendix L). Statements supporting
environmental preservation centered on the need to preserve the nation’s landscapes and wildlife,
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management of public lands, and enforcement of environmental laws. Oppositional statements
focused on the economic benefits of making use of public lands for infrastructure, agriculture,
jobs, etc., and utilizing natural resources to reduce dependence on foreign energy sources.
Arguments were adapted from the websites of organizations devoted to environmental
preservation (e.g., the Sierra Club) as well as those advocating the development of national lands
and resources (e.g., U.S. Department of Energy). Messages were standardized in terms of length
and content, and the order of presentation of the supporting and opposing statements was
counterbalanced, as in the previous studies.
Posttest Attitudes Measure. Participants’ posttest attitudes toward environmental
preservation were assessed using the same series of five items used in the previous three studies.
The five posttest attitude items were averaged to form the composite posttest attitude score (α =
.97), with higher values indicating greater positivity toward environmental preservation.
Self-Reported Attitude Change. As in Study 3, participants also reported their selfassessed attitude change on a 9-point scale ranging from -4 (much more against environmental
preservation) to +4 (much more in favor of environmental preservation). This self-reported
change item was incorporated in Study 4 and served as an additional dependent variable.
Thought Listings. Following the posttest attitude items, participants were again
provided with eight blank spaces and asked to list, in each, one thought or fact that they recalled
from the essay they had read on environmental preservation. The accuracy of these thought
listings was subsequently rated by two independent coders, as in Studies 2 and 3. Paired
comparisons of the accuracy ratings revealed that there was sufficient agreement between the
coders (rs > .72), so average accuracy ratings for each thought listing were generated from the
coders’ paired ratings. These individual accuracy ratings were internally consistent (α = .90) and
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were therefore averaged to create a composite accuracy variable, for which higher scores
represented greater accuracy. This composite accuracy variable again served as the primary
indicator of biased assimilation, as in Studies 2 and 3.
Political Ideology Scale. Political ideology was again assessed using the composite
scale employed in the previous three studies (see Appendix D). After reverse-coding the selfreported ideology question and standardizing all items, the forty-five political ideology items
were averaged to create a composite political ideology variable (α = .94), for which higher scores
were indicative of a more conservative ideological orientation.
Importance of Environmental Preservation. As work by Petty and Cacioppo (1979)
and Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) has demonstrated, the degree of personal relevance
that a particular topic has for an individual affects his or her motivation to cognitively elaborate
on arguments surrounding it. Instead of assessing the importance that individuals placed upon
politics generally, it was important to assess how much participants cared about the particular
issue described and evaluated in Study 4, environmental preservation. Given that the more
general importance of politics measure (IPQ) had not contributed directly or interactively to the
prediction of attitude change scores in the previous three studies, it was removed and replaced by
this measure of specific issue importance in Study 4. The importance participants placed on
environmental preservation could moderate the effect of extremity and/or ideology on
participants’ attitudes toward the issue and arguments presented. To assess this potential
motivational factor, an item addressing the importance participants placed on environmental
preservation was incorporated in Study 4. This item read, “How important is environmental
preservation to you personally?” with response options ranging from -3 (not important) to +3
(very important).
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Need for Cognition Scale. As in Studies 2 and 3, participants completed Cacioppo and
Petty’s (1982) 18-item need for cognition scale (see Appendix H). After reverse-scoring the
necessary items, the average of these eighteen items was computed to create a composite NFC
score (α = .91), with higher scores indicating greater need for cognition.
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale. In order to gauge individual differences in need for
cognitive closure, all participants completed the abbreviated Need for Cognitive Closure Scale
(NCCS; see Appendix J), as in Study 3. In Study 4, these fifteen items were found to be highly
correlated and internally consistent (α = .87), so their average was computed to create a
composite NCCS variable, higher scores on which indicated greater need for cognitive closure.
Cognitive Flexibility Scale. The 12-item Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin &
Rubin, 1995) was again included in order to assess individual differences in willingness to
consider multiple options and alternatives, as well as self-efficacy in being flexible (Appendix
K). The twelve CFS items were averaged to create a composite variable (α = .79). Higher scores
on the composite CFS variable indicated greater cognitive flexibility.
Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed the demographics
questionnaire (see Appendix F) assessing sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and
hometown size.
Procedure
SONA participants. The order of measures for Study 4 closely resembled that
employed in the previous three studies. However, in order to more closely approximate the
study experience of those in the non-college sample, participants in the college sample
completed the study online instead of in the laboratory. After signing up to participate in the
“Social Issues” study through SONA, participants followed a link to the study on

103

SurveyMonkey, an online company that enables the creation and administration of web surveys.
After having read and agreed to an informed consent statement, participants provided their
attitudes about environmental preservation, among several other issues, followed by the CFS.
Participants then read the essay about social networking sites and evaluated the issue. Next, they
read about and evaluated environmental preservation, indicated the importance they placed on
the issue, completed the self-reported attitude change item, and completed the thought listings.
Participants then completed the following measures: Need for Cognition (NFC), Need for
Cognitive Closure Scale (NCCS), demographics, and Political Ideology (composite scale and
self-identification item; PID). The next to last screen provided participants with a summary
debriefing and included contact information should they have any questions regarding the study
(none did). Finally, VCU participants provided their email address (which was subsequently
removed from the data set to protect confidentiality) as a means of confirming completion of the
online study and ensuring that they would receive credit in the SONA system.
MTurk participants. The study was advertised as a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on
the Mechanical Turk marketplace, making it available for unique MTurk participants to complete
in return for 1.5 Amazon dollars. Participants were able to complete the study from any
computer that allowed connection to the MTurk web site. Participants voluntarily created a login and password, granting them access to the Social Issues HIT. Once registered, participants
followed a link to the study on SurveyMonkey, the same link provided to the college sample
through SONA. After having read and agreed to an informed consent statement, participants
provided their attitudes about environmental preservation, among several other issues, followed
by the CFS. Participants then read about and evaluated social networking sites. Next, they read
about and evaluated environmental preservation, indicated the importance they placed on the
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issue, completed the self-reported attitude change item, and completed thought listings.
Participants then completed the following measures: Need for Cognition (NFC), Need for
Cognitive Closure Scale (NCCS), demographics, and Political Ideology (composite scale and
self-identification item; PID). The next to last screen provided participants with a summary
debriefing and included contact information should they have any questions regarding the study
(none did). Finally, MTurk participants generated a unique eight-digit code (which was
subsequently removed from the data set to protect confidentiality) as a means of confirming
completion of the online study and ensuring that they would receive credit for completion on the
MTurk system. Following confirmation of completion, MTurk participants received 1.5 Amazon
dollars for their time and effort.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest in Study 4 are presented in
Table 4. Before proceeding with tests of the study’s main hypotheses, the data were checked to
ensure that assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance were met. The
pretest attitude (Skewness = -1.34, SE = 0.13), posttest attitude (Skewness = -1.11, SE = 0.13),
importance of environmental preservation (Skewness = -1.02, SE = 0.13), and accuracy
(Skewness = -1.11, SE = 0.13) variables were found to be negatively skewed. In addition, selfreported attitude change scores were found to be positively skewed (Skewness = 1.95, SE =
0.13). In order to correct for this non-normality, log transformations were performed on these
five variables. Following transformation, much improved fit statistics were found for pretest
attitudes (Skewness = -0.36, SE = 0.13), posttest attitudes (Skewness = -0.16, SE = 0.13),
importance of environmental preservation (Skewness = -0.18, SE = 0.13), accuracy (Skewness =

105

-0.14, SE = 0.13, and self-reported attitude change (Skewness = 0.61, SE = 0.13). As such,
subsequent analyses were conducted using these transformed variables. All other variables of
interest were found to meet the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of
variance, making it appropriate to run analyses with these data in their original form. As in the
previous three studies, the composite measure of political ideology was not significantly skewed
(Skewness = 0.15, SE = 0.13) and did not indicate any restriction of range or variability,
indicating that the sample was not biased in terms of its ideological composition.
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics for Study 4
Variable

M (SD)

Min

Max

Skewness

SESk

Pretest Environmental Preservation 7.34 (1.97)
Attitude

1.00

9.00

-1.34

0.13

Posttest Environmental Preservation 7.38 (1.69)
Attitude

1.00

9.00

-1.11

0.13

Self-Reported Attitude Change

0.49 (1.10)

-1.00

4.00

1.95

0.13

Political Ideology Composite¹

2.60 (0.65)

1.00

4.40

0.13

0.13

Self-Identified Ideology¹

4.57 (2.14)

1.00

9.00

0.15

0.13

Need for Cognition

3.54 (0.72)

1.33

4.78

-0.64

0.13

Accuracy

3.36 (0.65)

1.00

5.00

-1.11

0.13

Cognitive Flexibility

4.72 (0.61)

2.42

6.00

-0.61

0.13

Need for Cognitive Closure

3.84 (0.76)

1.73

5.87

-0.05

0.13

Importance of Environmental
Preservation

5.50 (1.61)

1.00

7.00

-1.02

0.13

¹ higher values = more conservative
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Comparisons were made between the SONA and MTurk samples to determine if they
differed in terms of the primary variables of interest. No differences were found between the
two samples in regards to pre- or posttest attitudes, self-reported attitude change, composite or
self-reported political ideology, importance of environmental preservation, or need for cognitive
closure (all ps > .11). The only three significant differences were found for the variables of need
for cognition, cognitive flexibility, and accuracy. The SONA sample demonstrated significantly
lower need for cognition scores (M = 3.35, SD = 0.60) than the MTurk sample (M = 3.68, SD =
0.76), t(338) = 4.25, p < .001. In addition, greater cognitive flexibility was observed in the
MTurk sample (M = 4.79, SD = 0.58) than in the SONA sample (M = 4.60, SD = 0.64), t(338) =
2.87, p < .01. Finally, the thought listings of the MTurk sample were significantly more accurate
(M = 3.50, SD = 0.50) than the thought listings of the SONA sample (M = 3.12, SD = 0.79),
t(323) = 4.37, p < .001.
Tests of Main Hypotheses
The main purpose of the current study was to test the effects of attitude extremity and
political ideology on changes in attitudes toward environmental preservation. As in Study 3, two
conceptualizations of attitude change were employed as dependent variables. First, a direct
assessment of change in participants’ attitudes from pre- to posttest (i.e., before versus after
encountering the environmental preservation essay) was employed. The difference score was
computed in the same way as in the previous studies, with positive values indicating a positive
evaluative shift and negative values indicating a negative evaluative shift. In addition, the item
assessing self-reported change in attitudes toward environmental preservation (log transformed)
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was employed as a second dependent variable. These two measures of attitude change did not
significantly correlate with one another (r = .07), so they were analyzed separately.5
Effects on difference scores. In order to examine both main and interactive effects of
attitude extremity, political ideology (PID), and participant type on attitude difference scores, a
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Also, given that the personal relevance of a
specific persuasive target can affect attention to and impressions of arguments about it (e.g.,
Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), importance of environmental preservation was included as a fourth
predictor variable. Attitude extremity was operationalized as in the previous three studies (i.e.,
pretest attitude squared), such that higher values indicated more extreme initial attitudes toward
environmental preservation. The attitude extremity, political ideology, and importance of
environmental preservation variables were centered to reduce collinearity, and the participant
type variable was dummy coded (0 = “MTurk,” 1 = “SONA”) in accordance with Aiken and
West (1991). The dummy coded participant type variable, along with the centered attitude
extremity, political ideology, and importance of environmental preservation variables, were
entered in Step 1. The six two-way interactions among attitude extremity, political ideology, and
participant type, and importance of environmental preservation (i.e., extremity X PID, extremity
X type, PID X type, extremity X EPI, PID X EPI, type X EPI) were entered in Step 2. The four
three-way interactions of extremity, ideology, participant type, and importance (i.e., extremity X
PID X type, extremity X PID X EPI, extremity X type X EPI, PID X type X EPI) were entered in
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In addition to exploring the effects of attitude extremity, political ideology, and
importance of environmental preservation on both directly assessed and self-reported attitude
change, direct and interactive effects of gender, NFC, accuracy, and mental rigidity were also
examined. However, hierarchical regressions revealed no significant direct or interactive effects
of gender, NFC, accuracy, or mental rigidity, (ps > .06) for either dependent measure.
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Step 3. Finally, the four-way interaction among all four predictor variables (i.e., extremity X
PID X type X EPI) was entered in Step 4.
The first model of the regression analysis predicted significant unique variance in
environmental preservation attitude difference scores, F(4,331) = 35.12, p < .001, R2 = .30. This
significance was driven by two main effects. First, attitude extremity significantly predicted
attitude difference scores, B = -0.15, t(338) = -11.48, p < .001. Specifically, individuals
espousing more moderate attitudes toward environmental preservation became more evaluatively
positive, whereas those expressing extreme attitudes demonstrated negative change. Second,
importance of environmental preservation also emerged as a significant predictor of directly
assessed attitude change, B = 0.09, t(338) = 7.13, p < .001. Whereas individuals who viewed the
target issue as relatively less important became more negative in their evaluations, those for
whom environmental preservation was relatively more important tended not to change their
attitudes. Neither political ideology nor participant type emerged as significant predictors.
Model 2 also predicted significant unique variance in environmental preservation attitude
difference scores, F(6,325) = 3.06, p < .01, R2 = .04. Three of the six two-way interactions
significantly predicted attitude change. First, there was a significant attitude extremity X
political ideology interaction, B = 0.03, t(338) = 2.28, p < .03 (see Figure 6). Simple slopes
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) were conducted to decompose the interaction. Liberal
individuals (-1 SD) with more extreme initial attitudes became more negative in their attitudes
toward environmental preservation, whereas liberals with more moderate attitudes became more
positive, B = -0.18, t(338) = -7.40, p < .001. For more conservative participants (+1 SD), this
same significant pattern emerged but in an attenuated form, B = -0.12, t(338) = -6.10, p < .001.
This pattern suggests that the main effect of attitude extremity on attitude difference scores was
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stronger for political liberals than for political conservatives, with moderates getting more
positive and extremes becoming more negative in their evaluations of environmental

Change in Envirnomental Preservation
Attitudes

preservation.
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05

Attitude
Extremity

0
-0.05

Moderate

-0.1

Extreme

-0.15
-0.2
-0.25

Liberal

Conservative

Political Ideology
Figure 6. Environmental preservation attitude difference scores as a function of political
ideology and attitude extremity at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 4).

Second, the interaction of political ideology and participant type significantly predicted
differences in environmental preservation attitudes, B = -0.06, t(338) = -2.13, p <.04 (see Figure
7). Simple slopes analyses revealed that, among SONA participants, political ideology
significantly predicted attitude difference scores, B = -0.05, t(131) = -2.05, p <.04, such that
liberals tended not to change and conservatives demonstrated negative change. For MTurk
participants, however, political ideology was not related to differences in environmental
preservation attitudes from pre- to posttest, B = -0.00, t(206) = -0.24, p =.81. Consistent with
this, the effect of participant type was significant for conservatives, B = -0.08, t(338) = -2.41, p <
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.02, but not liberals B = 0.03, t(338) = 0.84, p = .40. The significant interaction between political
ideology and participant type was therefore driven by the negative shift in attitudes found among
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more conservative SONA participants.
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Figure 7. Environmental preservation attitude difference scores as a function of participant type
and political ideology at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 4).

Third, a significant interaction between political ideology and importance of
environmental preservation was found, B = -0.04, t(338) = -3.09, p < .01 (see Figure 8). Simple
slopes analyses revealed that the relation between importance and directly assessed attitude
change differed based upon ideology. Among liberal participants, those who assigned greater
importance to environmental preservation became more positive about the issue, whereas those
viewing the issue as less important demonstrated negative change, B = 0.14, t(338) = 5.66, p <
.001. The same general pattern was found among conservative individuals but in an attenuated
form, B = 0.06, t(338) = 3.46, p < .001. In addition, ideology predicted attitude difference scores
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among those who were higher in importance of environmental preservation, B = -0.05, t(338) = 2.40, p < .02 (with liberals showing more positive change than conservatives) but not among
those who viewed the issue as less important, B = 0.03, t(338) = 1.83, p > .07. These findings
suggest that those for whom environmental preservation was important demonstrated positive
change, whereas those viewing the issue as less important demonstrated negative change – and
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that this effect was more pronounced among liberals than among conservatives.
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Figure 8. Environmental preservation attitude difference scores as a function of political
ideology and importance of environmental preservation at one standard deviation above and
below the mean (Study 4).

Unlike the first two models, Models 3 and 4 did not predict significant unique variance in
environmental preservation attitude difference scores (ps > .08). The only additional significant
effect was the three-way interaction among attitude extremity, participant type, and importance
of environmental preservation, B = 0.06, t(338) = 2.32, p = .02 (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Environmental preservation attitude difference scores as a function of participant type,
attitude extremity, and importance of environmental preservation at one standard deviation above
and below the mean (Study 4).
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To examine this pattern, regression models predicting the effects of participant type at
high and low levels of extremity and issue importance were run. Participant type emerged as a
significant predictor of attitude difference scores only for individuals with relatively extreme
attitudes who also viewed the issue of environmental preservation as less important, B = -0.13,
t(338) = -2.10, p < .04. Among this particular subgroup, SONA participants became more
evaluatively negative than did MTurk participants. The results of these analyses indicated that
individuals with relatively extreme attitudes who also viewed environmental preservation as less
important became more negative than the other participants – and that this perception of negative
change was stronger among SONA participants than MTurk participants.
Effects on self-reported attitude change. A hierarchical regression was also conducted
to investigate the effects of attitude extremity, political ideology, participant type, and their
interactions on participants’ self-reported change in attitudes toward environmental preservation.
As previously described, the original self-reported change variable was highly negatively skewed
and demonstrated limited variability. Approximately 25% of participants reported becoming
more positive about environmental preservation from pre- to posttest (n = 82), but only eleven
participants reported that their attitudes toward environmental preservation had changed in a
negative direction, and the nearly three-quarters of participants (n = 246) indicated that their
attitudes toward environmental preservation had not changed at all (i.e., self-reported change of
zero). This pattern is not inconsistent with what might be expected, given that social desirability
concerns likely discouraged some participants from truthfully reporting that they had become
less supportive of preserving the environment. In order to correct for the non-normal distribution
of self-reported attitude change scores, the original factor was log transformed, and all
subsequent analyses were conducted on this transformed self-reported change factor.
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As in the analyses predicting directly assessed change scores, importance of
environmental preservation was included as well in order to examine if this motivational factor
directly or interactively affected perceived attitude change (log transformed). The centered
attitude extremity, political ideology, and importance of environmental preservation (EPI)
variables, along with the dummy coded participant type variable, were entered in Step 1. The six
two-way interactions among attitude extremity, political ideology, participant type, and
importance of environmental preservation (i.e., extremity X PID, extremity X type, PID X type,
extremity X EPI, PID X EPI, type X EPI) were entered in Step 2. The four three-way
interactions of extremity, ideology, participant type, and importance (i.e., extremity X PID X
type, extremity X PID X EPI, extremity X type X EPI, PID X type X EPI) were entered in Step
3. Finally, the four-way interaction among all four predictor variables (i.e., extremity X PID X
type X EPI) was entered in Step 4.
The first model of the regression analysis was significant, F(4,331) = 5.21, p < .001, R2 =
.06. This significance was driven by two main effects. First, as with the prediction of
environmental preservation difference scores, attitude extremity significantly predicted selfreported attitude change, B = -0.01, t(338) = -2.73, p < .01, with those expressing more moderate
attitudes reporting that they had become more positive than individuals with more extreme initial
evaluations. Second, a main effect of importance of environmental preservation was also found,
B = 0.02, t(338) = 4.20, p < .001, such that participants who placed greater importance on
environmental preservation reported becoming more positive than those who viewed
environmental preservation as relatively less important.
The second model also contributed significantly to the prediction of self-reported change
scores, F(6,325) = 2.59, p < .02, R2 = .04. This was due to two significant two-way interactions.
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First, a significant political ideology X participant type interaction was found, B = 0.03, t(338) =
2.48, p < .02 (see Figure 10). Simple slopes analyses revealed that, although political ideology
did not significantly predict self-reported change scores among MTurk participants (B = -0.01,
t(206) = -1.19, p = .24), differences between liberals and conservatives were found among
SONA participants (B = 0.02, t(131) = 2.22, p < .03). Specifically, SONA participants who were
more conservative reported more positive attitude change than did their liberal counterparts.
This pattern suggests that the overall interaction between participant type and political ideology
was driven by conservative SONA participants, who reported becoming more positive in their
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attitudes toward environmental preservation than any other participants.
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Figure 10. Self-reported change in environmental preservation attitudes (log transformed) as a
function of participant type and political ideology at one standard deviation above and below the
mean (Study 4).
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In addition to the significant political ideology X participant type interaction, the twoway interaction between attitude extremity and importance placed on environmental preservation
also significantly predicted self-reported attitude change scores, B = -0.01, t(338) = -2.00, p < .05
(see Figure 11). Simple slopes analyses indicated that, among those who considered
environmental preservation to be more important, moderate attitudes were associated with more
self-reported positive change than were extreme attitudes, B = -0.03, t(338) = -3.28, p < .01.
Attitude extremity did not predict perceived attitude change scores for individuals who viewed
environmental preservation as relatively less important, B = -0.01, t(338) = -0.93, p = .35). This
pattern indicates that individuals with moderate attitudes about the topic who also viewed it as
relatively more important reported more positive change than did the other combinations of issue
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Figure 11. Self-reported change in environmental preservation attitudes (log transformed) as a
function of importance of environmental preservation and attitude extremity at one standard
deviation above and below the mean (Study 4).
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Model 3 in the overall regression analysis did not predict significant unique variance in
ratings of self-assessed attitude change. However, a significant three-way interaction was found
among political ideology, participant type, and importance of environmental preservation, B =
0.03, t(338) = 2.22, p < .03 (see Figure 12). To decompose this pattern, regression models
predicting the effects of participant type at high and low levels of political ideology and issue
importance were run. Participant type emerged as a significant predictor of self-reported attitude
change only for conservative individuals who also viewed the issue of environmental
preservation as relatively more important, B = 0.07, t(338) = 3.31, p = .001. Among this
particular subgroup, SONA participants reported more positive evaluative shifting than did
MTurk participants. The results of these analyses indicated that conservative SONA participants
who also viewed environmental preservation as more important reported becoming more positive
than the other participants in Study 4.
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Figure 12. Self-reported change in environmental preservation attitude difference scores (log
transformed) as a function of participant type, political ideology, and importance of
environmental preservation at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Study 4).
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Accuracy as a Mediator of the Extremity-Polarization Relation
It was hypothesized that differences in biased assimilation would at least partially
mediate the extremity-polarization relation in Study 4. Attitude extremity significantly predicted
directly assessed attitude change (i.e., posttest – pretest difference score), B = -0.09, t(338) = 8.13, p < .001, and attitude extremity predicted accuracy, B = 0.13, t(338) = 2.36, p < .02.
However, attitude extremity did not predict self-reported attitude change scores, B = -.00, t(338)
= -0.45, p = .66. Moreover, accuracy did not predict attitude change as assessed by either
difference scores or self-reported change, ps > .11. Thus, there was no evidence of biased
assimilation as a mediator of the extremity-polarization association.
Mental Rigidity as a Mediator of the Ideology-Polarization Relation
As both cognitive flexibility and need for cognitive closure speak to the general
characteristic of mental rigidity, the two measures (i.e., NCCS and CFS) were again combined to
create a composite variable indicating general mental rigidity. As in Study 3, items from the
CFS were first reverse-coded, so that higher values indicated less cognitive flexibility. Then, all
items in the NCCS and reverse CFS were standardized. All twenty-seven standardized items
were found to correlate highly and demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency (α = .75), so a
composite variable assessing general mental rigidity was created, with higher values being
indicative of greater mental rigidity.
It was hypothesized that differences in mental rigidity would at least partially mediate the
relation between political ideology and environmental preservation attitude change in Study 4.
Although political ideology did not emerge as a significant predictor of either difference scores
(B = -0.00, t(338) = 0.31, p = .76) or self-reported change (B = -0.01, t(338) = -0.21, p = .83),
mediation could still occur in the absence of a significant direct association between predictor
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and outcome variable (Kenny, 2011). Tests of mediation were therefore conducted, despite the
lack of a consistent significant effect of political ideology on the dependent measures of interest.
Analyses revealed that political ideology did predict mental rigidity, B = 0.26, t(338) = 4.95, p <
.001, such that greater mental rigidity was associated with greater conservatism. However,
mental rigidity did not predict attitude change as assessed by either the difference score or selfreported change, ps > .23.6 Thus, there was no evidence that mental rigidity mediated the
relation between political ideology and either actual or perceived attitude change in Study 4.
Conclusions
Study 4 extended the findings of the first three studies and provided further information
regarding the relations among attitude extremity, political ideology, and attitude change
following exposure to mixed evidence about a target issue. As in Study 3, the inclusion of a
measure of self-reported attitude change allowed for the examination and comparison of the
effects of the primary predictors (i.e., extremity and ideology) on both actual and perceived
changes in attitudes toward the target issue, environmental preservation. In addition, Study 4
incorporated a large, non-college sample to complement VCU participants. This broader sample
enabled me to examine if and how result patterns differed between the two samples, thereby
providing an indication of the generalizability of the studies’ findings. Although some effects
and interactions involving the other predictors were found to differ in the MTurk and SONA
subsamples (described below), no main effect of participant type emerged in the analyses
predicting directly assessed or self-reported change in attitudes toward environmental
preservation.
6

Mediation analyses were also conducted employing NCCS and CFS as potential
mediators of the ideology-attitude change relation. As these analyses revealed the same pattern
of results as those conducted on the overall composite mental rigidity variable, only mediation
analyses involving mental rigidity are described.
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Several significant effects emerged in Study 4. First, a robust main effect for attitude
extremity was again found in the prediction of both directly assessed and self-reported attitude
change. Participants espousing more extreme attitudes toward environmental preservation
demonstrated a negative evaluative shift from pre- to posttest, whereas those expressing more
moderate initial attitudes became more positive. Similarly, participants with extreme attitudes
perceived that they had not become as positive toward the target issue as had moderate attitude
holders. Given that the distribution of pretest attitudes toward environmental preservation was
negatively skewed, the overall pattern of negative attitude change (both directly assessed and
self-reported) among extreme attitude holders suggests that those with initially extreme attitudes
actually became less extreme in their evaluative position, or depolarized, following presentation
of the mixed information about the target issue. Also, the robustness of this main effect in terms
of predicting environmental preservation attitude difference scores, coupled with its consistent
pattern across both directly assessed and self-reported attitude change (something not found in
Study 3) may speak to the passion and conviction with which attitudes on this particular issue
were held.
Study 4 also examined the effect of political ideology on both attitude difference scores
and perceived attitude change. It was hypothesized that political conservatives would
demonstrate polarization of their initial attitudes, whereas political liberals were expected to
depolarize. However, political ideology did not emerge as a significant predictor of either
directly assessed or self-reported change in environmental preservation attitudes. As in the
previous studies, the sample was not skewed or restricted in regards to ideology, making it
highly unlikely that the lack of political ideology main effect could be accounted for by a lack of
ideological variability in the sample. Interestingly, although political ideology did not predict
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directly assessed or self-reported attitude change among MTurk participants, ideology did
significantly predict both actual and perceived attitude change among participants in the SONA
subsample. Specifically, conservative SONA participants demonstrated more negative attitude
change that their liberal counterparts in terms of difference scores (Figure 7), and yet the selfreported change scores of SONA conservatives were more positive than any other combination
of ideology and participant type in the overall sample (Figure 10). It would appear that
conservative participants in the SONA subsample not only demonstrated more actual change in
their attitudes toward environmental preservation than the rest of the participants but also were
relatively inconsistent in reporting the magnitude and direction of that evaluative shift.
In addition to the hypothesized main effects, an interactive effect for attitude extremity
and political ideology was also predicted. In Study 4, this interaction significantly predicted
directly assessed changes in attitudes toward environmental preservation. Specifically, the effect
of attitude extremity on difference scores (such that those with moderate initial attitudes became
more positive and those with extreme attitudes became more negative) was more pronounced
among liberal participants than among their more conservative counterparts (Figure 6). It could
be that the general openness associated with a politically liberal orientation (e.g., Jost et al.,
2003a) manifested as a more magnified difference between extreme and moderate attitude
holders than that found among more conservative participants in Study 4. In essence, liberal
individuals’ relative openness may have led them to shift their environmental preservation
attitudes in either a negative (if extreme initial attitudes) or positive (if initially moderate)
direction to a greater extent than their conservative counterparts. In contrast to the predictive
pattern found for directly assessed attitude change scores, the interaction of attitude extremity
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and political ideology did not significantly predict (transformed) self-reported change in attitudes
toward environmental preservation.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses advanced in Study 4 proposed two factors as mediators of
the relations between the primary predictors (i.e., attitude extremity, political ideology) and the
dependent measures of interest. First, it was predicted that biased assimilation would mediate
the relation between attitude extremity and subsequent change in environmental preservation
attitudes. Past work in the attitude polarization literature has found evidence that those with
more extreme attitudes engage in more biased processing of information and that this biased
assimilation accounts for differences in the attitude change among extreme versus moderate
attitude holders (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993). As in the previous study, however,
tests of mediation revealed no evidence that accuracy explained the observed relation between
attitude extremity and either actual or perceived attitude change. It was also hypothesized that
mental rigidity would at least partially mediate the relation between political ideology and both
directly assessed and self-reported change in attitudes toward environmental preservation,
drawing from work in the political ideology literature associating conservatism with higher need
for cognitive closure (e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Jost et al., 2003a) and lower cognitive
flexibility (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a) than political liberals. As in Study 3, no direct relation was
found between political ideology and either directly assessed or self-reported attitude change
scores, and mental rigidity (although correlated with political ideology) did not significantly
predict these two dependent measures. Therefore, mental rigidity did not mediate the relation
between political ideology and actual or perceived attitude change in environmental preservation
attitudes in Study 4.
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In addition to the hypothesized effects, individual differences related to the importance
placed on environmental preservation predicted actual and perceived attitude change in Study 4.
A main effect of importance of environmental preservation was found in regression analyses
predicting difference scores, with those viewing the issue as relatively more important resisting
change and those for whom environmental preservation was seen as less important
demonstrating negative change. This pattern would seem in keeping with much of the attitude
polarization literature, and particularly work by Harton and Latané (1997) suggesting that
increased issue involvement is associated with change resistance and attitude polarization.
Moreover, importance placed upon the issue of environmental preservation was also found to
interact with both attitude extremity and political ideology in predicting directly assessed and
self-reported attitude change.
These general patterns seem to indicate that viewing environmental preservation as an
important issue was associated with both demonstrated and reported positive attitude change if
such a shift was possible (and change resistance if it was not). For instance, participants who
viewed environmental preservation as relatively more important and also expressed moderate
pretest attitudes reported becoming more positive in their evaluations than did the rest of the
sample (Figure 11). Also, liberals for whom environmental preservation was relatively more
important became more evaluatively positive than did conservatives or liberals who viewed the
issue as less important (Figure 8). Conservative SONA participants who viewed the target issue
as relatively more important reported that they had become more positive in their evaluations of
environmental preservation relative to the rest of the sample (Figure 12). In contrast, those for
whom the target issue was less important did not demonstrate this propensity or desire to become
more evaluatively positive. For instance, SONA participants with extreme initial attitudes who
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also viewed the target issue as relatively less important demonstrated a larger negative evaluative
shift than did any other participants in Study 4 (Figure 9).
Study 4 built upon the findings of the previous three studies regarding the relations
among attitude extremity, political ideology, and attitude change, in terms of both directly
calculated difference scores and self-reported evaluative movement. Moderating effects of the
importance placed on the target issue were also found, indicating that individual differences in
motivation and personal relevance colored the associations between extremity, ideology, and
subsequent change. In addition, some effect patterns differed for the college (i.e., SONA) versus
non-college (i.e., MTurk) samples, suggesting that the two subsamples may have weighed the
particular influence of various predictors to differing extents and in different combinations.
Ultimately, however, many result patterns emerged consistently across both subsamples, lending
credence to the generalizability of the findings.
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General Discussion
The goal of the present research was to examine how the extremity of initial attitudes and
political ideology affect persuasion. Across four studies, the relations among attitude extremity,
political ideology, and attitude change were examined. Study 1 laid the foundation for the
subsequent studies by exploring the associations among the primary variables of interest in near
isolation. Each subsequent study then incorporated new elements (i.e., different target issues,
individual difference factors, conceptualizations of attitude change, and sample compositions) in
order to both replicate and broaden the scope of the findings of the first study, as well as past
work in the attitude polarization tradition. Across the four studies, several notable and
interesting effect patterns emerged: Some were in keeping with the original hypotheses, some
failed to appear, and still others emerged unexpectedly.
Hypothesized Effects
Attitude extremity. The first original hypothesis concerned the relation between attitude
extremity and attitude polarization. A substantial body of work in the attitude polarization
tradition (e.g., Lord et al., 1979, Miller et al., 1993, Boysen & Vogel, 2007, 2008) has found
evidence that extreme initial attitudes about a target tend to become entrenched or evaluatively
more intense following the presentation of a mixture of statements that both support and oppose
one’s espoused view. This resistance to changing one’s attitudes or the adoption of a more
extreme evaluative position following exposure to mixed evidence is known as attitude
polarization. In contrast, initial evaluations that are relatively more moderate tend to be
associated with an attenuation of the attitude, or depolarization, after encountering mixed
evidence. Based upon work in the attitude polarization tradition, a main effect of attitude
extremity was therefore hypothesized in the current studies. Specifically, it was expected that
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individuals with more extreme attitudes about the target issues would demonstrate resistance to
changing their evaluative positions or even become more evaluatively extreme after having read
a written piece comprised of both supporting and oppositional statements. Participants
espousing more moderate attitudes, on the other hand, were expected to demonstrate
depolarization of their attitudes when presented with the mixed evidence.
Across all four studies, attitude extremity emerged as a significant predictor of attitude
change. However, the pattern of this main effect was not consistent over the course of the
studies. In Study 1, the effect of attitude extremity on attitude polarization was in the predicted
direction. That is, participants reporting more extreme evaluative positions demonstrated
resistance to altering their attitudes after having read the arguments supporting and opposing
abortion rights, whereas participants with more moderate initial attitudes became more positive
in their attitudes toward abortion rights. Both the resistance to change demonstrated by extreme
attitude holders and the openness to change found among those expressing more moderate views
initially are in keeping with much of the research surrounding the phenomenon of attitude
polarization (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993; Boysen & Vogel, 2007, 2008).
A main effect of attitude extremity was also found in Study 2, but the result pattern
differed from that found in the first study. In Study 2, participants who held more extreme initial
attitudes toward gun control demonstrated a positive evaluative shift after having read the
arguments supporting and opposing the issue, whereas those with more moderate original views
became more negative in their attitudes toward gun control. Instead of demonstrating resistance
to change as in Study 1, those holding relatively more extreme attitudes about gun control
became more evaluatively positive following exposure to mixed evidence. This seemingly
inconsistent pattern may reflect that participants were not as familiar with or invested in the issue
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of gun control as Study 1 participants were in regards to the issue of abortion rights. Given that
the data were collected from a college sample at an urban university, attitudes toward gun control
may not have been very salient or the issue may not have been seen as personally relevant.
Consistent with this, pretest and posttest attitudes did not correlate in Study 2 (r = .01, p > .90),
indicating that participants may not have held well-formed, enduring evaluative views on the
issue of gun control. The lack of polarization observed among extreme attitude holders in Study
2 may therefore be due, at least in part, to a relative lack of issue salience or interest.
The inclusion of a self-reported attitude change item in Studies 3 and 4 allowed for the
comparison of predictive effects for directly assessed and perceived attitude change. Consistent
with the first two studies, attitude extremity significantly predicted both conceptualizations of
evaluative change in Studies 3 and 4. In Study 3, however, the result pattern differed for
difference scores versus self-reported attitude change. Individuals expressing more moderate
attitudes toward tax increases tended to remain consistent in their attitudes (i.e., resist change)
based on both the actual and self-reported attitude change. Individuals holding more extreme
initial attitudes demonstrated and perceived attitude change. Interestingly, however, the
direction of attitude change among extreme attitude holders differed for actual versus selfreported change: Whereas those expressing extreme tax increase attitudes actually became more
positive in their evaluations from pre- to posttest, these same individuals reported becoming
more evaluatively negative. This divergent pattern across conceptualizations of attitude change
is consistent with past work by Miller and colleagues (1993), which demonstrated that
participants’ directly assessed attitude change can differ markedly from their perceptions of their
evaluative movement in terms of both valence and magnitude. The divergence between reported
and directly assessed attitude change found among those espousing extreme attitudes is not
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easily explained. Indeed, no theoretical justification has been offered to explain the discrepancy
(e.g., Miller et al., 1993). Potentially, participants were motivated to report evaluative shifts that
differed from their true attitude change in the interest of social desirability (as may have been the
case in Study 4, wherein essentially no negative change in attitudes toward environmental
preservation was reported). It is also possible that the discrepancy was not intentional on the part
of participants: Lack of insight into if and how their evaluations of the target issue had changed,
as well as differential interpretation of the questions, could also account for the divergent selfreport and computed attitude change findings.
In Study 4, a robust main effect for attitude extremity was also found in the prediction of
both directly assessed and self-reported change in environmental preservation attitudes.
Moreover, this predictive pattern was consistent across both dependent measures. Participants
espousing more extreme attitudes toward environmental preservation demonstrated a negative
evaluative shift from pre- to posttest, whereas those expressing more moderate initial attitudes
became more positive. Similarly, participants with extreme attitudes perceived that they had not
become as positive toward the target issue as had moderate attitude holders. The robustness of
this main effect in terms of predicting environmental preservation attitude difference scores, as
well as its consistent predictive pattern across both directly assessed and self-reported attitude
change may speak to the passion and conviction with which attitudes on this particular issue
were held. Participants in Study 4 may have been relatively more aware of their attitudes toward
the issue of environmental preservation or less inclined to misrepresent their self-reported
attitude change than were participants evaluating tax increases in Study 3, which could explain
why the same general extremity effect was found across self-reported and computed attitude
change measures.
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Across all four studies, the extremity of initial attitudes toward the target issue reliably
predicted attitude change, whether operationalized as computed difference scores or as selfreported evaluative movement. The predictive pattern found for attitude extremity was not
consistent across the four studies, however. Some of the inconsistency may be due to inherent
differences in the specific target issues included in the studies. Abortion rights, gun control, tax
increases, and environmental preservation represent very different types of social, economic, and
political issues that may have spoken to certain participants to varying degrees and for varied
reasons. The issues also likely differed in terms of their salience and relevance to a college
sample, which may in turn have affected the conviction with which participants espoused their
initial attitudes as well as adhered to them in the face of mixed evidence.
Political ideology. The second general hypothesis tested in the current studies related to
the effect of political ideology on propensities to polarize. Decades of work examining
ideological differences in cognitive processing, tolerance for ambiguity, and openness to novel
and alternative viewpoints has shown that political conservatives are relatively more closeminded and resistant to change than are political liberals (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; FrenkelBrunswik, 1949; Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). Based on this general pattern, it was
hypothesized that conservatives would show more polarization of their attitudes in response to
the persuasive essays than would political liberals, whose relative open-mindedness and
tolerance of ambiguity was expected to give rise to more depolarization.
However, political ideology did not emerge as a significant predictor of attitude change in
any of the four current studies. The choice of target issue may help to explain this lack of a
predictive effect of political ideology in the first three studies. In Study 1, the distribution of
pretest abortion rights attitudes was highly negatively skewed, indicating that participants were
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generally highly positive about the issue of abortion rights. It seems that individuals in this
college sample held relatively positive attitudes toward the target issue, regardless of their
political ideology. The lack of a political ideology main effect in Study 2 may be due to the lack
of clear and consistent evaluative positions on what was likely seen as a less personally relevant
issue: gun control. Again, the weak correlation between pre- and posttest gun control attitudes
may indicate that participants did not know or care very much about the issue of gun control or
their attitudes toward it, making changes in those attitudes difficult to predict. In Study 3, the
prominence of the target issue – tax increases – in the national media during data collection may
have led individuals to rely primarily upon their pre-existing (and likely salient) attitudes about
tax increases in determining their evaluative reactions to the mixed evidence. The salience of
pre-existing evaluative positions and the topic itself may have meant that participants were
relatively less inclined to use their ideological orientation as a guide in reporting their attitudes
toward tax increases.
In Study 4, no overall main effect for political ideology was found. Interestingly,
although political ideology did not predict directly assessed or self-reported environmental
preservation attitude change among MTurk participants, ideology significantly predicted both
actual and perceived attitude change among participants in the SONA (i.e., college) subsample,
such that conservative SONA participants demonstrated more negative attitude change than their
liberal counterparts in terms of difference scores but reported that they had become more positive
than any other combination of ideology and participant type in the overall sample. It would
appear that conservative participants in the SONA subsample not only demonstrated more actual
change in their attitudes toward environmental preservation than the rest of the participants but
also were relatively inconsistent in reporting the magnitude and direction of that evaluative shift.
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In all four studies, the samples were not skewed or restricted in regards to political
ideology, making it highly unlikely that the lack of political ideology main effect could be
accounted for by a lack of ideological variability. Given that three of the four studies employed
college samples exclusively, it is possible that political ideology did not influence participants’
evaluations of the target issues as much as the issues themselves. Work examining political
socialization and the development of ideological identity suggests that determining one’s
political orientation may be less of a priority during the college years than other features of
identity, such as occupational leanings and interpersonal exploration (Pastorino, Dunham,
Kidwell, Bacho, & Lamborn, 1997). In addition, participants in the SONA samples were
primarily college freshmen, a significant number of whom likely had not yet had the opportunity
to vote – a key experience in the formation and expression of one’s political identity (e.g., Roker,
Player, & Coleman, 1999). Moreover, studies examining the extremity of political attitudes have
found a strong and reliable association between attitude extremity and issue importance but
essentially no link between political attitudes and partisan identification in the general electorate
(Liu & Latané, 1997). Given this lack of connection between political ideology and specific
issue attitudes, particularly among college students, it seems likely that participants in the current
studies brought other factors to bear when adjusting their evaluative positions. Participants may
have weighted other features, such as the specific target issue and the extremity of initial
attitudes, more heavily than political ideology in determining if and how to change their
attitudes.
Extremity X ideology. The third hypothesized effect in the current studies was an
interaction between attitude extremity and political ideology. That is, the extent to which
attitude extremity gave rise to subsequent attitude polarization following exposure to a mix of
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supporting and opposing statements was predicted to differ for liberals versus conservatives.
Political conservatives were expected to show evidence of attitude polarization, regardless of the
extremity of their initial attitudes. Based on characterizations of the conservative “profile” as
relatively intolerant, close-minded, and resistant to change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b),
attitude polarization was expected to be observed among conservatives with moderate initial
attitudes as well as among conservatives holding extreme initial attitudes. Among liberals,
however, the degree of attitude polarization was predicted to depend upon the extremity of initial
attitudes. As liberalism is generally associated with relative openness, tolerance, and preference
for change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), it was predicted that attitude extremity would be more
predictive of attitude polarization. Liberals holding extreme attitudes at the outset were expected
to show evidence of polarization, whereas liberals with more moderate attitudes toward the target
issues were expected to be relatively open to depolarizing their opinions in response to the
presentation of mixed evidence.
The interactive effect of attitude extremity and political ideology on attitude change did
emerge in the current studies. However, the specific pattern of the interaction proved
inconsistent across the studies and was generally not in line with that hypothesized. In fact, in
three of the four studies, the opposite pattern was found. That is, evaluative movement was
found among political conservatives, whereas evidence of change resistance emerged among
political liberals.
In Study 1, the interaction between attitude extremity and political ideology emerged, but
not in the predicted direction and only for men. Specifically, attitude extremity did not predict
change scores for liberal men, but for conservative men, extreme attitudes were associated with a
negative shift in abortion rights attitudes, whereas moderate attitudes predicted a positive shift.
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In Study 2, the interaction of attitude extremity and political ideology was again significant in
predicting change in gun control attitudes. In this case, attitude extremity did not predict change
scores for liberals, who demonstrated resistance to change regardless of the extremity of their
initial views on gun control. For conservative individuals, however, attitude extremity
significantly predicted gun control difference scores, such that extreme attitudes were associated
with little change, whereas moderate attitudes predicted a negative shift. Across the first two
studies, attitude change among political liberals was not affected by the extremity of their initial
attitudes, whereas evaluative shifts among political conservatives were. Moreover, a consistent
pattern of resistance to change was found among conservative individuals with extreme attitudes
– evidence of polarization in response to the mixed evidence.
In Study 3, the extremity X ideology interaction significantly predicted self-reported but
not directly assessed changes in tax increase attitudes. Specifically, only one subgroup of
participants in Study 3 reported changing their attitudes toward the target issue in either
direction: conservative individuals who espoused extreme attitudes about the issue at the outset
of the study. These participants reported that their attitudes toward tax increases had become
more negative following the presentation of the mixed evidence essay. Given the prominence of
the issue of tax increases in mainstream political discourse, as well as the general stance among
political conservatives that tax increases would further jeopardize an already faltering national
economy, it is likely that the extreme attitudes expressed by some conservative participants were
evaluatively negative. Indeed, a significant negative correlation between pretest attitudes and
political ideology confirmed that conservatives’ initial attitudes toward tax increases were
significantly more negative than were liberals’, r = -.26, p < .01. The perception of becoming
even more evaluatively negative toward tax increases following exposure to mixed evidence
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about the issue would seem to indicate that attitude polarization occurred among conservatives
with extreme initial attitudes.
In Study 4, the extremity X ideology interaction significantly predicted directly assessed
changes in attitudes toward environmental preservation. Specifically, the effect of attitude
extremity on difference scores (such that those with moderate initial attitudes became more
positive and those with extreme attitudes became more negative) was more pronounced among
liberal participants than among their more conservative counterparts. It could be that the general
openness associated with a politically liberal orientation (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a) manifested as a
more magnified difference between extreme and moderate attitude holders than that found
among more conservative participants in Study 4. In essence, liberal individuals’ relative
openness may have led them to shift their environmental preservation attitudes in either a
negative (if extreme initial attitudes) or positive (if initially moderate) direction to a greater
extent than their conservative counterparts. In contrast to the predictive pattern found for
directly assessed attitude change scores, the interaction of attitude extremity and political
ideology did not significantly predict self-reported change in attitudes toward environmental
preservation.
At first blush, it may seem difficult to find a consistent pattern or theme in terms of the
interactive effect of attitude extremity and political ideology on attitude change. It is interesting
to note that, in the three studies employing college samples exclusively, the effects of extremity
were found among conservatives. Perhaps this interactive effect speaks to a discrepancy
between the specific issue attitudes and general political identification of conservatives in the
college samples. As previous work surrounding the development of political identity indicates
(e.g., Pastorino et al., 1997), college-aged individuals are unlikely to have a fully crystallized
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sense of their political identity. Moreover, political ideology and attitudes on specific issues can
be essentially unrelated to one another (e.g., Liu & Latané, 1997). From this, it seems entirely
feasible that a college student could report being politically conservative and yet express issue
attitudes that do not align with the “conservative view” on that particular issue. In essence, the
college years are a time of transition and development – and ideological orientation may be
slower to formulate than other aspects of identity (e.g., Pastorino et al., 1997). The lack of a
cogent political identity among college students could help to explain counterintuitive patterns
such as the positive evaluative shift seen among conservative participants with moderate gun
control attitudes in Study 2. A lack of familiarity with the information presented in the
persuasive arguments, particularly among conservative participants, may have contributed to this
unexpected pattern as well.
The inclusion of the large non-college sample in Study 4 could potentially help to explain
why the extremity X ideology interaction pattern fits more closely with original expectations
regarding the differences between liberals and conservatives in terms of attitude change. Perhaps
liberal individuals’ relative openness led them to shift their environmental preservation attitudes
in either a negative (if extreme initial attitudes) or positive (if initially moderate) direction to a
greater extent than their conservative counterparts. This pattern of relative openness to change
among liberals was largely absent in the studies conducted using strictly college samples. It
could be that the inclusion of non-college participants, whose sense of political identity was
likely better established, drove this interactive pattern in the fourth study. The “liberal profile”
of openness may more appropriately characterize MTurk participants, who not only reported
being liberal but also expressed that openness in considering the issue arguments and changing
their issue attitudes.
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In addition to these possible explanations for the inconsistent predictive pattern of the
extremity X ideology interaction across studies, it is also possible that the original hypothesis
was not correct. The hypothesized pattern of polarization among conservatives and liberals with
extreme attitudes yet depolarization among liberals with moderate attitudes was drawn from
empirical work espousing the “rigidity of the ideological right.” As noted, this is not the only
interpretation of findings in the political ideology literature; indeed, many have argued that
change resistance and intolerance are equally characteristic of both ends of the ideological
spectrum (e.g., Shils, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). That the hypothesized
pattern did not emerge could lend credence to the view espoused by these and other researchers
who have argued that leftists and rightists (particularly at the extremes) may have more in
common than originally assumed.
Biased assimilation as mediator. In addition to the three primary hypotheses, two
mediation models were proposed and tested in an effort to understand the underlying
mechanisms at work in the relations among attitude extremity, political ideology, and attitude
polarization. First, biased assimilation was proposed to mediate the relation between attitude
extremity and subsequent attitude change. Studies of the attitude polarization phenomenon have
repeatedly indicated that extremity-polarization link is driven, at least in part, by the biased
assimilation of mixed persuasive evidence (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993).
Specifically, research has shown that individuals holding extreme attitudes about a target issue
do not process subsequent information in a balanced manner. Rather, the vividness of that
extreme initial attitude colors the processing of even a seemingly balanced mix of supporting and
opposing statements, such that the extreme attitude holder comes away from the mixed evidence
even more confident of the correctness of their original view and the faultiness of the opposing
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view. It is this biased assimilation of new information that strengthens the pre-existing attitude
and, in so doing, gives rise to attitude polarization.
In keeping with the pattern found in previous empirical investigations, it was therefore
hypothesized in Studies 2 through 4 that biased processing would at least partially mediate the
extremity-polarization relation. That is, individuals holding extreme attitudes were expected to
engage in more biased assimilation and processing of the mixed evidence than those holding
moderate initial attitudes, and this discrepancy in processing, in turn, was expected to manifest as
greater attitude polarization among extreme attitude-holders versus moderates. This mediating
effect did not emerge, however. Although attitude extremity predicted attitude change in all
three studies, extremity did not consistently predict accuracy, and accuracy emerged as a
significant predictor of attitude change in Study 2 only. Ultimately, no evidence of a mediating
effect of accuracy was found in Studies 2, 3, or 4.
As with many of the constructs involved in the current investigation, biased assimilation
can be – and has been – operationalized in many different ways. In the current studies, accuracy
of participants’ thought listings was used as a gauge of the degree to which individuals processed
the information provided in the mixed evidence essays in an impartial versus biased manner.
The lack of mediation in any of the studies could be due to the operationalization of biased
assimilation as simply the accuracy of information recalled. Another way to code the data in the
future would be to assess the balance of thought listings supporting versus opposing the issue at
hand. The content of all thought listings for each participant could be examined and coded in
terms of which side of the mixed evidence essay the content came from, and a ratio of the
number of “anti” statements to the number of “pro” statements could be computed. This ratio
would provide a sense of whether participants were recalling information from both sides equally
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(i.e., more accurate) or if their recall of information leaned more to one side or the other (i.e.,
more biased). Thus, future investigations will examine if meaningful differences exist in the
ratio of supporting to opposing evidence mentioned in participants’ thought listings, and whether
or not these differences explain the relation between attitude extremity and subsequent attitude
change or resistance.
Mental rigidity as mediator. The second mediation hypothesis put forward in the
current studies sought to explain the connection between political ideology and propensities to
polarize. Past work in the political ideology literature has indicated that political conservatives
demonstrate less cognitive flexibility (Jost et al., 2003a) and greater need for cognitive closure
(e.g., Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Jost et al., 2003a) than do political liberals and that this
difference in mental rigidity accounts for greater resistance to change among conservatives.
However, no direct relation was found between political ideology and either directly assessed or
self-reported attitude change scores in Studies 3 or 4, and mental rigidity (although correlated
with political ideology) did not significantly predict computed or perceived attitude change.
Therefore, mental rigidity did not emerge as a significant mediator in the relation between
political ideology and changes in attitudes toward tax increases or environmental preservation.
Individual Difference Factors
In addition to the primary variables of interest (i.e., attitude extremity, political ideology,
attitude change), measures of individual differences were incorporated and explored to see if
they directly or interactively contributed to the prediction of attitude change. Several of these
individual difference variables, particularly those related to motivation, were found to moderate
the primary hypothesized effects throughout the four studies.
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In Study 1, gender moderated the interactive effect of extremity and ideology on changes
in attitudes toward abortion rights, such that extremity alone predicted women’s attitude change
but both extremity and ideology affected men’s evaluative shift. In Study 2, individual
differences in need for cognition both directly and interactively predicted changes in gun control
attitudes. Participants who more routinely were motivated to put forth cognitive effort (i.e.,
NFChigh) tended to become more evaluatively positive than those who were lower in need for
cognition. In addition, individual differences in need for cognition further qualified the
interaction between attitude extremity and political ideology.
Although accuracy of participants’ thought listings did not emerge as a mediator in the
current studies, it was found to significantly predict gun control attitude difference scores (more
accurate thought listings were associated with positive change; less accurate responses related to
change resistance) as well as moderate the relation between extremity of initial attitudes toward
gun control and subsequent attitude change in Study 2. Individual differences related to the
importance placed on the specific issue of environmental preservation predicted actual and
perceived attitude change in Study 4. A main effect of importance of environmental preservation
was found, with those viewing the issue as relatively more important resisting change and those
for whom environmental preservation was seen as less important demonstrating negative change.
Moreover, importance placed upon the issue of environmental preservation was also found to
interact with both attitude extremity and political ideology in predicting directly assessed and
self-reported attitude change.
Across the four studies, various individual difference factors either directly influenced
attitude change or interacted with one or more other variables. To some extent, these factors
may provide some gauge of the personal relevance of the specific target issue. For instance, that
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different predictive patterns were found for men versus women in Study 1 may indicate that men
viewed the issue of abortion rights as less personally relevant than did women. The differences
in general cognitive processing and accuracy of recall that emerged as predictors in Study 2
could speak to the overall lack of knowledge about or interest in the topic of gun control.
Finally, a direct assessment of issue importance significantly predicted attitude change in Study
4. If the commonality among the effects of individual difference factors in the current studies is
their relation to issue importance, it is not surprising that they should influence the result patterns
obtained. Of note, however, none of the individual difference effects emerged in more than one
study. Nearly all of these factors (with the exception of issue importance) were assessed in
multiple studies, and yet no one variable was found to predict attitude change consistently.
Although individual differences clearly affected the results of the current studies, the lack of a
robust and reliable predictive effect for any one measure suggests that other factors (e.g., attitude
extremity) were more influential in terms of predicting attitude change.
Limitations
It is important to acknowledge that the current studies were limited in some ways. First,
there was heavy reliance on college samples in these studies. Although many individual
differences were assessed and controlled for, these samples may differ from the broader
population in several ways, including age, education level, racial/ethnic composition, and issue
awareness. The inclusion of a non-college sample in Study 4 provided some assurance that the
obtained findings were generalizable beyond college students; however, the subsamples were
found to differ in terms of need for cognition, cognitive flexibility, and recall accuracy.
Moreover, several interactive patterns emerged differently in the MTurk sample compared to the
SONA sample. There is also some question as to the structure and function of political ideology
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in informing the issue attitudes of college students. That political ideology failed to emerge as a
significant predictor of attitude change in most instances, despite the presence of good variability
on the composite ideology measure, would seem to suggest some degree of disconnect between
ideological identification and evaluative position on specific target issues.
A further limitation in the current studies was that issue importance was assessed only in
the fourth and final study. Although a general measure assessing the importance placed upon
politics was employed in Studies 1 through 3, it did not directly or interactively predict attitude
change. In contrast, the inclusion of an item assessing how important participants felt the
specific issue of environmental preservation was emerged as a robust predictor of both perceived
evaluative change and computed difference scores in Study 4, as well as moderating the effects
of attitude extremity and political ideology on the dependent measures of interest. Incorporating
an item addressing specific issue importance as opposed to general importance placed on politics
would likely have clarified and extended the findings of the earlier studies as well.
Another issue that arose in the current studies was one of data non-normality. The
distributions of several measures employed in the current studies were found to be highly
skewed. Issues of non-normality were addressed by transforming the data prior to analysis;
however, transformation poses some challenges for interpretation. Some of the non-normal
distributions obtained in the current studies were likely representative of patterns found in the
larger population (e.g., attitudes toward abortion rights and environmental preservation); others,
however, may indicate patterns particular to these specific samples (e.g., recall accuracy, issue
importance). In addition to non-normal distributions of several variables, an imbalance in the
representation of men versus women existed in Studies 1 and 4, with women comprising over
two-thirds of the sample in both cases. It is possible that the composition of these samples
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influenced the result patterns obtained, particularly in Study 1 (the target issue for which was
abortion rights). Given the presence of such a gender imbalance in these samples, it is difficult
to generalize the findings to an entire population.
Beyond the inclusion or omission of variables and the specific distribution patterns of
various factors, a broader issue to note is the potential for alternative or additional
conceptualizations of the variables themselves. As outlined in the first chapter, many of the
factors of primary interest in the current studies have been operationalized in different ways
throughout the literature, including attitude extremity, conservatism, biased assimilation, and
attitude polarization. In the current studies, every attempt was made to a) base decisions
regarding operational definitions on past work and theory and to b) explicitly state and
thoroughly explain how such concepts were defined and measured. It is certainly conceivable
that alternative definitions and measures of many variables could be employed and would likely
give rise to some amount of divergent result patterns – indeed, the use of markedly different
measures to assess the “same” phenomenon has likely contributed to the confusion and
controversy found in both the attitude polarization and political ideology literatures.
Future Directions
The current studies represent an important step in delineating the relations among attitude
extremity, political ideology, and the degree and direction of evaluative change following
exposure to mixed evidence. From here, many additional avenues of research related to this
topic could be explored that would build upon the current findings. It would be very interesting
to examine if and how the patterns observed here might change if different target issues were
provided (e.g., censorship, armed conflict, separation of church and state, etc.). In addition to
assessing attitudes toward the target issue itself, future studies could also measure participants’

144

evaluative reactions to the specific arguments presented in the issue essay. In particular, items
assessing perceptions of argument persuasiveness, familiarity, and novelty would provide
valuable insight into the processing of the mixed evidence. The incorporation of large noncollege samples, as in Study 4, would allow for the examination of these result patterns outside
of a college population. Another interesting group to incorporate would be political elites: party
leaders, policy “wonks,” and others well-versed in specific issues as well as relatively more
aware of and steeped in their ideological identity. Such a politically knowledgeable sample
might display a greater match between issue attitudes and political ideology than that found in
the college samples employed in the current studies.
Alternative or additional conceptualizations of the variables of interest could also extend
and clarify the findings obtained in the current studies. For instance, response options for
attitude measures could be expanded to provide more evaluative options for participants and
greater variability for analysis. The “cut-off” points for classifying as attitudes as relatively
more or less extreme could be moved; individuals rating their pretest attitudes as “neutral” could
be excluded from analyses. In terms of assessing polarization, it would be interesting to
incorporate a “trinary index” as a third dependent measure (as in Miller et al., 1993) in addition
to directly computed difference scores and self-reported change. Different or broader coding
dimensions could provide rich information not only on the accuracy of participants’ information
recall but also on their self-generated impressions of the issue and the arguments presented, as
well as the extent to which they spontaneously provide additional information not found in the
mixed evidence arguments. Further examination of participants’ qualitative data would surely
enrich and clarify findings related to how information is perceived and processed – it would be
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interesting to compare the essays of those espousing extreme versus moderate views to see if and
how they differed.
The scope and generalizability of the current studies’ findings could be broadened by
examining the role of other individual difference factors in qualifying the relations of primary
interest. It would be very interesting to see if and how differences in ideological extremity,
general political knowledge, familiarity with a specific issue, and general desire to evaluate a
target could modify the patterns found in the current studies. The external validity of the results
found in the current studies could also be addressed by conducting subsequent empirical
examinations in more real-world contexts. For example, would attitudinal responses to mixed
evidence look similar or different if that evidence was presented via political campaign ads or
congressional hearings? Finally, it would be very interesting to examine the downstream effects
and behavioral outcomes of attitude change and polarization, similar to Miller et al.’s (1993)
procedure. Future work could employ longitudinal designs to assess the duration of various
effects on attitude change. Subsequent studies could also assess if and how extreme versus
moderate attitude holders, or political liberals versus conservatives, differed in terms of
discussing the issues after having read about them. It would also be interesting to examine
whether attitude extremity or political ideology affect participants’ selective exposure to
subsequent issue information. Such extensions could build upon and broaden the findings of the
current studies in important and interesting ways.
Conclusion
In sum, the current studies integrated work in both the attitude polarization and political
ideology traditions in an effort to better understand the role of attitude extremity and political
ideology in effecting evaluative change versus resistance. In addition to examining the relations
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among extremity, ideology, and polarization following mixed evidence, this series of studies
extended and clarified these associations by incorporating a variety of target issues, individual
difference factors, and samples. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that attitude
extremity and political ideology influence the degree and direction of evaluative change
following the presentation of mixed evidence. In addition, they highlight the varied and nuanced
ways in which initial attitudes, political identification, and an array of personal and issue-specific
factors combine to inform and influence our political attitudes.
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Appendix A
Pretest Attitudes Measure
Please indicate your opinion about each social issue using the following scale:
-3
Extremely
Negative

-2

-1

0

1

1) Gun control
2) Censorship of media (e.g., television, movies, etc.)
3) Environmental preservation
4) Pornography
5) Social security
6) Tax increases
7) Social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, etc.)
8) Health care reform
9) Abortion rights
10) Welfare system
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2

3
Extremely
Positive

Appendix B
Social Networking Sites Essay
Social networking sites are a good way to make connections with people with similar interests
and goals and to meet people that you may not have had the opportunity to meet before. There
are more than 350 million active users on Facebook.com, and about 70% of Facebook users are
outside the U.S. This shows that there is no better way to share ideas/values and create
relationships. Making friends is easy, so meeting people and staying connected with classmates
and friends is a major benefit of social networking sites. Social networking sites offer campus
surveys, "party" or event listings, and other information that communicates the "pulse" of a
campus culture. These sites can be a great way to understand and stay connected to your campus
community as a whole. An additional benefit of social networking sites is that you can stay in
touch or reconnect with old friends, even those you might not have been able to communicate
with otherwise. Most importantly, social networking sites offer students the opportunity to create
a positive self-image. The profiles give students a chance to create the image of themselves that
they want people to see by putting their best qualities "out there."

On the negative side, social networking sites can be detrimental and even dangerous. For
instance, students are getting in trouble with university administrators for incriminating and
inappropriate information or pictures on their social networking profiles that are violations of
school policy or code of conduct. Students are being turned down by employers for jobs,
internships, and even interviews because of the information employers are finding out about
students on their social networking accounts. Recent research by an American university found
that 23 percent of employers reviewed candidates' profiles on social networking sites.
Compromising and inappropriate pictures, statements, or other information on student social
networking accounts can hurt students' chances of gaining (or even being considered for)
employment. Employers take the images that students are portraying on social networking sites
very seriously as a reflection of personal character. In addition to hurting one's employment
chances, social networking sites can also be dangerous. Many people provide detailed personal
information, including contact information and addresses, on their sites. Cyber criminals and
others with bad intentions can easily learn a lot about you, leaving you vulnerable to harassment,
threats, or even attack.
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Appendix C
Abortion Rights Essay
Those who oppose abortion rights say that the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to
life which cannot be undermined. They support a human life amendment to the constitution and
endorse legislation to make it clear that the 14th Amendment’s protections apply to unborn
children. Their purpose is to have legislative and judicial protection of that right against those
who perform abortions. They oppose using public revenues for abortion and refuse to fund
organizations which advocate it. They support the appointment of judges who respect traditional
family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.

On the other hand, individuals who support abortion rights believe in the privacy and equality of
women and stand proudly for a woman’s right to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, and
regardless of her ability to pay. They stand firmly against efforts to undermine that right. At the
same time, they strongly support family planning and adoption incentives. Abortion should be
safe, legal, and rare. Those who support abortion rights stand behind the right of every woman
to choose, which they believe it is a constitutional liberty. Their goal is to make abortion more
rare, not more dangerous. They support contraceptive research, family planning, comprehensive
family life education, and policies that support healthy childbearing.
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Appendix D
Political Ideology Measure
Please read each of the followings statements carefully. Indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with each statement using the scale below. Please think carefully before answering.
+2 Agree strongly
+1 Agree somewhat
0 Neither agree nor disagree, or no opinion
-1 Disagree somewhat
-2 Disagree strongly
1) Congress should not increase taxes, rather they should decrease spending.
2) More support for AIDS research is needed.
3) Abortion is wrong, because everyone, even unborn babies, has the right to life.
4) The government should adopt a stricter immigration policy.
5) It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America.
6) The benefits of nuclear power plants outweigh its potential hazards.
7) Sex education should be taught at home by the parents, not in public schools.
8) The government should spend less on defense and focus more on domestic needs.
9) Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the U.S.
10) Homosexuals should not legally be allowed to marry.
11) If drugs were decriminalized, society would degenerate.
12) Some crimes are so despicable, they should be punishable by death.
13) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
14) Evolutionary theory should not be taught in public schools.
15) Abortion should be illegal.
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16) Gay people are entitled to the same constitutional rights as heterosexuals.
17) Homelessness has become an issue that requires immediate attention by the federal
government.
18) The government should not adopt a stricter policy to protect the environment.
19) Because the U.S. is a world leader, it cannot cut its defense spending position without losing
its world position.
20) Terminal patients should not have the right to die.
21) It is women’s constitutional right to choose whether or not to have an abortion.
22) There should not be a complete separation between church and state.
23) Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation than they ought to have.
24) Environmentalists should worry less about the welfare of animals and more about
people’s jobs.
25) An increase in taxes is needed.
26) Marijuana should not be legalized for medicinal use.
27) Capital punishment is not an effective deterrent.
28) The government should restrict stem cell research.
29) Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to
Blacks than they deserve.
30) For safety reasons, all existing nuclear power plants should be shut down.
31) The United States did the right thing by attacking Iraq.
32) Too much money is being spent on AIDS research and not enough is being spent on research
for other serious diseases.
33) Censorship of music and art violates people’s constitutional rights.
34) The death penalty should not be abolished.
35) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
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36) Sex education in schools is vital, especially with the increasing concern of AIDS.
37) Gun control violates people’s constitutional right to bear arms.
38) The government should not adopt a policy to guarantee health care to all workers and their
families.
39) Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
40) Student-led prayer should be allowed in public schools.
41) The minimum wage should not be raised.
42) Quotas should be set so that more women are hired for traditionally male-dominated jobs.
43) The current pre-emptive (strike them before they strike you) foreign policy, is the most
effective foreign policy.
44) Censorship of art is justified when the artwork is deemed pornographic or obscene.

How would you rate yourself on the following scale?
a) As conservative as it gets
b) Very conservative
c) Moderately conservative
d) Slightly conservative
e) Neither one nor the other
f) Slightly liberal
g) Moderately liberal
h) Very liberal
i) As liberal as it gets
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Appendix E
Importance of Politics Questionnaire
1) How important are political figures, issues, and events to you?
Not important

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Very important

2) How often do you read about political figures, issues, and events?
0
Never

1
Rarely

2
Occasionally

3
Frequently

4
Constantly

3) How often do you watch media coverage of political figures, issues, and events?
0
Never

1
Rarely

2
Occasionally

3
Frequently

4
Constantly

4) How often do you engage in discussions of political figures, issues, and events?
0
Never

1
Rarely

2
Occasionally

3
Frequently

4
Constantly

5) My political beliefs are an important part of who I am.
Strongly disagree

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Strongly agree

0

1

2

3

Strongly agree

6) Political events directly affect the “average” person.
Strongly disagree

-3

-2

-1

7) Do you participate in politics?

Yes

No

8) Are you registered to vote?

Yes

No

9) Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?

Yes

No

10) Please put an “X” next to the political activity(-ies) in which you have taken part:
___ voted

___ contacted a political figure

___ volunteered/helped with a campaign

___ ran for political office

___ donated to a political party or organization

___ held political office

___ participated in a rally, march, or demonstration
___ other (please describe): ___________________________________________________
11) Voting is an important way that citizens can influence the political process.
Strongly disagree

-3

-2

-1

0
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1

2

3

Strongly agree

Appendix F
Demographics Questionnaire
Gender (circle): Male

Female

Marital Status (check one):
Single
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Ethnicity (check one):
White/Caucasian
Hispanic/Latino(a)
African-American/Black
Asian
Native American
Other – Please list:
What is your religious affiliation (check one):
Christian – Protestant
Christian – Catholic
Hindu
Buddhist
Not religious

Muslim
Jewish
Atheist
Agnostic
Other – Please list:

How would you characterize your hometown? (check one)
_____ rural (unincorporated)
_____ small town (village or town)
_____ suburban (metropolitan area of a large city)
_____ small city (population < 30,000)
_____ medium-sized city (population 30,000 – 100,000)
_____ large city (population > 100,000)
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Appendix G
Gun Control Essay
Individuals who support gun control argue that federal, state, and local gun crime prosecution
has increased by twenty-two percent since 1992, and over that time, crime has decreased by
thirty-five percent. Yet, stipulations to gun ownership should be added in order to maintain a safe
environment for citizens. It is not the gun that is being questioned, but the hand that pulls the
trigger. The United States has the highest rate of gun ownership and of gun homicide in the
developed world. Almost eight individuals aged 19 and under are killed each day by a firearm in
the United States. Firearms are the second leading cause of death for people 19 years and under.
In many neighborhoods, guns are accessible to children, the mentally ill and gang members. Not
only will homicide rates continue to decrease, gun control will decrease the rate of suicide as
well. Furthermore, mandatory child safety locks are needed. We should also require all
individuals to present a photo license I.D., consent to a background check, and complete a gun
safety test in order to buy a new handgun. A way to support more federal gun prosecutors is to
give states and communities another 10,000 prosecutors to fight gun crime. Stricter gun control
laws are the answer.

On the other hand, those who oppose gun control argue that we need to defend the constitutional
right to bear arms. Crime was lower when guns were easier to buy before 1968, when you could
buy a gun with no paperwork or waiting periods. Federal licensing of law-abiding gun owners
and national gun registration is a violation of the second amendment and an invasion of the
privacy of honest citizens. There are an estimated 80-100 million gun owners who have not
killed anyone. While one law guarantees the right to own guns, another amendment makes it
difficult for the common man in a crime-driven neighborhood to purchase a gun. For every
police officer, there are 1700 citizens that he or she has to protect. Unfortunately, police cannot
protect every individual, just the general public. Law-abiding citizens would be better equipped
to handle situations in which they find themselves face to face with criminals if they had freer
access to guns. Potential criminals would be scared away from home invasions and other types of
wrong-doing by the threat of a gun. Stricter gun control laws are not the answer.

164

Appendix H
Need for Cognition Scale
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you.
Please use the following scale:

1
extremely
uncharacteristic

2
somewhat
uncharacteristic

3
uncertain

4
somewhat
characteristic

5
extremely
characteristic

1.

I would prefer complex to simple problems.

2.

I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.

3.

Thinking is not my idea of fun.

4.

I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities.

5.

I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in
depth about something.

6.

I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.

7.

I only think as hard as I have to.

8.

I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.

9.

I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.

10.

The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

11.

I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.

12.

Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.

13.

I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.

14.

The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

15.

I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.

16.

I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental
effort.

17.

It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.

18. ______ I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
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Appendix I
Tax Increase Essay
Those who support tax increases argue that increased taxes lead to more money for the
maintenance of public property, military defense, enforcement of law and public order, and for
welfare and other public services such as education, healthcare, pensions for the elderly, and
unemployment. For example, increased spending on the maintenance of public property means
better roads, public transportation, and government facilities. Increased taxes would also mean
more people being hired to perform the work, which in turn leads to more people having the
ability to spend their earnings, thereby putting money back into the economy. Tax increases
benefit education as well. Better facilities and teacher salaries means an improved learning
environment and happier teachers. This will directly benefit the students, creating a better
educated youth that will lead to a more educated workforce which can only help the economy.
When taxes were first established, the poor were disproportionally taxed to support the rich, but
now taxes allow the government to help support the poor, disabled, and also military veterans.
The money from increasing taxes goes back into the services that aid our country’s citizens;
therefore, a tax increase could only benefit Americans.

On the other hand, those who oppose tax increases argue that a tax increase can only hurt United
States citizens further. The “rich” will not be the only ones affected. In fact, the tax increase
will hurt Americans at all income levels. A tax increase will eliminate all growth-promoting
policies from previous tax relief packages and will lead to slower economic growth. This lack of
spending will also cause a lowered standard of living in America. A tax increase will mean
fewer jobs and will keep those who would have otherwise found work unemployed. America is
already suffering from a high unemployment rate and now would be the least favorable time to
discourage citizens from taking part in the behaviors that will help improve the economy and
bring it out of its chronic downswing. Small businesses will also take a big hit with the tax
increase. These higher tax rates will discourage entrepreneurs and other individuals from
wanting to launch new businesses, therefore stifling what could be the next big industry. Tax
increases will only injure what is already a suffering economy; therefore, the government should
extend tax relief to its citizens as opposed to increasing taxes.
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Appendix J
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree with the statement on a scale
from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree).
1.

I don’t like situations that are uncertain.

2.

I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.

3.

I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.

4.

I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.

5.

I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.

6. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly.
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem
immediately.
10. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
11. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
15. I dislike unpredictable situations.
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Appendix K
Cognitive Flexibility Scale
The following statements deal with your beliefs and feelings about your own behavior. Read
each statement and respond by indicating the number that best represents your agreement with
each statement.
Strongly
Agree
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree
Strongly
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
6
5
4
3
2
1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) I can communicate an idea in many different ways.
2) I avoid new and unusual situations.
3) I feel like I never get to make decisions.
4) I can find workable solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.
5) I seldom have choices when deciding how to behave.
6) I am willing to work at creative solutions to problems.
7) In any given situation, I am able to act appropriately.
8) My behavior is a result of conscious decisions that I make.
9) I have many possible ways of behaving in any given situation.
10) I have difficulty using my knowledge on a given topic in real life situations.
11) I am willing to listen and consider alternatives for handling a problem.
12) I have the self-confidence necessary to try different ways of behaving.
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Appendix L
Environmental Preservation Essay
Some individuals feel that we need to take action to preserve our nation’s land. We need to work
now to preserve America’s untouched landscapes and to protect wildlife for future generations.
Our nation’s heritage is one of free, open, untouched landscapes – these beautiful areas are
increasingly threatened by encroaching development and unchecked expansion. We need to
oppose the clearing of old growth forests and the use of public lands as grazing areas for
livestock. In addition, mining and drilling cause significant and often irreversible damage to
public lands and the ecosystems they support, so we must advocate for more responsible and
renewable energy development. In order to protect America’s public lands and the wildlife they
support, we must act now. By working with scientists, lawyers, and developers, we can ensure
that public lands are managed appropriately and that those who violate environmental laws are
held accountable. If we do not work together to preserve our nation’s landscapes, waterways, and
wildlife, we risk losing them altogether.

Other individuals argue that it is imperative that we take action to make use of our nation’s land.
We need to work now to improve America’s troubled economy and to create jobs and homes for
future generations. Our nation’s heritage is one of seizing opportunity and working to improve
conditions instead of simply accepting them. In order to support a growing population with ever
increasing needs, our nation must expand its infrastructure and agricultural resources to meet the
growing demand. Clearing some public lands will allow us to grow more food, build more roads
and residential areas, and even make use of the plentiful energy resources such as coal and
natural gas that our country already has. Such expansion projects will mean more jobs for many
people who are currently unemployed, which will help individuals weather the economic crisis.
In addition, mining and drilling will reduce our nation’s dependence on foreign oil as an energy
source. If we do not work together to make use of our nation’s natural resources, we risk further
economic and international instability.
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